Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Gregory Rhynes was convicted by jury for the malice murder of Michael Holmes. He appealed, contending the trial court erred by partially denying his motion to suppress all statements he made to police during an interview on December 11, 2015. After review, and finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Rhynes’ conviction. View "Rhynes v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jeremy Scott was convicted by jury of felony murder, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and criminal use of a firearm with an altered identification mark in connection with the death of Romondo Ashley. On appeal, Scott contended he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the trial court erred by giving the jury an incomplete and misleading charge on accident. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Scott v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2013, a jury found Frederick Lee Gude guilty of malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and theft by taking in connection with the stabbing death of Jacquelyn Nash. He appealed, contending that the trial court erred in admitting a tape-recorded voicemail message into evidence and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Gude v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Ruby Evans was found guilty by jury of conspiring with her son to murder her daughter-in-law, Sunday Blombergh, with an overdose of drugs, and of committing malice murder as a party to her husband’s subsequent acts of shooting, strangling, and stabbing Blombergh to death. She appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions and that she was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Evans v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2013, Appellant De’Marquise Elkins was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of 13-month-old Antonio Santiago and the shooting of the baby’s mother, Sherry West, as well as the shooting ten days earlier of Pastor Wilfredo Calix-Flores behind his church. The trial court sentenced Appellant, who was 17 years old at the time of the crimes, to serve life in prison without the possibility of parole (“LWOP”) for the baby’s murder and consecutive terms of years for all but one of his other convictions. Appellant argued on appeal, among other things, that the trial court violated his constitutional rights by preventing him from showing that someone else committed the crimes; that he was deprived of a fair trial and the presumption of innocence when the jury heard that he had a juvenile criminal record; and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support Appellant’s convictions; the trial court did not violate Appellant’s constitutional rights by preventing him from showing that someone else committed the crimes; he was not deprived of a fair trial or the presumption of innocence by a fleeting reference at trial to a “criminal juvenile report;” and his claims of ineffective assistance related to his trial counsel were waived. One claim of ineffective assistance, which related to his motion-for-new-trial counsel, was not waived, however, and the Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing and findings of fact on that claim. View "Elkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The State the dismissal of an indictment against Dannie Albert Mondor, who cross-appealed. The indictment charged Mondor with homicide by vehicle in the first degree predicated on a hit-and-run offense (Count 1), and hit and run. Mondor filed demurrers to the indictment, as well as a motion to present evidence that Bradley Braland, who died as a result of the accident set forth in the indictment, was not wearing his seatbelt. The trial court dismissed the indictment because it was not “perfect in form and substance,” concluding that the hit-and-run count (Count 2) did not allege the essential element of mens rea. In the same motion, the trial court denied Mondor’s motion to present seatbelt-use evidence, declining to “find an exception” to the well-established “bar against seatbelt use evidence” under OCGA 40-8-76.1. Finally, the trial court also declined Mondor’s request related to his claims of unconstitutional vagueness to “declare an exact definition of the word ‘cause’ as used in OCGA 40-6-393.” The Georgia Supreme Court reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the indictment in Case Number S19A0209, and affirmed the exclusion of seatbelt-use evidence in Case Number S19X0210 for reasons different from those that the trial court gave. View "Georgia v. Mondor" on Justia Law

In 2014, Mahemood Budhani was convicted of possessing and selling XLR11, a Schedule I Controlled Substance. Budhani appealed his convictions to the Court of Appeals, claiming (among other things) that the indictment was void and that his statements to police were involuntary and therefore should not have been admitted at trial. The Court of Appeals rejected Budhani’s claims and affirmed his convictions. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the indictment was not fatally defective; and (2) whether a promise of no additional charges constitutes a “slightest hope of benefit” under OCGA 24-8-824. The Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s outcome, but on different grounds. Specifically, the Court held”: (1) Budhani’s indictment was not void; and (2) a promise made by law enforcement to bring no additional charges against a defendant did not constitute the “slightest hope of benefit” under OCGA 24-8-824, although such a promise may not always render a subsequent confession inadmissible. Furthermore, the Court concluded that although investigators’ promises of no additional charges during Budhani’s recorded, custodial interview constituted a hope of benefit under OCGA 24-8-824, any error the trial court made by admitting the portions of Budhani’s interview after investigators’ promises of no additional charges was harmless based on this record in this case. View "Budhani v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Bourassa was convicted of possessing more than one ounce of marijuana, conspiracy to commit that crime, and for violating the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) by using a telephone to arrange for the purchase of more than one ounce of marijuana from coindictee German Beltran. The evidence supporting these convictions was obtained during a police investigation of Beltran and others that included extensive surveillance and investigation warrants that authorized the interception of electronic and oral communications for several phone numbers, including Beltran’s. Neither Bourassa’s phone number nor any phone number allegedly used by him was listed as a target in the investigation warrants, and Bourassa’s phone number was not known to be associated with any of the phone numbers listed in the investigation warrants as targets. However, the following evidence uncovered in the course of the investigation led police to Bourassa. Bourassa moved to suppress the intercepted communications, arguing (among other things) that the investigation warrants that resulted in the interception of his phone conversations and text messages violated the laws of Georgia and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Bourassa did not testify at the hearing on the motion to suppress or stipulate that he was a party to those conversations and messages, and the State argued that he failed to prove standing. At the suppression hearing, the investigation warrants - including the applications and supporting affidavits—were admitted, and the affiant and sole witness, Sgt. Randy Folsom of the Douglas County Sheriff’s Office, confirmed that neither Bourassa nor any phone number associated with him was specified as a target in the warrants. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that Bourassa had to present his own evidence to prove standing and that circumstantial evidence could not suffice to meet that burden. As a result, the Court of Appeals did not properly evaluate Bourassa’s arguments about the evidentiary value of Sgt. Folsom’s testimony. Moreover, because the trial court did not make findings or credibility determinations about Sgt. Folsom’s testimony, the Court of Appeals had nothing to review on appeal in that regard. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court with direction to remand the case to the trial court for appropriate consideration of the evidence related to standing. View "Bourassa v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Torico Jackson appealed his convictions for malice murder and related offenses in connection with the 2004 stabbing death of John Ray. On appeal, Jackson claimed the trial court erred: (1) by failing to instruct the jury on the applicable statute of limitation for the relevant non-murder offenses; (2) by admitting certain police reports; and (3) by denying his motion for a mistrial. Jackson also argued trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in a number of ways. Although the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error with respect to Jackson’s convictions, the Court determined he was improperly sentenced. Therefore, the Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, vacated the sentence, and remanded for resentencing. View "Jackson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In this case’s previous appearance before the Georgia Supreme Court, the primary issue involved taxation of alcoholic beverages at the Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport. Clayton County appealed the trial court’s partial grant of summary judgment to the City of College Park on claims the City was not receiving its statutorily mandated share of taxes collected on alcoholic beverages. When the parties could not resolve their dispute, the City filed a complaint naming as defendants the County and two businesses that operated within the Airport, Mack II, Inc. and General Wholesale Company (the “taxpayer defendants”). The complaint sought an interlocutory and permanent injunction against the County (as well as the taxpayer defendants), and a declaratory judgment as to the City’s and County’s division and collection of alcoholic beverage taxes, as well as the taxpayer defendants’ payment of those taxes. The complaint also asserted claims against the County for an accounting, unjust enrichment, attorney fees, and damages. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the County’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding that sovereign immunity does not apply to the City’s claims or the taxpayer defendants’ cross-claims for indemnity and contribution. The court granted the City’s motion for partial summary judgment on the declaratory judgment counts, finding that the Alcoholic Beverage Code, OCGA 3-3-1 et seq., permitted the City to impose alcoholic beverage tax only within its municipal limits and the County to impose such a tax only in the unincorporated areas of the County, that neither could impose and collect alcoholic beverage taxes within the other’s taxing jurisdiction, and that the taxpayer defendants had to submit tax monies only to the entity authorized to collect the funds. Ultimately, the Supreme Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case for consideration of the “threshold question of whether sovereign immunity applies at all in suits between political subdivisions of the same sovereign (like the City and the County).” The Supreme Court disagreed sovereign immunity did not apply to multiple issues raised by this case. The case was remanded for reconsideration. View "City of College Park v. Clayton County et al." on Justia Law