Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Davious Taylor appealed his convictions for murder and possession of a weapon during the commission of a crime arising out of the 2009 shooting death of Onterio Perez Dorsey. On appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against him at trial, and argued the trial court erred in admitting extrinsic act evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b). Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. View "Taylor v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Donald Bannister was convicted of felony murder and a firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of Anthony Johnson, Jr. On appeal, he argued: (1) the weight of the evidence presented at his trial was strongly against the verdicts; (2) his trial counsel was ineffective in withdrawing a request for jury instructions on voluntary manslaughter and mutual combat; and (3) the trial court erred by denying a mistrial and giving an improper Allen charge after the jury indicated that it was deadlocked, by holding that he had not made a prima facie showing supporting his Batson challenge, and by admitting two recordings of phone calls made from jail. The Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed judgment. View "Bannister v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Ruiz Suchiapa Venturino was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2013 shooting death of Marcos Cruz. On appeal, Venturino contended the trial court erred in several way, principal among them, regarding the admission of certain evidence, and in failing to rebuke the prosecutor when she misstated the law regarding voluntary manslaughter during closing argument. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed conviction. View "Venturino v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Charles Fleming was tried and convicted of murder and related offenses in connection with the crimes he committed against Lamonte Corbin and Tracy Skrine. Skrine told officers he believed that Fleming had brought three unknown men to her house because Fleming thought Skrine and Corbin were withholding information regarding who shot Fleming’s brother. Howard Archer, who was sitting in his car at this time, saw Fleming and the unknown men make hand signals and perform handshakes associated with a street gang. Fleming approached Archer and asked if he had a gun, to which Archer replied, “no.” When Hampton told the group of men that Skrine was not at home, Fleming decided to remain outside by the carport while his companions went inside the house. Skrine returned home later with his girlfriend, Brittni Chatman, and Corbin. The three walked through the carport and into the house. Archer also went inside. There, he saw Skrine counting money while in the living room with the three unknown men who had arrived with Fleming. At this time, one of the men flashed a gun at Archer, leading him to believe that a drug deal was underway. Then Fleming came inside the house, gave the unknown men a “look,” and walked back out to the car. Soon after, the men approached Corbin and Skrine, brandished their guns, and began shooting. Then they fled the house, got into a running car where Fleming was waiting, and drove away. After the shooting, Corbin was found lying unresponsive on the floor of the kitchen. Skrine was hiding in his bedroom and had suffered a gunshot wound to his left buttock. Archer and another called the police, but Corbin had died by the time they arrived. Fleming appealed his ultimate conviction, alleging that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that the trial court erred by improperly admitting certain evidence at trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Fleming v. Georgia" on Justia Law

This case presented for the Georgia Supreme Court’s review an issue of first impression: the effects of the General Assembly’s wholesale revision in 2016 of the anti-SLAPP statute, OCGA 9-11-11.1, which substantially mirrored California Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. LTC Consulting, L.P. and two affiliated entities sued law firm Wilkes & McHugh, P.A. and one of its attorneys for violations of OCGA 31-7-3.2 (j), deceptive trade practices, and false advertising after the defendants ran full-page advertisements in local newspapers targeting patients of nursing homes owned by the plaintiffs. The defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss or to Strike Pursuant to OCGA sections 9-11-11.1 and 9-11-12 (b) (6), arguing among other things that OCGA 31-7-3.2 (j), enacted in 2015, violated the First Amendment. The motion was filed the day before a previously scheduled injunction hearing, but the trial court considered the defendants’ motion and denied it. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Supreme Court concluded the defendants met their burden under OCGA 9-11-11.1 to show that the plaintiffs’ claims were ones arising from acts that could reasonably be construed as acts in furtherance of the defendants’ right of free speech under the United States Constitution in connection with an issue of public interest or concern, thereby triggering the application of OCGA 9-11-11.1. The burden then shifted to the plaintiffs to establish that there was a probability that they would prevail on their claims. However, in analyzing these claims, the parties did not argue, and the trial court did not properly apply, the new standards for anti-SLAPP motions. Judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for reconsideration of the anti-SLAPP motion under the proper standards. View "Wilkes & McHugh, P.A., v. LTC Consulting, L.P. et al." on Justia Law

Joseph Brant appealed several trial court orders relating to his murder conviction. But because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded Brant’s plea agreement with the State precluded him from appealing the trial court’s orders, it dismissed the appeal. View "Brant v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kevin Boyd was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2013 shooting death of Ray Murphy. On appeal, Boyd challenged the evidence presented at trial used to support his conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Boyd v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Christian Vasquez appealed the denial of his motion for new trial after a jury found him guilty of malice murder, two counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, two counts of cruelty to children in the first degree, and concealing the death of another in connection with the death of his two-year old daughter, Prisi Vasquez. On appeal, Vasquez argued: (1) the State failed to present sufficient evidence to support his conviction for cruelty to children in the first degree predicated on his failure to seek timely medical care for the victim; (2) there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for concealing the death of another because the State did not prove that the applicable statute of limitation was tolled; (3) the trial court committed plain error by giving erroneous jury instructions regarding the statute of limitation applicable to the offense of concealing the death of another and the manner in which the statute of limitation could be tolled; (4) the trial court plainly erred when it failed to instruct the jury regarding corroboration of accomplice testimony; (5) he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel based on his counsel’s failure to object to the admission of evidence regarding prior acts of child abuse committed by Vasquez and because his counsel did not object to the trial court’s instruction regarding the statute of limitation for concealing the death of another; and (6) his convictions for cruelty to children in the first degree should have merged with his conviction for malice murder. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Vasquez v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Mercer University sought immunity from liability for claims by the estate and family of Sally Stofer, who was fatally injured when she fell at a free concert hosted by the university at Washington Park in Macon, Georgia in July 2014. The park was owned by Macon-Bibb County, but Mercer had a permit to use the park for its concert series. The concert series was planned, promoted, and hosted by Mercer’s College Hill Alliance, a division of Mercer whose stated mission is to foster neighborhood revitalization for Macon’s College Hill Corridor. The trial court concluded, and the Court of Appeals agreed, that defendant was not entitled to summary judgment on its claim of immunity under Georgia’s Recreational Property Act, given evidence that Mercer hosted the concert and it might (at least indirectly) benefit financially from the event. In arriving at this conclusion, the Georgia Supreme Court surmised the Court of Appeals was led astray by language in the Supreme Court’s most recent relevant decision that was inconsistent with previous case law. After careful consideration of the statutory text and a thorough review of the case law, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that whether immunity was available under this provision requires a determination of the true scope and nature of the landowner’s invitation to use its property, and this determination properly is informed by two related considerations: (1) the nature of the activity that constitutes the use of the property in which people have been invited to engage, and (2) the nature of the property that people have been invited to use. Clarifying that considerations of evidence of Mercer’s subjective motivations in hosting the concert and some speculation of the indirect benefits Mercer might have received as a result of the concert were generally improper, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case with direction that the court revisit its analysis consistent with the standard that was clarified here. View "Mercer University v. Stofer" on Justia Law

Ryan Duke was indicted for malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, burglary, and concealing the death of another in connection with the 2005, death of Tara Grinstead. Duke was initially provided counsel through the Tifton Judicial Circuit Public Defender’s office, but, in September 2018, he obtained pro bono private counsel. The case was set for trial in Irwin County Superior Court, and, in the lead-up to trial, Duke filed a series of motions in the trial court seeking public funding for expert witnesses and investigators to aid his defense. Notwithstanding the trial court’s finding that Duke was indigent and that the assistance of experts was necessary to mount a proper defense, his motions were denied, and the trial court did not grant Duke’s request for a certificate of immediate review pursuant to OCGA 5-6-34 (b). In the absence of a certificate from the trial court, Duke filed both a motion asking the Georgia Suprem Court to stay the proceedings below and an application asking the Court to exercise discretion to allow an interlocutory appeal pursuant to the analysis set forth in Waldrip v. Head, 532 SE2d 380 (2000). The Georgia Supreme Court granted Duke’s request for supersedeas and stay, but held Duke’s application to appeal in abeyance pending consideration of whether Waldrip should be overruled. After briefing and oral argument, the SUpreme Court overruled Waldrip to the extent it permitted the Supreme Court to disregard the requirement set forth in OCGA 5-6-34 (b) that a party must obtain a certificate of immediate review from the trial court before pursuing an interlocutory appeal not otherwise authorized by OCGA 5-6-34 (a). Because the trial court did not issue a certificate of immediate review in this case, the Supreme Court was without jurisdiction to consider Duke’s application for interlocutory appeal. His application was therefore dismissed. The stay previously issued in this case would dissolve when the Supreme Court's remittitur was received by and filed in the trial court. View "Duke v. Georgia" on Justia Law