Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Charmane Goins was convicted of malice murder in connection with the strangling death of Lauren Taylor. The trial court summarily denied his motion for new trial. In a prior appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the evidence presented at Appellant’s trial was legally sufficient to support his murder conviction, but it otherwise vacated the trial court’s order and remanded the case for the court to make factual findings and legal conclusions regarding Appellant’s claim that his constitutional right to a speedy trial was violated; the Supreme Court did not address his other claims. On remand, the trial court issued a detailed order rejecting the speedy trial claim, and again denying Appellant's motion for a new trial. On second appeal, Appellant raised the speedy trial claim, along with claims that the State failed to preserve allegedly exculpatory evidence and that the trial court erred by admitting evidence from his cell phone, by denying his motion for a mistrial, and by excluding evidence about the victim. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "Goins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Donnel Rawls was convicted of malice murder and feticide in connection with the killing of his pregnant girlfriend, Amber Beckwith. Appellant argued on appeal that his convictions were not supported by the evidence presented at his trial, that hearsay evidence of his prior abuse of Beckwith was improperly admitted, that the jury was improperly instructed on flight, and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Rawls v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Christopher Middleton was convicted by jury of felony murder for the shooting death of Wesley Bryant. Middleton contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, that the count of the indictment charging him with felony murder based on armed robbery was void because it did not allege the essential elements of armed robbery, and that the trial court erred in refusing to charge the jury on self-defense. Seeing no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "Middleton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Vincent Harris was convicted by jury of the malice murders of Tina Green-Hall and her six-year-old son, Jeremy Green-Hall. On appeal, Harris argued the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain evidence and committed plain error by failing to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding that evidence. Harris also contended his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in various respects. Seeing no reversible error after a review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "Harris v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Adrien Johns was seriously injured in August 2013 when the front brake on his Suzuki motorcycle failed suddenly. He sued the designer and manufacturer of the motorcycle, Suzuki Motor Corporation, and its wholly-owned subsidiary and American distributor, Suzuki Motor of America, Inc. (collectively, “Suzuki”), asserting a claim of strict products liability based on a design defect and two negligence claims (breach of a continuing duty to warn and negligent recall). Adrien’s wife, Gwen Johns, also sued Suzuki, alleging loss of consortium. At trial, the Johnses presented evidence showing that the brake failure of Adrien’s motorcycle was caused by a defect in the design of the front master brake cylinder that created a corrosive condition, which resulted in a “leak path” that misdirected the flow of brake fluid and caused the total brake failure. About two months after Adrien’s accident, Suzuki issued a recall notice warning about a safety defect in the front brake master cylinder. Suzuki had notice of the issue, including reports of similar accidents, for a significant amount of time before Adrien’s accident. Adrien admitted, that contrary to the instructions in the owner’s manual to replace the brake fluid every two years, he had not changed the fluid during the eight years he had owned the motorcycle. The jury found in favor of the Johnses on all claims. Because the damages after apportionment were less than the Johnses’ pretrial demand of $10 million, the trial court rejected the Johnses’ request for pre-judgment interest under OCGA 51-12-14 (a). The Johnses cross-appealed, arguing that because their claim was based on strict products liability, the trial court erred in reducing the damages awards based on OCGA 51-12-33 (a), and therefore also erred in failing to award them pre-judgment interest. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari review to decide whether OCGA 51-12-33 (a) applied to a strict products liability claim under OCGA 51-1-11. The Court of Appeals held that strict products liability claims were subject to such apportionment. To this, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed. View "Johns, et al. v. Suzuki Motor of America, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this matter to determine whether the trial court had jurisdiction to modify a sentence outside the one-year period after a sentence was imposed, as authorized under OCGA 17-10-1 (f), when the motion to modify was filed within the one-year period. The Court of Appeals held in Gray v. Georgia, 832 SE2d 857 (2019), that trial courts lacked jurisdiction after one year, irrespective of when the motion to modify sentence is filed. After the enactment of OCGA 17-10-1 (f) in 2001, despite the change in language from previous statutes, the Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals continued to follow the common-law rule as to motions filed within the term of court or before the statutory deadline. "The key question, then, is whether the addition of the word 'jurisdiction' to the statute’s grant of 'power and authority' to the trial court clearly overrides the common-law rule, and we conclude that it does not." Moreover, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals that the legislature rejected the common-law rule because the legislature did not expressly write the common-law rule into the current version of the statute. The Court, thus, concluded that the text of OCGA 17-10-1 (f) did not expressly or by necessary implication contravene the common-law rule, and the Court of Appeals erred in determining otherwise. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Gray v. Georgia" on Justia Law

When Lillie Mae Bedford died in 1997, she left a residential property in Marietta, Georgia by testamentary devise to her daughter, Jennifer Hood. Although the Bedford estate never made and delivered a deed to Hood to perfect a conveyance of legal title, Hood lived on the property for some time after the death of her mother, and she paid the taxes associated with it. But beginning in 2009, the taxes on the property were unpaid, and in 2013, the property was sold to Crippen & Lawrence Investment Co., Inc. at a tax sale. More than 12 months later, Crippen took steps to foreclose the statutory right of redemption, and Crippen gave Hood notice of foreclosure. Once the redemption period expired, Crippen petitioned for quiet title. Hood did not respond to the petition, but the Bedford estate appeared and moved to dismiss, asserting the estate was entitled to notice of the foreclosure, and had not been served with such notice. Crippen responded that the estate was not entitled to notice because the executor by his conduct had assented to the devise of the property, which by operation of law passed title to Hood notwithstanding that the estate had made and delivered no deed, and that the estate, therefore, no longer had any interest in the property. A special master of the trial court determined the estate was entitled to notice and dismissed the quiet title petition. Crippen appealed, but the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon further appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the appellate court: "assent may be presumed from legatee’s possession of the property. ... Although Crippen would not have standing to move a probate court to prospectively compel the executor of the Bedford estate to give assent that has been so far withheld, Crippen has standing in this quiet title proceeding to establish that the executor previously assented to the devise to Hood under the old Probate Code." View "Crippen & Lawrence Investment Co., Inc. v. A Tract of Land Being Known as 444 Lemon Street, et. al." on Justia Law

The federal Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Georgia Supreme Court. In it, the federal appellate court asked whether OCGA section 45-5-3.2 conflicted with the Georgia Constitution, Article VI, Section VII, Paragraph I(a) or any other provision of the state constitution. The question arose over Deborah Gonzalez's attempt to qualify for the November 3, 2020 general election for the office of district attorney for the Western Judicial Circuit after Ken Mauldin resigned from the office effective February 29. The Georgia Secretary of State determined that Gonzalez could not qualify for the November 2020 election for district attorney because, under OCGA 45-5-3.2 (a), there would not be an election for that position until November 2022 – the state-wide general election immediately prior to the expiration of the Governor’s future appointee’s term. Though the vacancy began more than six months before the scheduled November 2020 election, the Governor did not make an appointment in time to maintain that scheduled election pursuant to the provisions of the statute. In May 2020, Gonzalez and four other registered voters sued the Governor and the Secretary of State at the federal District Court for the Northern District of Georgia. Gonzalez alleged that OCGA 45-5-3.2 (a) violated Paragraph I (a) and moved for a preliminary injunction to mandate the Governor move forward with the November 2020 election for district attorney. The district court granted the request, finding Gonzalez would likely succeed on her federal due process claim because OGCA 45-5-3.2(a) conflicted with Paragraph I(a) and was therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court responded to the federal appellate court in the affirmative: the answer to the question was “yes” to the extent that OCGA 45-5-3.2 authorized a district attorney appointed by the Governor to serve beyond the remainder of the unexpired four-year term of the prior district attorney without an election as required by Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph I (a) of the Georgia Constitution of 1983. View "Kemp v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

Layton Lester was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Lorrine Bozeman. Bozeman, who lived in a house with her mother and who was fifteen-year-old Lester’s great aunt, received a large amount of cash that she was planning to use to buy a piece of property. On the evening of April 29, 2007, Lester was at co-indictee Shurrod Rich’s house. Rich’s brother was present and heard Lester suggest to Rich that they “go rob” Bozeman, telling Rich that they could get $5,000 from the robbery. Between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. on the same evening, Bozeman’s front door was kicked in and she was shot twice. Bozeman’s sister, Vernel Clay, who lived several houses away, heard the gunshots and saw two people running through her backyard afterwards. When Rich and Lester returned to Rich’s house, Rich’s brother observed that Lester had changed into black clothes, was breathing hard, was nervous, and later had cash to spend for food. Rich and Lester told Sean Ross, a friend of theirs who lived in the area, that they had robbed and shot Bozeman and that she had screamed. After Lester’s mother overheard Lester talking on the phone and noticed that he was acting nervous and scared, she grew concerned and approached law enforcement. The jury would find Lester guilty on all counts, and he was ultimately sentenced to life in prison for malice murder, a concurrent term of 20 years for armed robbery, and terms of 20 years for burglary to run consecutively to the murder sentence and 5 years for the firearm count to run consecutively to the burglary sentence. The felony-murder counts were vacated by operation of law. On appeal, Lester contends that the trial court erred in admitting statements he made to law enforcement after Bozeman’s death and in denying his “motion for mistrial” arising from the presence of an alternate juror during jury deliberations. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Lester v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Horace Coates appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Adrian Brooks and aggravated assault of Senchael Clements following an illicit drug purchase gone bad. In his sole enumeration of error on appeal, Coates contended the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Coates' convictions. View "Coates v. Georgia" on Justia Law