Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Charles Pennington and Jay Briele were found guilty By jury of possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine within 1,000 feet of an elementary school. At trial, Pennington and Briele requested that the jury be instructed on an affirmative defense provided in the Georgia Controlled Substances Act, specifically, that the conduct prohibited by OCGA 16-13-32.4 (a) took place entirely within a private residence, that no minors were present in the residence at any time during the commission of the offense, and that the prohibited conduct was not carried on for financial gain. The trial court denied the request and, in denying Pennington’s motion for a new trial, explained that the court refused to instruct the jury on the affirmative defense because Pennington and Briele, neither of whom testified at trial, did not admit doing the act charged, possessing with intent to distribute methamphetamine, and because neither the State nor either defendant presented any evidence that the “active meth lab” in Pennington’s residence was not being used for financial gain. The Court of Appeals affirmed Pennington’s convictions, reasoning that, because he did not admit that he possessed with intent to distribute methamphetamine near a school, he was not entitled to the affirmative defense he requested. Pennington petitioned for certiorari review, asking “What, if anything, must a criminal defendant admit in order to raise an affirmative defense?” The Georgia Supreme Court held a criminal defendant was not required to “admit” anything, in the sense of acknowledging that any particular facts are true, in order to raise an affirmative defense. “To the extent a defendant in raising an affirmative defense accepts for the sake of argument that he committed the act alleged in a charge, the defendant may do so only for the limited purpose of raising the affirmative defense at issue.” Judgement was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Pennington v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Carlos McClure was found guilty of two counts of aggravated assault based on an indictment that charged him with assaulting Armando Cuevas and Jamie Thun with a lever-action BB rifle by aiming the gun at them. McClure requested that the jury be instructed on the affirmative defenses of justification in defense of self and justification in defense of habitation. The trial court refused to give the requested instructions on justification on the basis that McClure, who testified that he carried the BB gun during an encounter with the victims but denied pointing the gun at them, could not both deny that he performed the act of pointing the gun at someone and at the same time argue that he was justified in performing that act. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that, because McClure did not admit to aiming the BB gun at the victims, an element of aggravated assault as charged, he was not entitled to an instruction on any affirmative defense. The Georgia Supreme Court determined a criminal defendant was not required to “admit” anything, in the sense of acknowledging that any particular facts are true, in order to raise an affirmative defense. “To the extent a defendant in raising an affirmative defense accepts for the sake of argument that he committed the act alleged in a charge, the defendant may do so only for the limited purpose of raising the affirmative defense at issue.” The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the trial court erred in failing to give the requested instructions regarding the affirmative defenses of justification, that is, whether the theory of the instructions was supported by at least slight evidence, and, if so, whether any such instructional error was harmful. View "McClure v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Atlanta Botanical Garden, Inc. (the “Garden”) leased land from the City of Atlanta. The Garden wished to enforce a policy precluding the possession of firearms by visitors to, and guests of, the Garden, like Phillip Evans. Evans held a valid weapons carry license under Georgia law and asserted that he was authorized to carry a firearm at the garden under the authority of OCGA 16-11-127 (c). The Garden contended it could enforce its policy based on an exception to the general rule found in the same statutory paragraph. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether OCGA 16-11-127 (c) permitted a private organization that leased property owned by a municipality to prohibit the carrying of firearms on the leased premises. The Court of Appeals determined that it did and affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Garden on the petition for declaratory and injunctive relief filed by GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. The Georgia Supreme Court determined this case turned on whether the Garden was indeed private property. Because no lease was entered into the trial court record, judgment was reversed for further proceedings at the trial court. View "GeorgiaCarry.org, Inc. et al. v. Atlanta Botanical Gardens, Inc." on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari review in Case Number S18G1189 to consider whether: (1) the standard that appellate courts should apply when reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a claim under OCGA 51-12-12; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals properly applied that standard in this case. In Case Number S181190, the Supreme Court questioned whether it was error for the appellate court to remand the case for retrial on both liability and damages, assuming the proper standard of review had been applied. Janice Evans fell violently ill and was taken to defendant Rockdale Hospital. What was first diagnosed as high blood pressure was later revealed to have been a blood clot to the brain from a ruptured aneurysm. She and her husband sued Rockdale for medical malpractice. Her damages totaled over $1 million. A jury found in Mrs. Evans’ favor, and awarded her husband damages for loss of consortium. Plaintiffs filed a new motion for additif or for a new trial on the ground that the jury’s damage award was so inadequate as to be inconsistent with the preponderance of the evidence. The Georgia Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals applied the wrong standard when reviewing the trial court’s decision, so that judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Rockdale Hospital, LLC v. Evans" on Justia Law

Roman Hills was convicted of malice murder in connection with the 2014 strangulation, beating, and stabbing death of his live-in girlfriend, Beverly Jones. He appealed, arguing the trial court erred in excluding a defense witness’ testimony, and he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his conviction. View "Hills v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Quintavius Hawkins was convicted of felony murder (predicated on criminal attempt to commit armed robbery) in connection with the death of Clayton Smith, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. On appeal, Hawkins contended: (1) he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel; (2) the trial court erred in finding that his third amended motion for new trial was untimely; and (3) the trial court erred in denying him an opportunity to present evidence in support of his third amended motion for new trial. Although the Georgia Supreme Court found no merit in these claims, the record revealed the trial court erred when it imposed sentence on both the felony murder and the predicate offense of criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, which offense merged with the felony murder for sentencing. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated Hawkins’s conviction for criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, and affirmed in all other respects. View "Hawkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In its second appearance before the Georgia Supreme Court, the dispute between appellee Lowndes County Board of Tax Assessors (“the Board”) and eight partnerships which built and operated affordable housing apartment complexes (“Section 42 properties”) in Lowndes County (collectively, “Appellants”), with the help of federal and state Low Income Housing Tax Credits (“LIHTCs” or “Section 42 Tax Credits”), in connection with which they executed Land Use Restrictive Covenants. The dispute this time turned on the valuation of those tax credits when calculating ad valorem real property taxes. The Supreme Court determined the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction to decide this case, and that LIHTCs did not constitute “actual income” for purposes of OCGA 48-5-2 (3) (B) (vii) (II). Moreover, OCGA 48-5-2 (3) (B) (vii) (I) and (II) did not run afoul of the Georgia Constitution’s taxation uniformity provision. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Heron Lake II Apartments, LP v. Lowndes County Board of Tax" on Justia Law

Appellant Polo Golf and Country Club Homeowners Association, Inc. (“PGHOA”) filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against appellees John Cunard, Director of Forsyth County, Georgia's Department of Engineering, and Benny Dempsey, Stormwater Division Manager of Forsyth County’s Department of Engineering (the “stormwater executives”), in their individual capacities to determine their constitutional authority to prospectively enforce an addendum to Forsyth County’s stormwater ordinance. In January 2014, Forsyth County enacted a new version of Section 4.2.2 of the Georgia Stormwater Management Design Manual. PGHOA argued the 2014 version of Section 4.2.2 was unconstitutional because: (1) it impaired PGHOA’s contractual obligations with homeowners inasmuch as the 2014 version of Section 4.2.2 made PGHOA responsible for the maintenance of all stormwater mechanisms within the subdivision; and (2) it was retrospective in nature. According to PGHOA’s complaint, the 2014 version of Section 4.2.2 precluded it from enforcing the Declaration of Covenants, Restrictions and Easements (the “Declaration”), which required individual homeowners of the Polo Fields to maintain such drainage and stormwater mechanisms. The trial court rejected these constitutional challenges to the 2014 version of Section 4.2.2. Because it determined that the 2014 version of 4.2.2 was constitutional, the trial court concluded the stormwater executives were immune from suit based on the doctrine of sovereign immunity and granted the stormwater executives’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. The trial court granted the executives' motion, denying the motions for summary judgment as moot. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court erred when it did not make a ruling on whether sovereign immunity applied before it considered more substantive matters. Likewise, the trial court erred in its finding that sovereign immunity barred PGHOA's suit. Therefore, that portion of the trial court's judgment dismissing the case on sovereign immunity grounds was reversed. The Court affirmed the trial court's grant of the motion for judgment on the pleadings based on the constitutional issues concerning PGHOA's contract rights. The trial court did not address PGHOA's various other claims, including trespass and involuntary servitude. The case was remanded for the trial court to address those claims in order to fully resolve the stormwater executives' motion for judgment on the pleadings. View "Polo Golf & Country Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Cunard" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Javis Denson and his brother, Myron Mitchell, Jr., individually and as parties to a crime, for the felony murder (predicated on aggravated assault) of Mickey Albritton; two counts of aggravated assault, one of Albritton and the other of Earl Dasher; and three counts of possession of a firearm during commission of a felony. A jury would later find Denson and Mitchell guilty of all counts, for which Denson was sentenced to life imprisonment plus concurrent sentences. Denson moved for a new trial, arguing (among other things) that “[t]he verdict [wa]s contrary to the evidence” and “the principles of justice and equity” and that it was “decided strongly against the weight of the evidence.” After holding a hearing and considering the parties’ legal briefs, the trial court granted Denson’s motion for a new trial under OCGA sections 5-5-20 and 5-5-21. The State then appealed. Having reviewed the entire record, and considering that the trial court was authorized, as the thirteenth juror, to credit Denson’s version of events and discount versions offered by other witnesses, and bearing in mind the standard of review set forth in OCGA 5- 5-50, the Georgia Supreme Court could not say the trial court abused its "substantial discretion" in granting Denson a new trial on the general grounds. Therefore, it affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Georgia v. Denson" on Justia Law

Appellant Geno West appeals his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2008 shooting death of Marcus Simpson. On appeal, he argued the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction, the trial court violated his right to full and fair appellate review by failing to follow the proper procedure for supplementing the record, and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. Finding no such errors, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed West's convictions. View "West v. Georgia" on Justia Law