Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Archie Bryant and Jose Carrillo in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Shawn Rhinehart. The indictment charged Bryant with malice murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Bryant elected to proceed under reciprocal discovery. The State brought an interlocutory appeal of the trial court’s order to exclude certain evidence on the basis that the evidence was not produced until just over a month before trial, or had not been produced at all, in violation of the trial court’s pre-trial scheduling order. The trial court’s order could stand only if it properly found the State acted with bad faith and that defendant was prejudiced as a result. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court’s order was ambiguous both as to whether the court actually found bad faith on the part of the State at all and as to the basis for the trial court’s finding of prejudice to the defendant. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s ruling and remanded for the trial court to clarify its ruling on the defendant’s motion to exclude the evidence. View "Georgia v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Sandy Mitchell, Jr., was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Byron Brown. On appeal, Mitchell argued his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to certain trial testimony from a detective in this case on the grounds that it was improper expert opinion, and that other testimony offered by the same detective was admitted in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). Mitchell also contended the trial court erred in permitting the detective to testify about the alleged Brady violation evidence and in admitting a particular autopsy photograph into evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed Kenneth Williams’ conviction for aggravated sexual battery based on its conclusion that the trial court gave an erroneous charge to the jury concerning an underage victim’s capacity to consent. The State appealed, arguing the jury instruction did not constitute plain error to warrant reversal of the conviction. The Georgia Supreme Court concurred: the victim was young, the conduct was clearly sexual in nature, the adult was an authority figure in the child’s life, and the evidence was strong. The Court surmised it was unlikely that the trial court’s instruction affected the jury’s decision to return a verdict of guilty for the charge of aggravated sexual battery. “In other words, the jury instruction error did not constitute plain error here given the circumstances.” Accordingly, judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed as it pertained to Williams’ conviction for aggravated sexual battery. View "Georgia v. Williams" on Justia Law

Joseph Gittens was convicted by jury of malice murder in connection with the death of fellow inmate Johnny Johnson. Gittens argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction, that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective, that he was denied the right to communicate freely with counsel, and that newly discovered evidence entitles him to a new trial. Finding no merit to these claims, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that each claim was without merit and affirmed. View "Gittens v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In a personal injury case, the trial court excluded the testimony of an expert defense witness, reasoning that the expert had “not [been] properly identified within the parameters of the scheduling order.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted the defendant’s petition for a writ of certiorari to answer whether: (1) a trial court could exclude an expert witness solely because the witness was identified after the deadline set in a scheduling, discovery, and/or case management order; and (2) If not, what factors should a trial court consider when exercising its discretion whether to exclude an expert witness who was identified after the deadline set in a scheduling, discovery, and/or case management order? The Court concluded the answer to (1) was “no,” and with respect to (2), the Court concluded that when a trial court exercises its discretion in a civil case to determine whether to exclude a late-identified witness, it should consider: (1) the explanation for the failure to disclose the witness; (2) the importance of the testimony; (3) the prejudice to the opposing party if the witness is allowed to testify; and (4) whether a less harsh remedy than the exclusion of the witness would be sufficient to ameliorate the prejudice and vindicate the trial court’s authority. Based on these answers, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part and remanded this case with direction that the Court of Appeals vacate the trial court’s ruling and remand to the trial court for reconsideration. View "Lee v. Smith, II" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review centered on a claim of abusive litigation that Timothy Coen filed based on a previous contract lawsuit against his former employer that was resolved in his favor. In his abusive litigation case, Coen sought punitive damages. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court’s ruling that punitive damages were not available for a statutory abusive litigation claim, relying on its prior decisions that in turn relied on dicta in footnote 3 of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Yost v. Torok, 344 SE2d 414 (1986), which was decided three years before the current abusive litigation statutes, OCGA sections 51-7-80 to 51-7-85, were enacted in 1989. The Supreme Court granted Coen’s petition for certiorari to decide whether that statute authorized the recovery of punitive damages. The Court concluded punitive damages generally may be recovered in an abusive litigation lawsuit (as long as the lawsuit is not solely to recover damages for injury to peace, happiness, or feelings), because the text of OCGA 51-7-83 (a) indicated that punitive damages were included, the statute did not change the common law generally allowing punitive damages in abusive litigation cases, and punitive damages in abusive litigation cases did not always constitute an impermissible double recovery. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Coen v. Aptean, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Johnny Rammage was convicted of malice murder and a firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of Chris Johnson. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred: (1) by not allowing him to introduce evidence of Johnson’s prior acts of violence; (2) by declining to give jury instructions on justification and accident; and (3) by admitting evidence of his prior conviction. Appellant also contended his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by not objecting to the court’s failure to give the jury instructions. After review of the record and the briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Rammage v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jonathan Jackson was convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of DeAngelo Head. On appeal, Jackson argued only that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions. Finding the evidence to support his conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Jackson’s convictions. View "Jackson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Tyrecquiss Wells appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of David Scott. Wells argued: (1) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his custodial statements on the ground that he did not knowingly waive his rights; (2) his confrontation right was violated when the trial court admitted an accomplice’s inculpatory statements; and (3) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to sever his trial from those of his co-defendants. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed because: (1) the record showed that Wells knowingly waived his rights when he voluntarily agreed to speak with the police; (2) there was no confrontation violation because the accomplice testified at trial and Wells was able to cross-examine him; and (3) trial counsel’s reason for not filing a motion to sever was not objectively unreasonable. View "Wells v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2012, Sylvester Davis, Jr. was convicted of malice murder in connection with the 2011 shooting death of Marquis Wadley. Davis apppealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting certain testimony by a Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”) agent and in denying his motion for a mistrial, and that, to the extent that the Georgia Supreme Court concludes that he waived certain evidentiary objections by failing to raise them at trial, his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Davis’ conviction. View "Davis v. Georgia" on Justia Law