Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Summary judgment was awarded to Fulton County, Georgia on Sandra Ward-Poag’s civil whistleblower claims on the ground of judicial estoppel. Specifically, the superior court concluded judicial estoppel barred Ward-Poag’s claims because she took an inconsistent position regarding the nature of those claims when she failed to disclose her claims in her bankruptcy case, and then amended her bankruptcy petition to value her claims against the County as worth far less than alleged here. The Court of Appeals reversed the superior court’s decision, concluding that Ward-Poag’s amendment to her bankruptcy petition to list the claim in fact showed that she did not take an inconsistent position in the superior court. In making that determination, the Court of Appeals relied on its case law that created a bright-line rule that a party takes consistent positions, and thus lacks an intent to deceive the court system, when the party successfully amends a bankruptcy schedule to include a previously undisclosed asset. The Georgia Supreme Court disapproved the Court of Appeals’s analysis and its previous case law to the extent it created that bright-line rule, because "such rules have no place in the application of judicial estoppel." The Supreme Court nevertheless affirmed the Court of Appeals’s ultimate conclusion that the superior court abused its discretion in applying the doctrine at this procedural stage because there were genuine issues of material fact that precluded summary judgment to Fulton County. View "Fulton County v. Ward-Poag" on Justia Law

In 2017, Claude Wilson Geer IV filed a request with Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc. under the Open Records Act seeking the release of minutes of its board meetings held between January 2008 and December 2017. The following day, Phoebe Putney denied the request, asserting that it was not subject to the Open Records Act and that its minutes and other documents and records were not “public records” within the meaning of the Act. Geer filed suit against Phoebe Putney in superior court seeking an injunction compelling the release of the records he had requested and other relief. Along with its answer, Phoebe Putney filed a counterclaim for attorney fees under OCGA 50-18-73(b). In response, Geer filed a motion to strike Phoebe Putney’s counterclaim for attorney fees under Georgia’s anti-SLAPP statute, asserting that the counterclaim was nothing more than an effort to chill his rights to petition the government and to free speech. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Geer’s motion to strike, concluding that he had not made a prima facie showing that the anti-SLAPP statute applied to the counterclaim. The trial court did not consider the merits of Phoebe Putney’s claim for attorney fees. The Court of Appeals later affirmed the trial court’s judgment, concluding that the anti-SLAPP statute did not apply to an Open Records Act defendant’s claim for attorney fees because the anti-SLAPP statute “does not preclude a party defending a lawsuit from preserving its right to seek attorney fees and expenses if the lawsuit later is determined to lack substantial justification.” After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's judgment. View "Geer v. Phoebe Putney Health System, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2005, the Georgia Department of Community Health (Department) promulgated a rule, commonly known as the “Psychiatric Rule” (“the Rule”), that required hospitals to obtain a Certificate of Need (“CON”) “prior to the establishment of a new or the expansion of an existing acute care adult psychiatric and/or substance abuse inpatient program,” and defined “expansion” as “the addition of beds to an existing CON-authorized or grandfathered psychiatric and/or substance abuse inpatient program.” The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court's review centered on whether the Department could, through the Rule, require a licensed hospital with a psychiatric/substance-abuse program authorized by a CON, to obtain an additional CON to redistribute inpatient beds in excess of those identified in its CON to operate a psychiatric/substance-abuse program, but within its total licensed bed capacity. In UHS of Anchor, L.P. v. Department of Community Health, 830 SE2d 413 (2019), the Court of Appeals held that the Department could. The Supreme Court determined the appellate court erred in that conclusion, and reversed. "The General Assembly’s delegation of legislative authority to the Department to promulgate rules as part of its administration of the CON program does not include the authority to define additional new institutional health services requiring a CON, beyond those listed in OCGA 31-6-40 (a)." View "Premier Health Care Investments, LLC v. UHS of Anchor, LP" on Justia Law

Christopher Glenn’s petition for a writ of certiorari was granted for consideration of whether the Georgia Court of Appeals erred in affirming a trial court’s order revoking Glenn’s probation based on its determination by a preponderance of the evidence that Glenn committed felony interference with government property by kicking and damaging the door of a police car when he was detained inside. Glenn claimed he damaged the door in the court of exercising his common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest and detention; this claim was rejected by both the trial and appellate courts. On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court addressed: (1) whether a person has a common-law right to attempt to escape from the detention resulting from an unlawful arrest; and (2) if so, whether a person may damage government property in such an attempt. The Court held that the common-law right to resist an unlawful arrest includes the right to use proportionate force against government property to escape an unlawful detention following the arrest. Because the trial court found that Glenn’s arrest was unlawful but did not then consider whether the force he used in attempting to escape the ensuing unlawful detention was proportionate, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision with direction that the case be remanded to the trial court to make this "essential" determination. View "Glenn v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Brandon Cross was convicted in 2003 of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Debra Hymer. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred: (1) by declining to allow him to impeach the hearsay statements of his co-conspirator Jessica Cates; (2) by failing to charge the jury as to the burden of proof for co-conspirator statements; and (3) by admitting three autopsy photographs and a video recording of the crime scene. He also argued he should have been granted a new trial because the record was insufficiently comple View "Cross v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Andre Bridgewater was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shooting of Myron Short. Bridgewater appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that the trial court erred when it admitted the prior inconsistent statements of a witness. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bridgewater v. Georgia" on Justia Law

James Eggleston was tried by jury and convicted of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with Richard Byrd’s death. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Eggleston appealed, contending only that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Because the evidence was sufficient, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Eggleston v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Donald Griffin was convicted by jury of felony murder in connection with the stabbing death of Truitt Cheeley. Griffin appealed the denial of his motion for a new trial, contending that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence witness testimony about Griffin’s racism and Griffin’s custodial statement. Griffin also claimed his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective. Furthermore, Griffin contended the trial court erred in denying his request to cross-examine a witness who testified as to Cheeley’s reputation for peacefulness with evidence that Cheeley had been convicted of a crime of violence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Griffin v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Todd Welch was convicted by jury of murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Christopher Brown and the aggravated assault of Darrell Agee. Welch contended on appeal that the trial court erred by improperly admitting hearsay evidence under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing exception to the rule against hearsay, and erred by failing to give his requested jury instruction on grave suspicion. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the arguments Welch raised were without merit. However, the Court found it had to vacate Welch’s sentences as to Counts 10 and 20 of his indictment in order to correct sentencing errors that harmed him. View "Welch v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Patrick Satterfield was convicted by jury of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Richard Boynton. On appeal, Satterfield contended the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts and that his trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Satterfield v. Georgia" on Justia Law