Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Andrea Brown Jacobs and several family members holding ownership interest in certain undeveloped real property filed a partition action in January 2006 after another family member, Mary Young, refused to sign a contract for the sale of the property. The parties entered into a consent writ of partition which provided for the sale of the property pursuant to OCGA 44-6-166.1. However, neither Young nor any other party in interest tendered the sums necessary to purchase petitioners' shares of the property. Mary Young then deeded her interest in the property to the Mary E. Young Revocable Trust and died one day later. In 2010, the case appeared on a pretrial calendar; the property not having been sold and there being no appearance by Young or anyone on her behalf, the trial court struck Young's pleadings, entered judgment in favor of the petitioners, and appointed three commissioners to conduct the sale of the property consistent with the requirements of OCGA 44-6-167 through 169. Because the property had not been sold and the owners of the property still were unable to reach an agreement with regard to its disposition, the court, believing that a mandated public sale would cause financial loss to all owners, amended its 2010 partition order to provide for the listing of the property with a particular broker with the terms of the sale to be established by a majority of the previously appointed commissioners. The 2010 judgment was quickly voided by the trial court after certain petitioners alleged counsel had acted without authority in seeking the partition order. In September 2011, petitioner Florence Brown through new counsel filed a motion for order for public sale. After a hearing on Brown's motion, the trial court entered an order for public sale and appointed three commissioners to conduct the sale. The sale was advertised and the property sold to the highest bidder. Appellant Jacobs appealed orders in Case No. S12A1340. In Case No. S12X1342, Brown filed across-appeal stating she was satisfied with the trial court's orders and was cross-appealing only to ensure the entire record was included on appeal. Because the Supreme Court found that all parties received proper notice of the partition action and in fact, agreed to the entry of a final consent judgment of partition which gave rise to the trial court's authority to order the public sale, the trial court's orders confirming the sale of the property and directing the parties and parties in interest to execute the deeds were affirmed. View "Jacobs v. Young" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals in "Glass v. Gates" to answer whether the definition of "any motor vehicle" in OCGA 33-24-51(a) continued to be the broader definition of the term provided for in prior case law, notwithstanding the 2002 passage of OCGA 36-92-1. As inmates at the Troup County Correctional facility, Jonathan Glass and Tony Smith were operating tractors when Smith's tractor got stuck in a ditch. Donrell Gates, Glass' detail supervisor, instructed the men to attach a chain to the tractors so Glass could use his tractor to pull Smith's from the ditch. As Glass did so, Smith engaged his tractor's bush hog, causing a rock to take flight and pierce Glass' throat. Glass bled profusely and died later that day. Plaintiffs, Glass' minor son and the executor of his estate, brought a wrongful death and survivor action against Troup County and Gates. The county sought summary judgment, claiming plaintiffs' claims were barred by sovereign immunity. The County asserted that by revising OCGA 33-24-51 (b) in 2002 (effective 2005), the legislature demonstrated its intent to apply the more narrow definition of "motor vehicle" found in OCGA 36-92-1 (6) in determining whether a local government waived sovereign immunity by purchasing liability insurance on a motor vehicle. The trial court agreed and granted summary judgment in favor of the County, concluding that the county did not waive sovereign immunity because neither a tractor nor a bush hog could be deemed a "motor vehicle" under OCGA 36-92-1. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the broader definition of "motor vehicle" should have been applied under 33-24-51, and that therefore, the County waived its sovereign immunity as long as it purchased insurance for the tractor and bush hog used by Smith. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals' reasoning, and affirmed by answering the appellate court's original question in the affirmative. View "Gates v. Glass" on Justia Law

Following trial, a jury declared that a Will and Revocable Trust executed by Thomas Hines, Sr. in 2002 were invalid as they were the product of undue influence. Steve and Deborah Davidson, executors of the Hines estate, appealed that ruling. The Davisons contended that the trial court erred in denying their motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence did not support the jury's finding. Furthermore, the Davidsons argued that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain evidence upon which the jury ultimately relied in reaching its decision. Finding no error nor abuse of discretion, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decisions and the jury's verdict. View "Davison v. Hines" on Justia Law

Appellant A.R. Mays, executor of the estate of decedent Gilbert Henry Kinchen, filed a petition to probate the decedent's will, and Appellee Katherine Rancine-Kinchen, the decedent’s widow, filed a caveat thereto. Appellant moved to dismiss the caveat. In its order resolving the motion to dismiss, the probate court granted the motion to dismiss in part by denying two counts raised by the caveat. The probate court declined to grant the remainder of the motion to dismiss when it allowed three counts of the caveat, which raised issues about a non-testamentary trust agreement that was referenced in the will, to remain pending. Because it concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to resolve the trust agreement issues, the probate court’s order transferred those issues to the superior court for resolution. Although it determined that appellee had not shown that the will was "incomplete" and "uncertain," the probate court nevertheless reserved admitting the will to probate until the trust issues were resolved by the superior court. It is from this order that Appellant directly appealed to the Supreme Court. Appellee moved to dismiss the appeal contending appellant failed to follow the correct appellate procedure. Finding that Appellee indeed did not follow the proper procedures, the Supreme Court dismissed the direct appeal. View "Mays v. Racine-Kinchen" on Justia Law

These cases arose from a declaratory judgment action filed by a trustee seeking to determine the effect of an in terrorem clause in an express trust. At issue was whether appeals that involved the proper interpretation of a trust provision came within the court's general appellate jurisdiction over "equity cases," Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. III(2), because the resolution of that legal issue would affect the administration of the trust. Consistent with the court's precedent on this question, the court concluded that such cases did not come within its equity jurisdiction. View "Durham v. Durham; Callaway v. Willard" on Justia Law

Appellant appealed from the probate court's ruling that OCGA 15-9-120(2) was not a special law in violation of Article III, Section VI, Paragraph IV(a) of the 1983 Georgia Constitution. The court held that OCGA 15-9-120(b) satisfied the elasticity requirement of a general law, and the probate court erred in construing section 15-9-120(2) to mean that a probate court always would have jurisdiction to hold jury trials once its county passed the population threshold, even if the county's population dropped below the threshold in a future census. It also erred in ruling that, so construed, the statute would not be a special law. However, the probate court reached the right result, and so its ruling that OCGA 15-9-120(2) was a constitutional general law could be affirmed under the right-for-any-reason doctrine. The court also held that the parties' arguments regarding whether a right to a jury trial was triggered when the lawsuit was filed or when they started trial were moot. Finally, the court held that appellee's demand for a jury trial was timely. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed. View "Ellis v. Johnson, et al." on Justia Law

This case arose from a trust dispute where appellants subsequently filed a petition for writ of mandamus to compel Judge Stephens to allow them to appeal from an order dismissing their appeal. The court held that appellants have shown that they have a clear legal right to file a direct appeal from the order dismissing their properly filed direct appeals from the June 7, 2011 order and that granting mandamus relief would not be nugatory because the notices of appeal from the June 7, 2011 order were proper and valid. However, in order for mandamus relief to be granted, appellants must also show that they have no alternative adequate remedy at law. In the present case, Judge Stephens has denied permission to appellants for them to file such an appeal. Therefore, as appellants were unable to obtain "judicial review of the judicial act in question, this case presents the unusual situation where mandamus is a viable means of seeking review of a judicial action." Therefore, the trial court erred in denying the mandamus petition, and the court directed the trial court to issue the writ of mandamus. View "Sotter v. Stephens; White, et al. v. Stephens" on Justia Law

The court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to consider whether that court erred in determining that the doctrine of res judicata barred plaintiff's "complaint for breach of contract" in this litigation involving the ultimate distribution of plaintiff's father's estate. The court concluded that res judicata was a bar to the present suit where plaintiff's restyling of her complaint in terms of a breach of contract theory of recovery did not revive her cause of action for fraud that was defeated on appeal from a summary judgment ruling. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Crowe v. Elder" on Justia Law

William J. Mason appealed the probate court's order denying his petition to probate the will of Frances E. Hobbs. At issue was whether the petitioner proved that the will was properly executed or that the signature to the will was in Mrs. Hobbs' handwriting. The court held that, because the trial court did not err in concluding that the petitioner failed to prove that the document was the will of Frances E. Hobbs, the judgment was affirmed.

Testatrix had four predeceased siblings, and Propounder and Caveator were two of five nieces and nephews who were Testatrix's heirs at law. Caveator appealed the probate court's order holding that Propounder carried her burden of proving that the proffered will was the last will and testament of Testatrix and that Testatrix possessed the required testamentary capacity to make a will at the time of execution. The court affirmed the order where Caveator failed to establish sufficient evidence to meet his burden of proof.