Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

by
Appellant Contevious Stepp-McCommons appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2013 shooting death of Clarence Gardenhire. On appeal, Stepp-McCommons McCommons alleged the trial court erred in failing to give certain jury charges and that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err on the grounds raised by Stepp-McCommons and that he failed to establish his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, judgment was affirmed. View "Stepp-McCommons v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Appellant Aaron Strong was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault, and knife-possession offenses based on the fatal stabbing of his wife’s son, Maurice Arnold, and the stabbing of her grandson, Deandre Arnold. At his trial, Appellant claimed that he acted in self-defense. His main contention on appeal was that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted under OCGA 24-4- 404 (b) voluminous evidence of multiple other acts of violence that he allegedly committed. While the Georgia Supreme Court agreed the trial court did abuse its discretion by admitting that evidence, and because those evidentiary errors were not harmless, the Court reversed Appellant’s convictions. "[A]lthough the jury could have found Appellant guilty if it believed the State’s witnesses and disbelieved Appellant, we cannot say that it is highly probable that the trial court’s erroneous admission of the voluminous evidence that Appellant had previously committed multiple serious violent acts did not contribute to the guilty verdicts that the jury retuned." View "Strong v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Terrence Burney was tried by jury and found guilty of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the death of Joseph Kitchens. Burney appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence presented against him was insufficient to support the jury’s verdict on the malice murder charge; (2) the trial court erred by not conducting a hearing pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975); (3) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting testimony from the medical examiner as to the cause of the victim’s death; (4) he was denied his right to a speedy trial; and (5) he should be granted a new trial because a juror conducted internet research relevant to the case during deliberations. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Burney v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Shanika Dunbar was convicted by jury for the murder of Theron Robbins, and for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. On appeal, she contended the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support the verdict, the trial court erred by admitting an irrelevant AK-47 rifle into evidence, and the trial court erred by allowing testimony regarding the withdrawal of consent to search Dunbar’s home. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. View "Dunbar v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
In 2013 when he was 17 years old, Dantazias Raines was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for malice murder. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Raines' convictions and sentences in part, reversed Raines' convictions for misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer, and vacated his sentence in part. On remand, Raines filed a motion for a jury to make the requisite determination under Veal v. Georgia, 784 SE2d 403 (2016). The trial court denied his motion and certified its order for immediate review. The Supreme Court granted Raines' request for interlocutory review to consider whether a defendant facing a sentence of life without parole for an offense committed when he was a juvenile had a constitutional right to have a jury (as opposed to a judge) make the requisite determination of whether he was “irreparably corrupt” or “permanently incorrigible.” Raines argued in favor of having a jury make the determination prior to imposition of a LWOP sentence; the State argued a defendant did not have a right under the Sixth Amendment for the jury to make the "specific determination" outlined in Veal. The Supreme Court held a defendant convicted of committing murder as a juvenile did not have a federal constitutional right to have a jury determine, in accordance with Veal and the Sixth Amendment, whether he was irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible such that he may be sentenced to LWOP, thereby affirming the trial court. View "Raines v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
In the Fall of 2016, Lakenin Morris was driving his older cousin Keith Stroud’s car when he collided with a car driven by 18-year-old Alonzo Reid, sending Reid to the hospital. Morris had been drinking with Stroud, and Stroud asked Morris to drive his car and gave him the keys even though Morris was obviously drunk and Stroud knew that Morris was drunk, did not have a valid driver’s license, and had a habit of recklessness. Morris later pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI). Reid sued Morris for negligence and Stroud for negligent entrustment, and both were found liable for Reid’s injuries (Morris by default and Stroud by summary judgment). In a bench trial, the court awarded Reid more than $23,000 in compensatory damages, which the court apportioned equally between the two defendants, pursuant to the then-current version of the Georgia apportionment statute. The trial court also found that Morris and Stroud acted while under the influence of alcohol and further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that they acted in a manner that showed willful misconduct, malice, wantonness, and that “entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” Reid challenged the amount of punitive damages he received. The Georgia Supreme Court found OCGA 51-12-5.1(f) did not categorically bar an award of punitive damages against Stroud, because the term “active tort-feasor,” as used in the statute, was not necessarily limited to drunk drivers. The trial court therefore erred in finding that it was categorically prohibited from considering whether Stroud was an “active tort-feasor” for purposes of analyzing the appropriateness of punitive damages under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated in part the trial court’s judgment, and remanded the case for the trial court: (1) to determine whether Stroud was intoxicated to the degree that his judgment was substantially impaired and whether he was an “active tort-feasor” within the meaning of OCGA 51-12-5.1(f); and (2) if so, to set the amount of punitive damages to be awarded against Stroud. View "Reid v. Morris et al." on Justia Law

by
Appellant Olivia Smith appealed her 2017 convictions for felony murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of her husband, Cory Smith. Appellant argued the trial court erred in refusing to allow her expert witness to testify to out-of-court statements made by some of Appellant’s family members and in excluding documents reflecting Cory’s prior domestic violence against her. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed conviction. View "Smith v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Appellant Rickey Williams was convicted by jury in 2017 for felony murder for the shooting death of Lynett Karim. Williams contended the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on mutual combat and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
Appellant Damon Frazier was convicted of malice murder and related offenses arising out of the 2015 shooting death of Corey Echols. On appeal, Frazier contended the evidence against him was insufficient, the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b), and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a charge on a justification defense. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Frazier v. Georgia" on Justia Law

by
The Court of Appeals affirmed a superior court decision to certify a class action lawsuit against The Medical Center, Inc. ("TMC"). Class representatives were uninsured patients who received medical treatment from TMC and who claimed that TMC charged them unreasonable rates for their medical care, which rates TMC then used as a basis for filing hospital liens against any potential tort recovery by the patients. The Court of Appeals also ruled on the causes of action raised by the plaintiffs. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer three questions: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that class certification was proper; (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the denial of summary judgment for TMC on common law claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the denial of summary judgment to TMC on claims brought under the Georgia RICO Act. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred with regard to the first two questions, but not the third. Therefore, judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bowden v. The Medical Center" on Justia Law