Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Robert Williams was convicted of murder and the unlawful possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He appealed pro se the denial of his motion to recuse and the apparent denial of his motion to vacate an earlier order, in which the trial court refused his motion to correct certain transcripts. Finding no cognizable claim of error presented by Williams in this appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2014, Montravious Bradley entered a non-negotiated guilty plea to murder and other offenses in connection with the death of Jerrick Jackson during the armed robbery of Jackson and his fiancee, Kimberly Little. After entry of judgment, Bradley filed a timely motion to withdraw his guilty plea, contending that his guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The trial court denied the motion. Bradley appealed, arguing the trial court failed to advise him of the sentencing range for murder and felony murder, but advised him instead only of the maximum sentence authorized for those offenses, and that the trial court therefore improperly failed to advise him of the direct consequences of entering a guilty plea. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, except that it vacated in part to correct a sentencing error. View "Bradley v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 1999, appellant Donald Davis pled guilty to the murder of Shereka Smith, for which he was convicted and sentenced. Davis did not timely pursue a direct appeal. Following his unsuccessful pursuit of a writ of habeas corpus, he filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal of his conviction, which the trial court denied. Davis appealed that denial to the Georgia Supreme Court. "[F]rustrating Davis’s present effort to obtain an out-of-time appeal is the doctrine of res judicata." The Court found that Davis filed a habeas petition in 2002, and the habeas court denied Davis relief. Although Davis did not “plainly raise in the [petition for writ of habeas corpus] the issues he raises now, there is no reason he could not have.” Therefore, because the trial court was precluded from considering this claim, it did not err in denying Davis’s motion for out-of-time appeal. View "Davis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Shane Collett appealed his convictions for malice murder and concealing the death of another in connection with the 2012 death of nine-year-old Skylar Dials. Collett challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support these convictions and argues that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of reckless conduct or on mistake of fact. The Georgia Supreme Court found the evidence was sufficient and the instructions were unwarranted. View "Collett v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Johnny Ray Cochran was convicted of murder and a related offense arising out of the shooting death of Melony Strickland. On appeal, Cochran argued the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in various ways. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cochran v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Shontori Gooden appealed after the denial of her motion to withdraw her plea of guilty to felony murder, asserting as her sole enumeration of error that the case should be remanded for a hearing on alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2016, Gooden was indicted for felony murder and other crimes arising out of the October 2016 shooting of Nyla Foster. Represented by a public defender, Gooden entered a negotiated plea of guilty to felony murder and was sentenced. Through different counsel she filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea some time later; as soon as the hearing on that motion began, new counsel moved for a continuance. Counsel stated at first, Gooden wanted to drop her motion to withdraw her plea. He sent the necessary papers to her to withdraw the motion, but she signed them on the wrong signature line; he sent them to her again, but she signed them in too many places, including the signature line for a witness; he sent them to her a final time, but he received no response. He concluded that it would be simpler to have Gooden attend the hearing and withdraw the motion in person, but when he met with her immediately before the hearing, she told him that she wanted to proceed with the motion to withdraw her guilty plea after all. Counsel also informed the court that Gooden had told him that she had mental health issues and refused medication while detained at the county jail but that she had begun taking medication again once in state custody and “is thinking better and that’s why she wants to go forward.” The trial court denied the motion for a continuance and went forward with the hearing. Daniel called no witnesses and presented no evidence but argued that the public defender should have moved for a psychiatric evaluation before allowing Gooden to enter a guilty plea. The Georgia Supreme Court determined could not meet her burden of showing her plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance and affirmed denial of her motion to withdraw her guilty plea. View "Gooden v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Kyle Strother was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Cristobal Becerre-Contreras. Appellant argued on appeal: (1) that the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to support his convictions; (2) that the trial court failed to act as the “thirteenth juror” when it denied his motion for new trial; (3) that the court erred by admitting character evidence related to gang activities and other murders; (4) that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by “opening the door” to that character evidence; and (5) that he was denied a fair trial when one of his co-defendants allegedly testified falsely. The Georgia Supreme Court found each of Appellant’s claims was meritless, so it affirmed. View "Strother v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant James Spell was tried and convicted of two murders, an aggravated battery, an aggravated assault, and two firearm offenses, all in connection with the fatal stabbing of his ex-wife and the fatal shootings of her parents. On appeal, he claimed he was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The Georgia Supreme Court found no merit in this claim, but noted the trial court erred when it failed to merge the aggravated battery and aggravated assault with one of the murders of which Appellant was convicted. Accordingly, the convictions for aggravated battery and aggravated assault were vacated; the convictions were affirmed in all other respects. View "Spell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to address whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing as moot the appeal of a juvenile delinquency adjudication. M. F. was found delinquent for criminal attempt to enter an automobile, for which M. F. was placed on probation for 12 months. M.F. appealed, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the juvenile court's adjudication of delinquency. When M.F.'s probationary sentence concluded, the Court of Appeals issued an order in which it declined to reach the merits of M. F.’s appeal, concluding that his case was moot because his probationary sentence had expired and because M. F. “has not shown, on this record, any adverse collateral consequences arising from the juvenile court’s adjudication of him as delinquent.” The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a juvenile who appeals his adjudication of delinquency was not required to show adverse collateral consequences in the record; such consequences would be be presumed. The Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred, and its order was reversed and the matter remanded for consideration on the merits. View "In the Interest of M.F." on Justia Law

At issue in this case is whether the Environmental Protection Division of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources (“EPD”) properly issued a permit to the City of Guyton to build and operate a land application system (“LAS”) that would apply treated wastewater to a tract of land through spray irrigation. Craig Barrow III challenged the issuance of that permit, arguing that, among other things, EPD issued the permit in violation of a water quality standard, Ga. Comp. R. & Regs., r. 391-3-6-.03 (2) (b) (ii) (the “antidegradation rule”), because it failed to determine whether any resulting degradation of water quality in the State waters surrounding the proposed LAS was necessary to accommodate important economic or social development in the area. An administrative law judge rejected Barrow’s argument, finding that the rule required an antidegradation analysis only for point source discharges of pollutants and the LAS at issue was a nonpoint source discharge. The superior court affirmed the administrative ruling. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the plain language of the antidegradation rule required EPD to perform the antidegradation analysis for nonpoint source discharges, and that EPD’s internal guidelines to the contrary did not warrant deference. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this matter to consider what level of deference courts should afford EPD's interpretation of the antidegradation rule, and whether that regulation required an antidegradation analysis for nonpint source discharges. The Court concluded the Court of Appeals was correct that the antidegradation rule was unambiguous: the text and legal context of the regulation showed that an antidegradation analysis was required only for point sources, not nonpoint sources. Therefore, the Court reversed. View "City of Guyton v. Barrow" on Justia Law