Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant James Hampton was tried with Dwayne Abney and convicted of three counts of malice murder and several other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Kiana Marshall, Isaiah Martin, and Alexis Kitchens. Marshall's former roommate, Diamond Butler, asked Appellant to help her move out of Marshall's home. Butler could not fit all of her belongings into Appellant's car; appellant asked Butler whether she wanted him to shoot up the house. Appellant told Butler he had "killed all three of them." Abney was arrested following a traffic stop; appellant was found and arrested the next day. On appeal, Appellant contended the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay testimony of a jailhouse informant and by excluding the testimony of Appellant’s proposed alibi witness. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hampton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Antione Hood was convicted by jury of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Candace McGriff. Hood appealed, contending that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to consult a certain expert on gunshot and gunpowder residue. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Hood's convictions. View "Hood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant, Warden Glen Johnson, challenged a habeas court’s order setting aside Larry Williams’ convictions for four counts of armed robbery, one count of terroristic threats, and one count of using a hoax device. In its order granting habeas relief, the court determined that Williams received ineffective assistance when his appellate counsel failed to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel (1) during the plea bargaining process and (2) in failing to object to improper character evidence. The habeas court determined that because the evidence presented against Williams at trial was not strong, and the only witness identifying Williams was an officer who did not see Williams commit the robbery; the officer's testimony insinuated that Williams was a repeat offender and was harmful. The habeas court went on to find that had the issue been raised on appeal, there was a reasonable probability that Williams would have been granted a new trial, asserting that, under former OCGA 24-9-20 (b), bad character evidence was disallowed against a defendant unless the defendant testified, and Williams did not do so. For these reasons, the habeas court granted Williams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of both claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Having reviewed the record, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the habeas court erred. The Supreme Court concluded Williams could not show the outcome of the plea process would have been more favorable to him had he received different legal advice from his trial counsel. And contrary to the habeas court's conclusions, the Supreme Court determined Williams could not show as a threshold matter that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the officer’s testimony on the basis that it included harmful character evidence or that such objection would have been sustained. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the habeas court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Williams" on Justia Law

Monique Sullivan was convicted by jury of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault in connection with the death of Amelia Hiltz; the aggravated assaults of Maureen Floyd and Kevin Mollenhauer; reckless conduct in regard to Grayson Tucker and Olden Ganus; cruelty to children in the second degree in regard to Sullivan’s son, J.S.; and three traffic offenses. Sullivan’s Suburban sped up and continued traveling the wrong way in the left eastbound lane of Riverwatch Parkway. The path taken by the Suburban forced four drivers, including Grayson Tucker and Olden Ganus, to swerve from the left lane into the right lane in order to avoid a head-on collision. Those drivers testified that the Suburban did not slow down, swerve, switch lanes, or engage in any other evasive maneuvers to warn or avoid colliding with other vehicles. After passing those four vehicles, Sullivan’s Suburban entered a sharp curve near Eisenhower Park. At the time, three other vehicles were entering the curve heading eastbound. The Suburban collided head-on with a van being driven by Amelia Hiltz and was then propelled about five to six feet into the air above the guardrail to the right. The Suburban landed on the guardrail and started bouncing, before flipping back over into the eastbound lanes of Riverwatch Parkway. Hiltz’s vehicle suffered significant damage and was pushed into the right shoulder of the eastbound side of the road. As the Suburban lay flipped over, vehicles driven by Kevin Mollenhauer and Maureen Floyd collided with it. No information was given as to why Sullivan was driving on Riverwatch Parkway. Sullivan appealed her conviction, arguing: the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts with regard to the felony murder of Hiltz and the aggravated assaults of Floyd and Mollenhauer; the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on accident; the court erred in preventing Sullivan from presenting evidence that she did not suffer from any mental illness; and erred in permitting the State to introduce inadmissible hearsay. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sullivan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Vashon Walker challenged his 2016 conviction for felony murder for the shooting death of his girlfriend, Jessica Osborne. He contended that the evidence was legally insufficient, that the trial court erred in admitting a shell casing and related photographs in violation of his constitutional right to confront his accusers, and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. Finding no merit to these contentions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed judgment of conviction. View "Walker v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Anderson Carson was tried by jury and convicted of the malice murder of Lee Solkol, and the robbery by force of Fred Hickson. On appeal, Carson argued the trial court erred by: (1) denying his motion to sever; (2) appearing to assist the State in its prosecution by recommending that the State procure material witness warrants; (3) permitting the introduction into evidence of Carson’s prior conviction for aggravated assault; (4) allowing the State to introduce into evidence a booking photograph without providing the photograph to the defense in accordance with the State’s discovery obligations; (5) denying his motion to exclude his statements to a police detective; (6) denying his motion to suppress; and (7) failing to strike a prospective juror for cause. Carson also argued the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Carson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2014, Appellant Charles Mahaffey entered negotiated guilty pleas to felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the stabbing death of Christopher Reynolds. Appellant later challenged the trial court’s order denying his timely motion to withdraw his pleas, contending that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily plead guilty. The Georgia Supreme Court determined that the trial court record as a whole supported the conclusion that Appellant was advised of his pertinent constitutional rights, that he understood those rights and the consequences of waiving them, and that he then knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered his guilty pleas. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s motion to withdraw his pleas. View "Mahaffey v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In June 2018, Appellants Mary Jackson and her non-profit organization, Reaching Our Sisters Everywhere, Inc. (“ROSE”), filed a complaint against the Secretary of State challenging the constitutionality of the Georgia Lactation Consultant Practice Act (the “Act”), which prohibited the practice of “lactation care and services” for compensation without a license from the Secretary of State. Specifically, Appellants alleged that, under the Act, they were ineligible for a license because they lacked a privately issued credential that the Act required for licensure, even though they had other private credentials that made them equally competent to provide lactation care and services and pose no risk of harm to the public. Accordingly, they argue that the Act violates their rights to due process and equal protection under the Georgia Constitution. The trial court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Specifically, the trial court ruled that Appellants failed to state a claim that the Act violated due process, because the Georgia Constitution did not recognize a right to work in one’s chosen profession, and that Appellants failed to state a claim that the Act violated equal protection, because the complaint did not sufficiently allege that Appellants were similarly situated to those who are able to obtain a license. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with Appellants that the trial court erred in both rulings. "We have long interpreted the Georgia Constitution as protecting a right to work in one’s chosen profession free from unreasonable government interference. And the trial court erred in concluding that the Appellants are not similarly situated to lactation consultants who can be licensed because, according to the allegations in the complaint, they do the same work." Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment and remanded with direction to the trial court to reconsider the motion to dismiss. View "Jackson v. Raffensperger" on Justia Law

After approximately ten years of litigation, the Georgia Supreme Court granted a second petition for certiorari in a dispute over the refund of millions of dollars in Georgia sales and use taxes that allegedly violated a federal statute. In 2010, New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC and three other AT&T Mobility subsidiaries (collectively, “AT&T”) filed refund claims with the Georgia Department of Revenue seeking the return of the sales and use taxes that AT&T had collected from its customers and turned over to the Department. In 2015, the Department denied the claims, and AT&T filed a complaint in DeKalb County Superior Court to compel the refunds. In 2016, the trial court dismissed the complaint on grounds: (1) a Georgia regulation required “dealers” like AT&T to return the sums collected from their customers before applying to the Department for a refund of the illegal taxes; (2) AT&T lacked standing to seek refunds of taxes for periods prior to May 5, 2009, the effective date of the General Assembly’s amendment to the refund statutes to allow dealers to seek refunds on behalf of their customers; and (3) AT&T’s claims amounted to a class action barred by the refund statutes. In its first certiorari review, the Georgia Supreme Court reversed that ruling, holding that the regulation, as properly construed, did not require dealers to return the sums collected before applying for a refund. On remand, the Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling that AT&T lacked standing to seek refunds for periods prior to the effective date of the 2009 amendments to the refund statutes allowing dealers to seek refunds on behalf of their customers. The issue presented in the second petition for certiorari review was whether plaintiffs lacked standing to file the refund claims. The Supreme Court determined AT&T was statutorily granted representational standing to recover wrongfully paid sums on behalf of and for the benefit of its customers. To the extent, therefore, that the Court of Appeals held that AT&T lacked standing to file a claim on behalf of its customers for any taxes for periods before May 5, 2009, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was erroneous and had to be reversed. View "New Cingular Wireless PCS, LLC v. Dept. of Revenue" on Justia Law

Joshua Brumbelow petitioned the Superior Court of Habersham County to legitimate his biological son, E.M. The superior court denied the petition, concluding that, under In re Eason, 358 SE2d 459 (1987), Brumbelow had abandoned his opportunity interest to pursue a relationship with his son. Brumbelow appealed to the Georgia Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred in finding that he had abandoned his opportunity interest. The Court of Appeals agreed and reversed the trial court. The Court of Appeals further remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether Brumbelow’s legitimation petition should be granted based on Brumbelow being a fit parent for E.M., instead of being evaluated under the best interests of the child standard. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the superior court’s decision that Brumbelow had abandoned his opportunity interest to pursue a relationship with his son; and (2) if not, whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that Brumbelow’s legitimation petition should have been assessed on remand under the parental fitness standard rather than the best interests of the child standard. The Supreme Court determined that, because evidence supported the superior court’s finding that Brumbelow abandoned his opportunity interest, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in denying the legitimation petition. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals erred in its decision on that issue, and the Supreme Court reversed that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment. With respect to the second question, the Supreme Court concluded that the portion of the Court of Appeals’ opinion relating to the standard that had to be applied to assess a biological father’s right to custody of his child in a legitimation action should be viewed as dicta only. View "Mathenia v. Brumbelow" on Justia Law