Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2008, decedent Grady Williams Stevens was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer and was given approximately four weeks to live. He began a strenuous regimen of pain medications to provide him relief during his last weeks, and his daughter, Sherry Ray, began caring for him at her home. On September 17, 2008, the decedent signed a will naming Ray as executrix and sole beneficiary and signed two deeds conveying certain real property to the decedent's brother, Propounder Thomas Stevens and his sister. The decedent died in October. The attorney who had prepared the decedent's will and the two deeds subsequently filed the will with the probate court. Ray never submitted the will for probate because she believed it to be the result of Propounder's undue influence over her father, that her father lacked the requisite mental capacity to understand what he was signing, and that her father would have wanted his estate, including the property he conveyed by the two deeds he signed before his death, to pass equally to her and her only sibling, Shane Stevens. Approximately nine months after the decedent died, Propounder submitted the will for probate and sought appointment as administrator of the estate. Ray and Shane Stevens filed caveats to the petition. Caveators claimed that Propounder Stevens exerted a predominant and undue influence on their father to induce him to sign the will and deeds and that their father lacked testamentary capacity at the time he signed the will because he was heavily medicated and possessed insufficient mental capacity. The probate court issued an order denying Propounder's petition to probate, finding that the decedent lacked testamentary capacity. Propounder appealed to the superior court, which denied Caveators' motion for summary judgment, finding that genuine issues of fact remained. Caveators then filed a motion to dismiss, contending that Propounder lacked standing to probate the will, which the court denied. After a bench trial, the court issued an order finding that the will was valid, the decedent did not lack testamentary capacity, and Propounder did not exert an undue influence over the decedent. After the court denied their motion for new trial, Caveators appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing, inter alia, that the court erred by denying their motion to dismiss for lack of standing. The Supreme Court found the Propounder did not have standing to offer the will for probate because he was not an "interested person" as required by OCGA 53-5-2. Accordingly, the Court reversed. View "Ray v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Appellant Louise Shorter Barzey challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions in the Workers' Compensation Act that precluded her, as a non-dependent parent, from recovering benefits for the death of her son, Deron Shorter, from his employer, the City of Cuthbert. Shorter was killed in 2010 while acting in the course of his employment with the City. He was 37 at the time of his death, was not married, and had no dependents. His mother Barzey was his only heir at law. After Shorter's death, Barzey filed a lawsuit against the City, seeking a judgment declaring that she has the right to sue the City. Barzey acknowledged that the Workers' Compensation Act provided the exclusive remedy of an employee's heirs for the employee's death during the course of his employment. She also acknowledged that the Act expressly said that the compensation for a deceased employee "shall be payable only to dependents and only during dependency." After its review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that the Act's limitation on the recovery of nondependent heirs did not violate Barzey's constitutional rights to due process and equal protection. View "Barzey v. City of Cuthbert" on Justia Law

Robert Haege died in 2006. Three months earlier, Haege made a will, in which he left his “personal assets” to his brother and sister, and in which he left his “business interests, both tangible and intangible, real or personal, connected to the business known as Traditional Fine Art, Ltd.” to his brother, sister, and two longtime employees. After Haege died, questions arose about the disposition of property associated with Traditional Fine Art, Ltd., insofar as Traditional Fine Art was a sole proprietorship and, therefore, had no legal existence separate and apart from Haege himself. The will was admitted to probate, and Sharon Haege England (sister) was appointed executrix of his estate. England failed to distribute any property to James Simmons and Elery Stinson, the two employees. The employees filed suit against England, seeking a declaratory judgment as to the meaning of the will with respect to the property associated with Traditional Fine Art. The trial court ruled in favor of England, concluding that, because Traditional Fine Art was only a sole proprietorship, the property associated with the business was merely the personal property of Haege. Simmons and Stinson appealed, and in a split decision, the Court of Appeals reversed. To the Supreme Court, England did not dispute the fundamental premise of the decision of the Court of Appeals, that a sole proprietor could separately dispose in his will of personal property connected with his sole proprietorship and his other personal property. Instead, England argued that Haege did not actually intend to separately dispose of any property associated with his sole proprietorship. Taking the will as a whole, the Supreme Court concluded that the most natural and reasonable understanding of the provisions of the will was that Haege left his personal property that amounted to "business interests . . . connected to the business known as Traditional Fine Art, Ltd." specifically including, but not limited to, membership certificates that he owned, to Simmons, Stinson, and his brother and sister, and he left all of his other personal property to his brother and sister alone. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "England v. Simmons" on Justia Law

Four children-beneficiaries to the estate of Evelyn Copelan contested her will. Appellants sought to probate a will in which their mother left almost her entire estate to them, leaving only one dollar each to the appellees. In turn, the appellees opposed the admission of the will to probate, claiming that their mother was without testamentary capacity when she executed the will, and asserting that their mother made the will under the undue influence of the appellants. The probate court admitted the will to probate, the appellees sought review in the superior court. Following a jury trial, the superior court entered a judgment for the appellees, denying the petition of the appellants to probate the will. The appellants sought the Supreme Court's review. But finding no reversible error in the superior court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Copelan v. Copelan" on Justia Law

O. Wayne Rollins established ten irrevocable trusts, the Rollins Children's Trust (RCT), and nine Subchapter S-trusts, each for the benefit of his nine grandchildren. Wayne's sons, Gary and Randall, and a close friend of the elder Rollins, Henry Tippie, were named trustees. In 2010, four of the nine beneficiaries of the S-trusts brought suit against the trustees alleging breach of trust and breach of fiduciary duty and seeking, among other things, an accounting of the family entities. The trial court awarded summary judgment to the trustees and refused to order a judicial accounting of the entities which held the trust assets. To this, the trial court noted, in part, that although the trustees failed to provide an accounting of the trust assets, plaintiffs ultimately received a report on trust assets and "complete relief" on their requests through discovery. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding: (1) plaintiffs were entitled to an accounting; (2) the trustees could be held to trustee-level fiduciary standards with regard to the family entities; and (3) genuine issues of material fact remained with regard to whether the trustees breached their fiduciary duties in administering the trusts. The issues this case presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the trial court should have ordered an accounting of the family entities; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred when it held that the appellants had trustee-level fiduciary duties. The Court answered 'yes' to both questions presented, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Rollins v. Rollins" on Justia Law

The testator's daughter challenges the propounder's petition to probate a copy of the testator's will. The Probate Court found that the propounder was unable to overcome the presumption that the testator intended to revoke the will created when the original will could not be found. Because there was evidence supporting the probate court's finding, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition to probate. View "Britt v. Sands" on Justia Law

Lonnie L. Michael died in 2010. He had executed a will in 2002. The original of that will could not be found. Nevertheless, Michael King Fitzgerald, who was named executor in the 2002 will, offered a copy of the will for probate in solemn form, requesting that it be admitted to probate upon proper proof. Danny Johnson, Michael Gwirtz, and Patricia Gwirtz, the Testator's heirs at law, filed a caveat, asserting that the 2002 will had been revoked by the Testator's subsequent destruction of it. After hearing evidence and argument, the probate court admitted the will to probate. Caveators appealed to the superior court, and the case was tried before a jury, which found in favor of the propounded will, which the trial court then admitted to probate in solemn form. After the denial of their motion for new trial, Caveators appealed to the Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Fitzgerald" on Justia Law

In May 2009, Hubert H. Johnson made a new will, in which he devised his most substantial asset (a 350-acre pecan farm) to Donna Ellis Burrell. He died a few weeks later, and Donna promptly filed a petition to probate the will. Two of his kin filed caveats, alleging that Donna had exerted undue influence upon Hubert with respect to the making of that will, and alleging that Donna had made false statements to Hubert, upon which he relied in making the will. The probate court awarded summary judgment to Donna, and the caveators appealed. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Johnson v. Burrell" on Justia Law

The remainder beneficiaries of the revocable marital trust created by the wife of Charles Howard Candler III sued Reliance Trust Company, co-trustee of the trust, for breach of trust. They alleged that after the death of the settlor, Reliance made improper distributions from the corpus of the trust to Mr. Candler, who was the life beneficiary. The remainder beneficiaries alleged these improper distributions significantly diminished the value of the trust and thereby damaged them in an amount equal to the improper distributions. The case was tried and the jury found that while Reliance did not act in bad faith, it otherwise found in favor of the remainder beneficiaries. The trial court entered final judgment on the verdict and also awarded the remainder beneficiaries pre-judgment interest, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Reliance petitioned for certiorari, contending that the Court of Appeals erred when it upheld the jury's verdict in favor of the remainder beneficiaries and when it affirmed the trial court's award of interest. Finding only that the remainder beneficiaries were entitled to interest on the damages awarded only from the state of the life beneficiary's death, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's award of interest. The case was remanded for recalculation of interest on damages, but otherwise affirmed the trial court in all other respects. View "Reliance Trust Co. v. Candler" on Justia Law

In consolidated cases, the Superior Court granted partial summary judgment to Joan Hasty Castleberry and denied summary judgment to her brother William Hasty, Jr., with respect to Joan's claims against her brother for his actions as executor of their parents' estate. Upon careful consideration of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision to award summary judgment to Joan on the question whether William acted under a conflict of interest simply by serving as Trustee of the Marital Trust while at the same time serving as co-chair of the Reinhardt Capital Campaign Committee. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Hasty v. Castleberry" on Justia Law