Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Seth Joseph Brian Rouzan challenged his 2013 convictions for malice murder and another crime in connection with the shooting death of Joseph Williams, Jr. Appellant claimed: (1) the trial court applied the wrong legal test in admitting other-acts evidence; (2) committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury that an accomplice’s testimony was not sufficient to establish a fact unless corroborated; and (3) abused its discretion in denying his request to continue the hearing on his motion for new trial based on his motion-for-new-trial counsel’s admitted failure to prepare for the hearing. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in applying an obsolete legal standard to allow the State to introduce the other-acts evidence. Accordingly, the trial court’s judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for the trial court to apply the correct test under the current Evidence Code and to exercise its discretion on whether other-acts evidence should have been admitted. View "Rouzan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Cedric Newton, Jr. was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the 2010 fatal shooting of Udondra Hargrove. On appeal, Newton claimed the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress evidence of two out-of-court identifications. He also contended he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Newton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

At a 2004 trial, a jury found Appellant Mario Stinchcomb guilty of felony murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon in connection with the shooting death of Jakesha Young. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Stinchcomb’s convictions on direct appeal. In 2018, Stinchcomb filed an extraordinary motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, which the trial court denied without the benefit of an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court thereafter granted Stinchcomb’s application for discretionary appeal to consider whether the trial court erred by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing before ruling on his motion. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did err, and, accordingly, the Court vacated the order denying Stinchcomb’s motion and remanded this case for an evidentiary hearing. View "Stinchcomb v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Dextreion Shealey and his co-defendant Kelvin Hurston were found guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2016 gang-related shooting death of Daven Tucker. Appellant’s only contention on appeal of his conviction was that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding from evidence statements that his co-indictee Charles Lovelace made during Lovelace’s guilty plea hearing. Seeing no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Shealey v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Timmy Thompson was found guilty by jury of murder in connection with the death of his wife, Peggy Thompson. Peggy’s cause of death was determined to be blunt-force injuries to her head in conjunction with asphyxia, and her death was ruled a homicide. She had injuries to her head, face, scalp, neck, upper chest area, and arms consistent with blunt-force trauma and strangulation, but not consistent with a fall. Peggy’s injuries were determined to have been caused between one and four hours before her death. Oral and rectal buccal swabs collected from Peggy at the scene tested positive for male DNA matching Thompson. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) by allowing improper testimony regarding other alleged acts of violence committed by Thompson against his stepdaughter, stepson, and daughter to be admitted at trial; and (2) by not applying the rule of sequestration to these other-acts witnesses. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed judgment. View "Thompson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

InComm Financial Services issued pre-paid debit and credit cards under the “Vanilla VISA” brand to cardholders who use the cards to buy goods and services. Global Payments, Inc. was a financial data payment processor. Thieves purchased Vanilla VISA pre-paid debit and credit cards and used them to buy goods and services. Then, using certain merchants that were not the merchants who originally sold the goods and services, the thieves initiated counterfeit electronic “reversal transactions” – basically requests for refunds on behalf of the cardholders. Upon receiving the reversal transaction data from the merchants, Global relayed the data to the VISA network. The VISA network then submitted the reversal transaction data to InComm. InComm received the data, posted the reversal transactions to the cardholder accounts, and then issued credits to the merchants who, in turn, passed the credits on to the thieves holding the Vanilla VISA cards. The thieves then converted those credits (in excess of $1.5 million made over 3,600 transactions) to their use. InComm did not allege that Global participated in creating the counterfeit reversal transactions. InComm asserted that Global was liable for the losses InComm suffered as a consequence of those transactions because Global negligently supplied to the VISA network the data created by the reversal merchants. In support of its claim, InComm asserted that Global, as a payment processor, “had a duty to exercise reasonable care in supplying the VISA Network and its participants with the transactions initiated by the Reversal Merchants.” The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order dismissing InComm's negligent misrepresentation claim against Global. Global's petition for certiorari review was granted, and the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that because the allegations of the complaint showed that Global merely transmitted data concerning debit and credit card transactions without representing that the transactions were legitimate, the Court of Appeals erred, and the Supreme Court therefore reversed. View "Global Payments, Inc. v. InComm Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Shane Berryhill fainted and fell out of an 18-foot deer stand while hunting five days after undergoing major heart surgery. Plaintiffs Berryhill and his wife sued his surgeon, Dr. Dale Daly, and Savannah Cardiology (collectively “defendants”), claiming Daly’s negligent prescribing caused him to faint. The trial court instructed the jury on assumption of risk, and the jury returned a defense verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the instruction should not have been given. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and found there was at least slight evidence presented at trial to warrant the instruction: Berryhill knew he had just had major surgery for serious cardiac problems, and evidence (although contradicted) existed to show that he had been instructed not to engage in strenuous activity and not to lift more than ten pounds, bend, or stoop over for at least seven days after his procedure. Even though Berryhill was not informed of the specific risk of fainting, violating such explicit medical instructions immediately after major heart surgery "poses an obvious cardiovascular risk to which competent adults cannot blind themselves," and constituted the slight evidence needed here to warrant a jury instruction. Judgment was reversed. View "Daly v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Kristine Heath was convicted by jury of homicide by vehicle in the first degree based on reckless driving; homicide by vehicle in the second degree; five counts of serious injury by vehicle; and failure to stop at a stop sign. The Court of Appeals reversed Heath’s convictions, except for the stop sign conviction, after concluding that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to demur to the fatally defective felony counts in the indictment. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for certiorari to consider whether trial counsel's failure to file a general demurrer resulted in prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Supreme Court determined Heath demonstrated prejudice under Strickland, thus affirming the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's denial of Heath's motion for a new trial as to the vehicular homicide and serious-injury-by-vehicle convictions. View "Georgia v. Heath" on Justia Law

Donnie Rowe, Jr. was accused of double murder during a prison escape. In the pending death penalty prosecution of Rowe, the trial court directed that all records of visits from Rowe’s defense team to various prisoners be placed under seal in the legal department of the Department of Corrections, rather than being maintained in the individual inmates’ files. The DOC argued that order was void because the trial court lacked the inherent authority or personal or subject matter jurisdiction to issue it and because, even if the trial court had the authority to do so, issuing it constituted an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the Georgia Supreme Court directed the parties to evaluate whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction in light of OCGA 5-7-1 limiting appeals by "the State of Georgia" in "criminal cases." The Court ultimately concluded it had jurisdiction over this appeal, and affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's order at issue. "While we conclude that the trial court had the authority to address the matter at issue here, we also conclude that the scope of the trial court’s order is nonetheless subject to review for an abuse of discretion. ... ordering the removal of the records from their usual place to the legal office was unnecessary, when the key issue was controlling the persons who were entitled to examine them. Instead, the trial court should have ... ordered the prison officials not to disclose any of the relevant visitation records to the prosecuting attorney or the prosecution team or to any person whose access to the records is not reasonably justified." View "Georgia v. Rowe" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia certified three questions to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the scope of the Georgia Dealers in Agricultural Products Act, Ga. L. 1956, p. 617 (codified as amended at OCGA sections 2-9-1 to 2-9-16) (“the Act”). At issue was the effect of the Act’s provisions upon contracts entered into by an agricultural products dealer that failed to obtain a license from the Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture: in this case, a contract entered into between San Miguel Produce, Inc. (“San Miguel”), a California corporation, and L. G. Herndon Jr. Farms, Inc. (“Herndon Farms”), a Georgia corporation. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) an entity as described by the district court did qualify as a dealer in agricultural products under the Act and was not exempt under OCGA 2-9-15 (a) (1), with the limited exception of specific transactions “in the sale of agricultural products grown by [itself];” (2) the Act’s licensing requirements were part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme in the public interest and not merely a revenue measure; and (3) if a dealer has failed to obtain a license as required by OCGA 2-9-2, it may not recover under a contract to the extent that the contract relates to business coming within the terms of the Act. View "San Miguel Produce, Inc. v. L.G. Herndon, Jr. Farms, Inc." on Justia Law