Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Timmy Thompson was found guilty by jury of murder in connection with the death of his wife, Peggy Thompson. Peggy’s cause of death was determined to be blunt-force injuries to her head in conjunction with asphyxia, and her death was ruled a homicide. She had injuries to her head, face, scalp, neck, upper chest area, and arms consistent with blunt-force trauma and strangulation, but not consistent with a fall. Peggy’s injuries were determined to have been caused between one and four hours before her death. Oral and rectal buccal swabs collected from Peggy at the scene tested positive for male DNA matching Thompson. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred by: (1) by allowing improper testimony regarding other alleged acts of violence committed by Thompson against his stepdaughter, stepson, and daughter to be admitted at trial; and (2) by not applying the rule of sequestration to these other-acts witnesses. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed judgment. View "Thompson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

InComm Financial Services issued pre-paid debit and credit cards under the “Vanilla VISA” brand to cardholders who use the cards to buy goods and services. Global Payments, Inc. was a financial data payment processor. Thieves purchased Vanilla VISA pre-paid debit and credit cards and used them to buy goods and services. Then, using certain merchants that were not the merchants who originally sold the goods and services, the thieves initiated counterfeit electronic “reversal transactions” – basically requests for refunds on behalf of the cardholders. Upon receiving the reversal transaction data from the merchants, Global relayed the data to the VISA network. The VISA network then submitted the reversal transaction data to InComm. InComm received the data, posted the reversal transactions to the cardholder accounts, and then issued credits to the merchants who, in turn, passed the credits on to the thieves holding the Vanilla VISA cards. The thieves then converted those credits (in excess of $1.5 million made over 3,600 transactions) to their use. InComm did not allege that Global participated in creating the counterfeit reversal transactions. InComm asserted that Global was liable for the losses InComm suffered as a consequence of those transactions because Global negligently supplied to the VISA network the data created by the reversal merchants. In support of its claim, InComm asserted that Global, as a payment processor, “had a duty to exercise reasonable care in supplying the VISA Network and its participants with the transactions initiated by the Reversal Merchants.” The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order dismissing InComm's negligent misrepresentation claim against Global. Global's petition for certiorari review was granted, and the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that because the allegations of the complaint showed that Global merely transmitted data concerning debit and credit card transactions without representing that the transactions were legitimate, the Court of Appeals erred, and the Supreme Court therefore reversed. View "Global Payments, Inc. v. InComm Financial Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Shane Berryhill fainted and fell out of an 18-foot deer stand while hunting five days after undergoing major heart surgery. Plaintiffs Berryhill and his wife sued his surgeon, Dr. Dale Daly, and Savannah Cardiology (collectively “defendants”), claiming Daly’s negligent prescribing caused him to faint. The trial court instructed the jury on assumption of risk, and the jury returned a defense verdict. The Court of Appeals reversed and held that the instruction should not have been given. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari and found there was at least slight evidence presented at trial to warrant the instruction: Berryhill knew he had just had major surgery for serious cardiac problems, and evidence (although contradicted) existed to show that he had been instructed not to engage in strenuous activity and not to lift more than ten pounds, bend, or stoop over for at least seven days after his procedure. Even though Berryhill was not informed of the specific risk of fainting, violating such explicit medical instructions immediately after major heart surgery "poses an obvious cardiovascular risk to which competent adults cannot blind themselves," and constituted the slight evidence needed here to warrant a jury instruction. Judgment was reversed. View "Daly v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Kristine Heath was convicted by jury of homicide by vehicle in the first degree based on reckless driving; homicide by vehicle in the second degree; five counts of serious injury by vehicle; and failure to stop at a stop sign. The Court of Appeals reversed Heath’s convictions, except for the stop sign conviction, after concluding that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to demur to the fatally defective felony counts in the indictment. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for certiorari to consider whether trial counsel's failure to file a general demurrer resulted in prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). The Supreme Court determined Heath demonstrated prejudice under Strickland, thus affirming the Court of Appeals' reversal of the trial court's denial of Heath's motion for a new trial as to the vehicular homicide and serious-injury-by-vehicle convictions. View "Georgia v. Heath" on Justia Law

Donnie Rowe, Jr. was accused of double murder during a prison escape. In the pending death penalty prosecution of Rowe, the trial court directed that all records of visits from Rowe’s defense team to various prisoners be placed under seal in the legal department of the Department of Corrections, rather than being maintained in the individual inmates’ files. The DOC argued that order was void because the trial court lacked the inherent authority or personal or subject matter jurisdiction to issue it and because, even if the trial court had the authority to do so, issuing it constituted an abuse of discretion. Additionally, the Georgia Supreme Court directed the parties to evaluate whether the Supreme Court had jurisdiction in light of OCGA 5-7-1 limiting appeals by "the State of Georgia" in "criminal cases." The Court ultimately concluded it had jurisdiction over this appeal, and affirmed in part and reversed in part the trial court's order at issue. "While we conclude that the trial court had the authority to address the matter at issue here, we also conclude that the scope of the trial court’s order is nonetheless subject to review for an abuse of discretion. ... ordering the removal of the records from their usual place to the legal office was unnecessary, when the key issue was controlling the persons who were entitled to examine them. Instead, the trial court should have ... ordered the prison officials not to disclose any of the relevant visitation records to the prosecuting attorney or the prosecution team or to any person whose access to the records is not reasonably justified." View "Georgia v. Rowe" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia certified three questions to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding the scope of the Georgia Dealers in Agricultural Products Act, Ga. L. 1956, p. 617 (codified as amended at OCGA sections 2-9-1 to 2-9-16) (“the Act”). At issue was the effect of the Act’s provisions upon contracts entered into by an agricultural products dealer that failed to obtain a license from the Georgia Commissioner of Agriculture: in this case, a contract entered into between San Miguel Produce, Inc. (“San Miguel”), a California corporation, and L. G. Herndon Jr. Farms, Inc. (“Herndon Farms”), a Georgia corporation. The Supreme Court concluded: (1) an entity as described by the district court did qualify as a dealer in agricultural products under the Act and was not exempt under OCGA 2-9-15 (a) (1), with the limited exception of specific transactions “in the sale of agricultural products grown by [itself];” (2) the Act’s licensing requirements were part of a comprehensive regulatory scheme in the public interest and not merely a revenue measure; and (3) if a dealer has failed to obtain a license as required by OCGA 2-9-2, it may not recover under a contract to the extent that the contract relates to business coming within the terms of the Act. View "San Miguel Produce, Inc. v. L.G. Herndon, Jr. Farms, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant James Hampton was tried with Dwayne Abney and convicted of three counts of malice murder and several other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Kiana Marshall, Isaiah Martin, and Alexis Kitchens. Marshall's former roommate, Diamond Butler, asked Appellant to help her move out of Marshall's home. Butler could not fit all of her belongings into Appellant's car; appellant asked Butler whether she wanted him to shoot up the house. Appellant told Butler he had "killed all three of them." Abney was arrested following a traffic stop; appellant was found and arrested the next day. On appeal, Appellant contended the trial court erred by admitting the hearsay testimony of a jailhouse informant and by excluding the testimony of Appellant’s proposed alibi witness. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hampton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Antione Hood was convicted by jury of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Candace McGriff. Hood appealed, contending that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to consult a certain expert on gunshot and gunpowder residue. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed and affirmed Hood's convictions. View "Hood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant, Warden Glen Johnson, challenged a habeas court’s order setting aside Larry Williams’ convictions for four counts of armed robbery, one count of terroristic threats, and one count of using a hoax device. In its order granting habeas relief, the court determined that Williams received ineffective assistance when his appellate counsel failed to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel (1) during the plea bargaining process and (2) in failing to object to improper character evidence. The habeas court determined that because the evidence presented against Williams at trial was not strong, and the only witness identifying Williams was an officer who did not see Williams commit the robbery; the officer's testimony insinuated that Williams was a repeat offender and was harmful. The habeas court went on to find that had the issue been raised on appeal, there was a reasonable probability that Williams would have been granted a new trial, asserting that, under former OCGA 24-9-20 (b), bad character evidence was disallowed against a defendant unless the defendant testified, and Williams did not do so. For these reasons, the habeas court granted Williams’ petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of both claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. Having reviewed the record, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the habeas court erred. The Supreme Court concluded Williams could not show the outcome of the plea process would have been more favorable to him had he received different legal advice from his trial counsel. And contrary to the habeas court's conclusions, the Supreme Court determined Williams could not show as a threshold matter that his trial counsel performed deficiently by failing to object to the officer’s testimony on the basis that it included harmful character evidence or that such objection would have been sustained. The Supreme Court therefore reversed the habeas court's judgment. View "Johnson v. Williams" on Justia Law

Monique Sullivan was convicted by jury of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault in connection with the death of Amelia Hiltz; the aggravated assaults of Maureen Floyd and Kevin Mollenhauer; reckless conduct in regard to Grayson Tucker and Olden Ganus; cruelty to children in the second degree in regard to Sullivan’s son, J.S.; and three traffic offenses. Sullivan’s Suburban sped up and continued traveling the wrong way in the left eastbound lane of Riverwatch Parkway. The path taken by the Suburban forced four drivers, including Grayson Tucker and Olden Ganus, to swerve from the left lane into the right lane in order to avoid a head-on collision. Those drivers testified that the Suburban did not slow down, swerve, switch lanes, or engage in any other evasive maneuvers to warn or avoid colliding with other vehicles. After passing those four vehicles, Sullivan’s Suburban entered a sharp curve near Eisenhower Park. At the time, three other vehicles were entering the curve heading eastbound. The Suburban collided head-on with a van being driven by Amelia Hiltz and was then propelled about five to six feet into the air above the guardrail to the right. The Suburban landed on the guardrail and started bouncing, before flipping back over into the eastbound lanes of Riverwatch Parkway. Hiltz’s vehicle suffered significant damage and was pushed into the right shoulder of the eastbound side of the road. As the Suburban lay flipped over, vehicles driven by Kevin Mollenhauer and Maureen Floyd collided with it. No information was given as to why Sullivan was driving on Riverwatch Parkway. Sullivan appealed her conviction, arguing: the evidence introduced at trial was insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts with regard to the felony murder of Hiltz and the aggravated assaults of Floyd and Mollenhauer; the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on accident; the court erred in preventing Sullivan from presenting evidence that she did not suffer from any mental illness; and erred in permitting the State to introduce inadmissible hearsay. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sullivan v. Georgia" on Justia Law