Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue central to consolidated appeals and cross-appeals was the question of whether property owners were violating a zoning ordinance by operating their property as an event venue. In 2010, East Beach residents began raising complaints to the community homeowners' association and local law enforcement regarding noise, traffic, and parking issues arising from events held at "Villa de Suenos." From that time, Glynn County police investigated more than 20 noise complaints related to the property, many resulting in the issuance of citations or warnings. The property was situated within a single-family residential zoning district classified as “R-6” under the Glynn County Zoning Ordinance. the trial court issued an order on December 20, 2013, adopting the County’s interpretation of its zoning ordinance and directing the owners, Thomas and Lee Burton, to comply with the ordinance, so interpreted, in their future use of the property. The court also denied the Burtons’ equal protection claim, finding that they had presented no evidence of other residential properties in Glynn County that were operated in the same manner as the Burtons’ property but were treated differently by the County. The Burtons appealed, challenging the trial court’s interpretation of the zoning ordinance and its rejection of their equal protection claim; the County cross-appealed, seeking to clarify the nature of the relief the trial court had granted. Subsequently, with the appeal and cross-appeal pending, the County filed a motion for contempt in the trial court, alleging that the Burtons were continuing to promote Villa de Suenos as an event venue and accept bookings for this purpose, in violation of the trial court’s order. Upon review of the arguments made on appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court properly found that the owners were violating the ordinance, and that the court properly issued a declaratory judgment to that effect. View "Burton v. Glynn County" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted a discretionary appeal of Elbert County, its Board of Commissioners, and the County Manager (collectively, “the County”) of a superior court order that, inter alia, granted a declaratory judgment to the effect that the Elbert County Solid Waste Disposal Ordinance was unconstitutional, denied the County’s motion to dismiss, and issued a writ of mandamus requiring the County to reasonably consider the site proposed by Sweet City Landfill, LLC and its members for a solid waste landfill. Taking each of the County's contentions of error in turn, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in its decision as to all. The case was remanded therefore for further proceedings. View "Elbert County v. Sweet City Landfill, LLC" on Justia Law

Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc., d/b/a Oasis, described itself as a "restaurant featuring nude dance entertainment and alcohol service." Oasis appealed to the Supreme Court "to preserve those two pillars of its business – nudity and alcohol." Oasis argued that when its employees dance nude and serve alcohol, they were "clothed with constitutional free speech protection," which the City of Doraville's Code of Ordinances attempted to strip away. Oasis argued that it should not have been subject to the Doraville Code at all because the legislation making its land a part of Doraville was void due to an alleged statutory notice defect, and that various portions of the Code were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court concluded Oasis was properly subject to Doraville's Code and that the City's regulations did not violate the club's constitutional rights. The Court affirmed the trial court's order granting Doraville judgment on the pleadings. View "Oasis Goodtime Emporium I, Inc. v. City of Doraville" on Justia Law

The issue this appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on a superior court's validation of roughly $200 million in municipal bonds (the "2014 NSP Bonds") that were to be issued by the Atlanta Development Authority d/b/a Invest Atlanta ("Invest Atlanta"). Invest Atlanta and the Geo. L. Smith II Georgia World Congress Center Authority (collectively, the "New Stadium Entities") proposed to have the 2014 NSP Bonds issued for the purpose of funding a portion of the cost of developing, constructing, and operating a new stadium facility in downtown Atlanta for the Atlanta Falcons professional football team. Additional funding for the NSP would have been provided by the Atlanta Falcons Stadium Company, LLC ("StadCo"), a company associated with the Atlanta Falcons Football Club, LLC, as well as through the sale of personal seat licenses. On February 4, 2014, the State filed a Petition for Bond Validation in the superior court to authorize the issuance of the 2014 NSP Bonds. Several individuals moved to intervene in the proceedings to file objections to the bond validation, and the trial court allowed them to do so. Among other things, the intervenors contended that OCGA 48-13-51 (a) (5) (B) was an unconstitutional special law. The trial court ultimately entered a Validation Order and Final Judgment validating the 2014 NSP Bonds and overruling all objections. One of the intervenors appealed that ruling. However, finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cottrell v. Atlanta Dev. Authority" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted appellant Paul Kanitra’s application to address whether, as a holdover member of the City of Greensboro Planning and Zoning Board (the “Board”), he could only be removed for cause or whether the City Council of the City of Greensboro had the authority to replace him with a successor without regard to cause. After review, the Supreme Court concluded (as did the trial court) that the City Council had authority to appoint someone to replace appellant without regard to cause. View "Kanitra v. City of Greensboro" on Justia Law

East Georgia Land and Development Company, LLC sued Newton County and several of its officers for a writ of mandamus, arguing that a zoning ordinance adopted by the County in May1985 was invalid. The trial court agreed that the zoning ordinance is invalid, it awarded summary judgment to East Georgia. The County appealed. The zoning ordinance at issue referred to (and purported to incorporate by reference) a set of maps identified in the ordinance as the "Official Zoning District Maps for Newton County." These maps are an integral part of the zoning ordinance. The only such maps that appeared in the record, however, were adopted by the County on July 2, 1985, and nothing in the record showed that those maps even were in existence in May 1985. "A map not yet in existence cannot have been 'made a public record' and certainly is not 'accessible to members of the public who are, or may be, affected by it.'" The trial court found, and as a result, concluded that the ordinance was void at the moment of its enactment. The Supreme Court saw no error in the findings of the trial court on this point, nor in its conclusion that the ordinance was void from its inception. View "Newton County v. East Georgia Land & Development Cp., LLC" on Justia Law

In 1954, Stiles Apartments, Inc. and the City of Athens entered into an agreement to create a drive-in parking area and new sidewalk on the western side of South Lumpkin Street in Athens. The purpose was to relieve traffic congestion due to cars parking parallel to the raised sidewalk along the street. Stiles Apartments paid all construction costs, and the public sidewalk was relocated onto its private property, and a parking lot was created that contained 22 spaces. About two thirds of each space lies on land owned by Stiles Apartments and the other third lies on what was the old public sidewalk. The agreement provided that the parking spaces and sidewalk will be maintained by the Unified Government of Athens-Clarke County. In 2003, Stiles' commercial tenants, including the now-closed Five Points Deli, began complaining about non-customers using the parking area, with some leaving their cars for days. Stiles Apartments attempted to tow the vehicles, but was forced to stop when its president, Barry Stiles, was threatened with arrest by the county attorney, William Berryman. Berryman took the position that the parking area was created for use by the public, not just Stiles' tenants, and therefore Stiles Apartments did not control who could park there. After losing several tenants due in part to the parking problems, Stiles sued the local government, asserting ownership over the parking area and asking the court to grant a temporary injunction and prohibit the city and county government from exercising any control over the spaces while the case was being litigated. Athens-Clarke County counterclaimed and following a hearing, the trial court issued an order granting the injunction against the government's attempt to assert control over the parking area. Athens-Clark County then appealed to the Supreme Court, and the Court upheld the temporary injunction. The question that still needed to be answered was whether the parties to the 1954 agreement intended to reserve public property rights in the land owned by Stiles Apartments. The trial court entered a final order, concluding that under the agreement, the parties did not intend for the parking area to be available to the public. The trial court noted it would be unlikely for a landowner to give up control over property for which it paid taxes. Athens-Clarke County appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, which found that according to the agreement signed 60 years ago by the local government and apartment complex, "the parties never intended that the parking area be kept open for the public." View "Unified Government of Athens-Clarke Co. v. Stiles Apartments, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2010, the City of Sandy Springs and two individual homeowners, John E. Balsam and Jerry Burnstein, filed suit against Fulton County, its Board of Commissioners, and its Director of Public Works. Sandy Springs sought a declaratory judgment, mandamus, and injunctive relief on whether Fulton County retained ownership of and responsibility for two drainage retention ponds and a dam located within Sandy Springs. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of Sandy Springs, and Fulton County appealed, contending that it was prohibited from maintaining the detention ponds pursuant to the Georgia constitution. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court found that Fulton County retained current ownership of and responsibility for the easements it held over the dam and retention ponds located in Sandy Springs. However, any concomitant responsibility continued only until the easements at issue were legally transferred, terminated, or prospectively abandoned. As a result, to the extent that the trial court's order could be read to indicate that Fulton County had to maintain the easements in perpetuity, the Court reversed. View "Fulton County v. City of Sandy Springs" on Justia Law

This case involved a dispute over title to a 7.63 acre parcel of land located in Bacon County. The parcel was originally part of a 95-acre parcel owned by H.S. Carter that was taken by Bacon County via eminent domain proceedings commenced in 1973. As a result of the condemnation proceedings, Bacon County acquired over 2500 acres for creating a public recreation project known as Lake Alma and the Carter parcel was just one of the parcels condemned for that purpose. The proposed Lake Alma was part of a larger urban development project so that the City of Alma and Bacon County could execute a development plan that included, among other things, an industrial park, a waste water treatment plant, and improvement of the local airport, in addition to construction of Lake Alma. The other projects were completed but the Lake Alma project was abandoned and never constructed. After the project was abandoned, at the request of the city and county, the General Assembly passed an amendment to OCGA 36-9-3 that permitted counties to sell back to the original owners land that had been acquired for development, but the legislation failed to provide for repurchase of land by the heirs of the original owners. By that time, H.S. Carter was deceased and his original parcel was one of the only parcels condemned for construction that was not repurchased by the original owner. In 2010, OCGA 36-9-3 was amended again to grant the heirs of the original landowners the right to repurchase the land. Heirs of H. S. Carter sought to repurchase the original 95-acre parcel. The City of Alma executed a quit claim deed to Bacon County conveying its undivided interest in the 95 acres and, that same day, Bacon County executed a quit claim deed conveying all of its undivided interest in the property to the heirs. The heirs then filed a petition to quiet title and for ejectment against Darling and Southeastern Maintenance with respect to the 7.63 acres. Darling asserted it was entitled to summary judgment with respect to the quiet title and claim for ejection because, as a result of the county’s previous conveyance of the disputed property to the Development Authority and the subsequent chain of conveyances by which Darling ultimately obtained title, the heirs did not have title to that property. Without addressing Darling’s bona fide purchaser argument, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the heirs along with a decree that title to the property vested in them and was superior to Darling’s claim of title. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in concluding that the heirs’ title was superior to that of Darling’s as a result of Bacon County’s failure to comply with the requirements of OCGA 36-9-2 with respect to a 2003 conveyance of its interest in the property to the Bacon County Development Authority. Furthermore, the trial court erred in finding the 2003 conveyance to Southeastern Maintenance was invalid as a result of the governing authorities’ failure to formulate a new economic development plan. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment to the Carter heirs was reversed and the decree establishing title was vacated. View "Darling International, Inc. v Carter" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an effort by Mortgage Alliance Corporation (“MAC”) a residential subdivision called "Silverstone." In August 2008, MAC sued the county and various county officials alleging, among other things, that an August 2006 letter to MAC from the county's sole commissioner, which said that the county's position was that any proposal to develop MAC's property as a subdivision would need to comply with a recent amendment to the county's land use ordinances, resulted in a taking of MAC's property without just compensation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the ground that MAC's complaint was untimely. The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted MAC's petition for certiorari. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this case was resolved on the ground that the August 2006 Letter was not a “decision” within the meaning of the applicable statute, and the county never made a final decision on MAC's Silverstone proposal. Consequently, MAC's inverse condemnation claim never ripened for judicial review, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment to the defendants on this ground. Although the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in concluding there was an appealable decision, they reached the right result, and therefore the Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Mortgage Alliance Corp. v. Pickens County" on Justia Law