Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013 when he was 17 years old, Dantazias Raines was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for malice murder. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Raines' convictions and sentences in part, reversed Raines' convictions for misdemeanor obstruction of a police officer, and vacated his sentence in part. On remand, Raines filed a motion for a jury to make the requisite determination under Veal v. Georgia, 784 SE2d 403 (2016). The trial court denied his motion and certified its order for immediate review. The Supreme Court granted Raines' request for interlocutory review to consider whether a defendant facing a sentence of life without parole for an offense committed when he was a juvenile had a constitutional right to have a jury (as opposed to a judge) make the requisite determination of whether he was “irreparably corrupt” or “permanently incorrigible.” Raines argued in favor of having a jury make the determination prior to imposition of a LWOP sentence; the State argued a defendant did not have a right under the Sixth Amendment for the jury to make the "specific determination" outlined in Veal. The Supreme Court held a defendant convicted of committing murder as a juvenile did not have a federal constitutional right to have a jury determine, in accordance with Veal and the Sixth Amendment, whether he was irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible such that he may be sentenced to LWOP, thereby affirming the trial court. View "Raines v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In the Fall of 2016, Lakenin Morris was driving his older cousin Keith Stroud’s car when he collided with a car driven by 18-year-old Alonzo Reid, sending Reid to the hospital. Morris had been drinking with Stroud, and Stroud asked Morris to drive his car and gave him the keys even though Morris was obviously drunk and Stroud knew that Morris was drunk, did not have a valid driver’s license, and had a habit of recklessness. Morris later pled guilty to driving under the influence (DUI). Reid sued Morris for negligence and Stroud for negligent entrustment, and both were found liable for Reid’s injuries (Morris by default and Stroud by summary judgment). In a bench trial, the court awarded Reid more than $23,000 in compensatory damages, which the court apportioned equally between the two defendants, pursuant to the then-current version of the Georgia apportionment statute. The trial court also found that Morris and Stroud acted while under the influence of alcohol and further found, by clear and convincing evidence, that they acted in a manner that showed willful misconduct, malice, wantonness, and that “entire want of care which would raise the presumption of conscious indifference to consequences.” Reid challenged the amount of punitive damages he received. The Georgia Supreme Court found OCGA 51-12-5.1(f) did not categorically bar an award of punitive damages against Stroud, because the term “active tort-feasor,” as used in the statute, was not necessarily limited to drunk drivers. The trial court therefore erred in finding that it was categorically prohibited from considering whether Stroud was an “active tort-feasor” for purposes of analyzing the appropriateness of punitive damages under the facts of this case. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated in part the trial court’s judgment, and remanded the case for the trial court: (1) to determine whether Stroud was intoxicated to the degree that his judgment was substantially impaired and whether he was an “active tort-feasor” within the meaning of OCGA 51-12-5.1(f); and (2) if so, to set the amount of punitive damages to be awarded against Stroud. View "Reid v. Morris et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Olivia Smith appealed her 2017 convictions for felony murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of her husband, Cory Smith. Appellant argued the trial court erred in refusing to allow her expert witness to testify to out-of-court statements made by some of Appellant’s family members and in excluding documents reflecting Cory’s prior domestic violence against her. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed conviction. View "Smith v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Rickey Williams was convicted by jury in 2017 for felony murder for the shooting death of Lynett Karim. Williams contended the trial court erred in denying his request to instruct the jury on mutual combat and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the conviction. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Damon Frazier was convicted of malice murder and related offenses arising out of the 2015 shooting death of Corey Echols. On appeal, Frazier contended the evidence against him was insufficient, the trial court erred by allowing the State to present evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b), and that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a charge on a justification defense. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Frazier v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed a superior court decision to certify a class action lawsuit against The Medical Center, Inc. ("TMC"). Class representatives were uninsured patients who received medical treatment from TMC and who claimed that TMC charged them unreasonable rates for their medical care, which rates TMC then used as a basis for filing hospital liens against any potential tort recovery by the patients. The Court of Appeals also ruled on the causes of action raised by the plaintiffs. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer three questions: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in its determination that class certification was proper; (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the denial of summary judgment for TMC on common law claims of fraud and negligent misrepresentation; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the denial of summary judgment to TMC on claims brought under the Georgia RICO Act. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred with regard to the first two questions, but not the third. Therefore, judgment was reversed in part, affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bowden v. The Medical Center" on Justia Law

Warden Dennis Nelson challenged the habeas court’s order setting aside Morocco Jacobi Wilkey’s conviction for one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, to which he pled guilty. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the habeas court’s findings of fact regarding Wilkey’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, namely, that Wilkey desired to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing but was not informed by counsel of his absolute statutory right to do so under OCGA 17- 7-93 (b) and that trial counsel failed to give him the benefit of new advice stemming from information learned between the entry of the plea and the sentencing hearing, were supported by the record. The Court also determined that such findings supported the conclusion that Wilkey was deprived of his right under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution to the effective assistance of counsel. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the habeas court’s determination that Wilkey was entitled to habeas relief on this basis. View "Nelson v. Wilkey" on Justia Law

Terrance Medina was indicted for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder (Count 2), aggravated assault (Count 3), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4) in connection with the July 20, 2015, shooting death of James Thornton. The jury reached a verdict as to malice murder but was deadlocked on the remaining counts. The parties and the trial court agreed to a mistrial on all counts. Before the trial court actually declared the mistrial, however, it instructed the jury to disclose its verdict. When the jury reported its not guilty verdict on the malice murder count and the judge read it in open court, all of the requirements for formally returning a verdict on that count were fulfilled and the verdict became effective. The trial court then purported to declare a mistrial on all counts, including malice murder. But the mistrial was not effective as to the malice murder count. Double jeopardy thus precluded retrial on that count, although retrial was permissible on the felony murder, aggravated assault, and firearm possession counts. The Georgia Supreme Court found: (1) the record did not show the jury's verdict on Count 1 must have been based on a finding that Medina acted in self-defense; (2) the jury also could rationally have found Medina not guilty of malice murder based on a conclusion that the evidence did not prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt, while being undecided on the different issue of whether the evidence proved the general intent to inflict injury needed for aggravated assault (Count 2), which was the predicate for the felony murder count (Count 3) and one of the predicates for the charge of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 4). The Court concluded Medina failed to carry his burden of establishing that the jury necessarily determined that he acted in self-defense. Consequently, he could be retried on Counts 2, 3, and 4. View "Medina v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In a discretionary appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether the superior court erred in dismissing Marcus Tumlinson's petition for pre-trial habeas relief without considering the merits of his claims or holding a hearing. Because the record showed Tumlinson exhausted his efforts to seek an interlocutory review of the trial court’s order denying him bond in this case, and because he had no other adequate remedy for meaningful review of the lawfulness of his continued detention, the habeas court erred in concluding that it lacked the authority to consider the merits of Tumlinson’s petition for pre-trial habeas relief on this basis. The Supreme Court therefore remanded this case and directed the habeas court to consider Tumlinson’s petition and any exhibits, and if necessary, to conduct a hearing. View "Tumlinson v. Dix" on Justia Law

Michael Dobbins was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Hollis Boddie. On appeal, Dobbins contended: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred by failing to grant Dobbins’s motion for mistrial, to rebuke the prosecutor, or to give a curative instruction when the prosecutor referenced Dobbins’s “previous trial” before the jury; and (3) that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance by failing to provide written notice of her intent to use a prior conviction of one of the State’s witnesses for impeachment purposes. Seeing no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Dobbins v. Georgia" on Justia Law