Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Huscusson died leaving three adult daughters as heirs of his estate: Tina Banner, Deborah Vandeford and Karen Nee. In his will, Huscusson specifically revoked his previous will, which had been executed in 2006 and had provided that Huscusson's daughters were to share equally in the estate. The 2012 will named Banner as executrix. It provided that Huscusson was "extremely disappointed" in Vandeford and Nee and that each of them was to receive a specific bequest in the amount of $10. Banner was not given a specific bequest. Vandeford and Nee filed a declaratory judgment action seeking an interpretation of the will. Following a hearing, the probate court determined that the will was plain and unambiguous; that it did not contain a residue clause; and that, therefore, the lapsed gift of the residue must pass by intestacy. Banner appealed and after review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Banner v. Vandeford" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted interlocutory appeal by caveators to determine the validity of the self-proving affidavit attached to the testator's will. The Court found that the affidavit did not substantially comply with the requirements of a self-proving affidavit under OCGA 53-4-24. Accordingly, the Court reversed the superior court's conclusion which held otherwise. View "Martina v. Elrod" on Justia Law

Barbara Ann Odom appealed a judgment that sustained a caveat to a will, entered after a jury found that the propounded will was invalid due to lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, fraud, or monomania. Finding no error in the trial court's conclusion, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Odom v. Hughes " on Justia Law

Appellants Lisa Norton and Beth Simmons filed a caveat to their father Charles Norton's will, claiming undue influence. The caveat was rejected, and the Supreme Court affirmed. Appellants then filed a declaratory judgment action to determine what effect the will's in terrorem clause had upon their rights under the will. The trial court found appellants had no rights under the will. Appellants challenged the trial court's finding, arguing that the clause in question was incorrectly interpreted, and though the clause may have eliminated their specific devises, it did not affect their ability to inherit under a residuary clause. Finding no misinterpretation in the trial court's decision, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Norton v. Norton" on Justia Law

In a previous case, the Supreme Court determined that Robert Emory White (Robert), Myron James White (Myron), and Gary Gerrard, Robert's attorney, were entitled to a writ of mandamus requiring the trial court to allow them to file notices of appeal in this case regarding the administration of the estates of Robert L. White and Florence L. White, who were once married. This appeal was the result of the grant of that mandamus relief. The primary issue on appeal in this case was whether the trial court correctly found that the proceeds from the sale of certain real property held by a trust created by Robert L. White should have been distributed wholly to Marvin Terry White (Terry). Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed: "Through various arguments in these related appeals, Robert and Myron [argued] that [the trustee] violated her fiduciary duties by asking the trial court to ratify the distribution of any Trust property to Terry and that, by doing so, the trial court misinterpreted the Trust. An analysis of the facts of this case and the language of the Trust indicate that the trial court did not err. Robert and Myron contend, nonetheless, that, because the Trust refers only to three named children at certain points and the surviving children at others with the use of different articles of speech, the Trust evinces an unequivocal intent by Robert L. White that only his three older children take under the Trust. It does not. At best, it creates an ambiguity, and, as pointed out above and in the trial court's order, the law favors the ascertainment of class members at the death of the settlor." With regard to any remaining claims, the Court found no error in the trial court's rulings. View "White v. Call" on Justia Law

Lou Ann Cassell inherited $220,000 from a relative. After consulting with advisors, she used the inherited funds to purchase a single-premium fixed annuity from National Life Insurance Company. Cassell was 65 years old at the time she purchased the annuity. The annuity agreement provided monthly annuity payments of $1,389.14, and guaranteed payments for 10 years regardless of when Cassell died, naming her children as beneficiaries should she die within the guaranteed payment period. Cassell was not authorized to withdraw any funds from the annuity, cancel the annuity, or change the payment terms of the agreement. She was authorized to assign the right to the annuity payments and to change the name of her beneficiaries during the guaranteed period. In May 2010, Cassell filed a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition in the Bankruptcy Court and included the annuity as an asset. However, she also listed the annuity as exempt property under OCGA 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E). The trustee objected, arguing the annuity payments did not meet two of the requirements necessary to qualify for the statutory exemption, specifically that the annuity was not funded by employment related wages or benefits and the payments due under the annuity were not "on account of age." The bankruptcy court disagreed and entered an order concluding that the two challenged requirements were met. It did not make a ruling with regard to the third requirement, that the payments be reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor or her dependents, because it concluded the parties had provided insufficient evidence pertaining to that issue. The United States District Court affirmed on appeal and remanded to the bankruptcy court for it to rule on the issue not addressed in its original order. Rather than litigate that issue in the bankruptcy court, the trustee conceded the annuity was reasonably necessary for the support of Cassell and appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. After briefing and oral argument by the parties, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the absence of precedent on the dispositive issues of state law and certified its questions to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) is a single-premium fixed annuity purchased with inherited funds an "annuity" for purposes of OCGA 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E); and (2) is a debtor's right to receive a payment from an annuity "on account of . . .age" for the purposes of OCGA 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E) if the annuity payments are subject to age-based federal tax treatment, if the annuitant purchased the annuity because of age, or if the annuity payments are calculated based on the age of the annuitant at the time the annuity was purchased. The Supreme Court found that a single-premium fixed annuity purchased with inherited funds may qualify as an exempt annuity under 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E) and that the determination of whether a right to receive payment from an annuity is "on account of" age for purposes of 44-13-100 (a) (2) (E) is not necessarily based on the existence of a single factor but requires consideration of a variety of factors pointing to the existence of a causal connection between the payee's age and the right to payment. View "Silliman v. Cassell" on Justia Law

In "Norman v. Gober,"(707 SE2d 98 (2011)), the Supreme Court considered whether eleven-year-old William Howard Norman had standing to challenge the will of his maternal grandmother, Margaret Scheer, because he was not an heir-at-law when his caveat was filed. The Court found that Norman lacked standing to challenge the will because he was not "a person who will be injured by probate of [the] [W]ill, or who will benefit by its not being probated." After this opinion was issued, the Co-Executors filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and served discovery requests on the other beneficiaries to ascertain the facts surrounding the caveat. The appellant beneficiaries filed a motion to dismiss the Co-Executors’ petition for failure to state a claim, arguing there was no uncertainty of law and therefore no justification to request a declaratory judgment. Specifically, Appellants contended that (1) the prior caveat filed by Norman, which was dismissed for lack of standing, was not an actual will contest, and, therefore, the in terrorem clause could not have been violated by anyone, even by attribution and (2) the rights of the parties had already accrued and no uncertainty remained requiring direction from the court. The probate court denied the motion to dismiss and later denied Appellants’ motion for reconsideration. Finding no error in the probate court's decisions, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Norman v. Gober" on Justia Law

Through interrogatories, a jury determined that David Keever, individually and in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Henry Keever, failed to prove that he had adversely possessed certain land whose record title was held by James R. Dellinger, Jr. and Frank Troutman. Specifically, the jury found that, although Keever had proven all other elements of adverse possession, he had failed to establish exclusive possession. Keever appealed, contending, among other things, that the trial court made improper evidentiary rulings. Finding no errors, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Keever v. Dellinger" on Justia Law

Eloise Collins died in 2006. In July 2007, Lydia Swain, Collins’ goddaughter, filed a petition to probate two instruments alleged to be Collins’ will: an unwitnessed letter written in 1999 detailing how Collins wanted her property distributed after her death and a partially filled-out commercial will form that, while properly witnessed, did not address distribution of property. A number of Collins’ first cousins (collectively, Lee) challenged the will and the trial court initially granted judgment on the pleadings in their favor, finding that the two documents could not form a valid will. Swain appealed and the Supreme Court held that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the two documents, considered together, created a valid will. On remand, a jury found that the two instruments were indeed “the true Last Will and Testament of Eloise Harley Collins.” Lee appealed, claiming that the trial court erred by failing to grant summary judgment or a directed verdict, improperly instructing the jury on the law regarding codicils, and refusing to include a number of requested instructions in its charge to the jury. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s verdict in favor of Swain. View "Lee v. Swain" on Justia Law

Caveator Lisa Patterson-Fowlkes appealed a superior court's denial of her motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the alternative, motion for a new trial, following the entry of a final judgment on a jury verdict which upheld the last will and testament of her grandmother, Ruth Chancey Wright ("Wright"). The sole challenge on appeal was that Wright lacked the capacity necessary to execute the will. Wright executed her will on November 1, 2005, when she was 90 years old. She died three years later. Wright's grandson and Patterson-Fowlkes's brother, Bobby Chancey ("Chancey ") petitioned to probate the will. Shortly after, Patterson-Fowlkes filed her caveat. The probate court denied the caveat and upheld the will. Patterson-Fowlkes appealed to the superior court, and the case was tried before a jury, which rendered a verdict upholding the will. After its review of the lower courts' records, the Supreme Court found that the execution of Wright's will was videotaped. Patterson-Fowlkes contended that Wright was unable to answer simple questions such as recalling her family members and identifying the property subject to the will. However, the videotape revealed that when asked, Wright immediately named her sister, brother, and sister's children. She further identified her two grandchildren to whom her property was bequeathed and even her great- grandchildren. Wright mistakenly claimed that she owned two separate 100-acre tracts that she purchased for Patterson-Fowlkes and Chancey. While this was inaccurate, when asked what she wanted to do with her land, Wright answered how she wanted the property disposed. The Court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to authorize the jury to find that Wright possessed the capacity to execute the will in question: "significantly, the jury viewed the videotape of the will's execution, which is a linchpin of Patterson-Fowlkes's challenge." Accordingly, the Court affirmed the superior court's to deny Patterson-Fowlkes' motions. View "Patterson-Fowlkes v. Chancey" on Justia Law