Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Dawsonville City Council voted to remove W. James Grogan as mayor in May 2017. Grogan sought review of the removal by filing a direct appeal and a petition for certiorari with the superior court. Grogan continued to serve as mayor pending the appeal, and the City then filed counterclaims against Grogan for attorneys’ fees and for money had and received to recoup salary paid and other benefits provided to Grogan if the City prevailed before the superior court. Grogan moved to dismiss the City’s counterclaims under Georgia's Anti-SLAPP statute. The superior court dismissed Grogan’s appeal of the removal decision, found his certiorari petition was “procedurally defective,” denied his motion to dismiss the City’s counterclaims, and granted partial summary judgment on the City’s money-had-and-received counterclaim. Grogan argued to the Georgia Supreme Court he had the right to a direct appeal to the superior court and that his certiorari petition was not procedurally defective. Grogan also argued the superior court erred in denying his motion to dismiss under the Anti-SLAPP statute because the City’s counterclaims were filed to punish Grogan for exercising his constitutional rights to petition and free speech and the City did not establish a reasonable probability of success on the merits of those counterclaims. Furthermore, Grogan argued the court erred in granting relief to the City on its money-had-and-received counterclaim because it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over that claim and failed to apply the voluntary payment doctrine. The Supreme Court concluded it had jurisdiction over this appeal, but did not consider Grogan’s challenges concerning the superior court’s dismissal of his appeal and certiorari petition from the removal decision because those claims were now moot. The Court determined the trial court erred in granting relief to the City on its money-had-and-received counterclaim. View "Grogan v. City of Dawsonville" on Justia Law

Mark Birdow appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2010 death of Angela Woods. He argued to the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) the State failed to produce sufficient evidence at trial to overcome his claim of self-defense; (2) the trial court erred by excluding the testimony of an expert psychologist Birdow planned to call to testify about his behavior following Woods’ death; (3) the trial court failed to provide him with appropriate technology that would have allowed him to hear the trial proceedings; and (4) his trial counsel was ineffective in several regards. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Birdow's convictions. View "Birdow v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Gabriel Flannigan appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes stemming from the 2007 shooting death of Quantavious Ragsdale. He argued he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, contending counsel erred in admitting irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. Finding no merit to these claims, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Flannigan's convictions. View "Flannigan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Joshua McKelvin was convicted of murdering Marilyn Patterson and assaulting Myra Youngblood, Belinda Hines, and Zeddie Holley. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by: (1) concluding that the defense of involuntary intoxication necessitated pretrial notice to the State; (2) by requiring him to provide the State with a copy of his pretrial mental evaluation; (3) by refusing to excuse a juror and declare a mistrial; (4) by admitting certain rap lyrics into evidence; and (5) by denying a mistrial after, he says, evidence placed his character at issue. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "McKelvin v. Georgia" on Justia Law

McDaniel appealed the denial of numerous post-judgment motions he filed since 2009. He originally pled guilty to felony murder in 2002 and was sentenced to life in prison. The issues common to all these motions involve ineffective assistance of counsel, defective indictment, void sentence and conviction, involuntary plea, and general infringement by the trial court of his constitutional rights. In 2017, the trial court entered a two-paragraph order denying all outstanding motions filed between October 2009 and April 2017. Finding that the trial court properly denied McDaniel's motions, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "McDaniel v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2014, Charles White was found guilty of three counts of rape, one count of statutory rape, ten counts of child molestation, three counts of aggravated sodomy, three counts of incest, and one count of enticing a child for indecent purposes in connection with incidents involving three victims, including S.M., who was a member of White’s extended family. During the course of being questioned about her own sexual misconduct, S.M. disclosed that she had been sexually abused by White since she was five years old and that White had done things to her that were similar to the things that she had done to her stepsisters. Prior to White’s trial, S.M. was adjudicated delinquent in juvenile court for having committed sexual batteries against her two stepsisters. White filed a pretrial motion in limine to have evidence of S.M.’s prior sexual acts excluded from his trial, arguing that the admission of the evidence would have been more prejudicial to White than probative of any issue at trial. The trial court denied White’s motion, and, without further objection from White’s counsel, the State briefly elicited testimony from S.M. regarding her prior sexual misconduct and her delinquency adjudication. Subsequent to his convictions, White moved for a new trial, arguing for the first time that the trial court erred by admitting S.M.'s trial testimony in violation of Georgia's Rape Shield Statute. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals did too, reasoning that the Rape Shield Statute could not be invoked by a defendant to prevent a victim from offering evidence that was otherwise relevant to the case. The Georgia Supreme Court determined: (1) a defendant can invoke the Rape Shield Statute to prohibit the admission of evidence of a witness’s past sexual behavior offered by the State where such offered evidence is inadmissible pursuant to the terms of the Rape Shield Statute; (2) evidence of a complaining witness’s past sexual behavior is only admissible under the Rape Shield Statute if that evidence is relevant to the issue of consent; and (3) the trial court did improperly admit evidence of the complaining witness’s past sexual behavior in this case, but the admission of this evidence did not amount to plain error requiring reversal of White’s convictions. Accordingly, the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, though on different grounds. View "White v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari in two cases involving the liquidation of an insurance company to review the Court of Appeals’ decision in State of Georgia v. International Indemnity Company, 809 SE2d 64 (2017). The dispositive issue presented was whether the official immunity provision in OCGA 33-37-8.1 applied to claims for a “surcharge” and attorney fees against the State Insurance Commissioner and two other state employees, all in their official capacities as the liquidator and his deputies, and against a private company involved in the liquidation. The Court determined the Court of Appeals incorrectly concluded that section 33-37-8.1 would be applicable to these parties, and reversed that part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment allowing the claims to proceed against the state officer and employees in their official capacities. The Court affirmed in all other respects, meaning the case could proceed against the private company. View "Georgia v. International Indemnity Co." on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari review in this case to resolve whether the trial court applied Georgia's forum non conveniens statute to dismiss a lawsuit filed in Georgia by Michigan residents against a Georgia corporation, instead of the foreign county where the underlying incident occurred. While vacationing in the Dominican Republic in 2014, Appellant Francis La Fontaine was injured in a fall from a collapsed zip-line at a course operated by Cumayasa Sky Adventures (CSA). She and her husband, Appellant Roberto Melendez, were Michigan residents and filed a tort action in Douglas County, Georgia against Appellee Signature Research, Inc. Appellee was a Georgia corporation that inspected and certified the zip-line course operated by CSA. Appellee filed a motion to dismiss based on forum non conveniens saying it would submit to jurisdiction in the Dominican Republic and it would agree to extend the applicable statute of limitations period. Pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1, the trial court granted Appellee’s motion because the balance of private and public factors weighed in favor of adjudicating this matter in the Dominican Republic. The Supreme Court found that strictly construed OCGA 9-10-31.1 did not provide for dismissals of actions unless the claim should be moved to one of the other 49 states. The judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the dismissal of Appellants’ action pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1 was reversed. View "La Fontaine v. Signature Research, Inc." on Justia Law

Following the habeas court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, Richard Bishop filed an application for certificate of probable cause with the Georgia Supreme Court. The Court granted Bishop’s application to determine whether he was provided a full and fair hearing on his petition for writ of habeas corpus below. Shortly after shooting and killing his girlfriend and injuring her other boyfriend in 2009, then-76-year-old Bishop was arrested. Twelve days later, representing himself, Bishop pled guilty to malice murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to life in prison, plus twenty years to run concurrently. In 2014, then 81 years old, Bishop filed for habeas relief, asking for "assistance" from the court because he was unable to read (even with glasses), and had questions for the attorney to helped him at his plea hearing. The Warden filed an objection to the motion for assistance, arguing that there was no authority for the habeas court to provide Bishop with counsel. Bishop responded and clarified that he was not requesting that counsel be appointed, he simply needed someone to read for him. Though the habeas court acknowledged Bishop’s eye problems, it initially treated Bishop’s request as one for the appointment of counsel and found that Bishop was not entitled to any such appointment. The habeas court went on to express concern that Bishop’s written questions were conceived by an inmate other than Bishop, as the habeas court apparently recognized the handwriting. The Warden then objected to Bishop’s motion and his use of the pre-prepared questions, and the habeas court declined Bishop’s request to have someone read the proposed questions on Bishop’s behalf. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that under the circumstances of this case, conceded by the Warden, the appointment of a reader for Bishop in light of his undisputed visual impairment, was necessary to satisfy his due process right to a full and fair hearing. The Court vacated the ruling of the habeas court and remanded this case for a new hearing. View "Bishop v. Hall" on Justia Law

James Parker was tried by jury and convicted of the 2014 murder of Alan Helmuth. Parker appealed, claiming that the trial court erred when it charged the jury and that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel. The Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Parker v. Georgia" on Justia Law