Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The trial court in this case ordered the sheriff to take Ricky Lee Carr into custody solely because Carr had been charged with committing violent crimes and found mentally incompetent to stand trial. The court directed Carr be transferred to and held by the Georgia Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Disabilities for evaluation within 90 days as to whether there is a substantial probability that he will attain competency in the foreseeable future. In this appeal, Carr argued this detention by the State violated his constitutional due process rights. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed that indefinite or even unreasonably extended detention under OCGA 17-7-130 (c) would be unconstitutional, but did not agree that the statute permitted such extended detention. Instead, the Court construed 17-7-130 (c) as limiting the detention it authorizes to the reasonable time needed to fulfill its purpose. And because Carr initiated this appeal shortly after he was ordered to be detained, he had not yet shown on the record that the duration of his confinement was unreasonable. The Supreme Court agreed automatic detention, without an individualized determination of whether the confinement reasonably advanced the government’s purpose violated a defendant’s right to due process, and therefore held that this part of 17-7-130 (c) could not be applied constitutionally to Carr or similarly situated defendants who were not already being detained on another, lawful ground. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment ordering Carr to be detained for inpatient evaluation, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Carr v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In Lynchar, Inc. v. Colonial Oil Industries, Inc., 801 SE2d 576 (2017), the Court of Appeals found that certain individual guaranties of Lynchar, Inc.’s debt to Colonial Oil Industries, Inc. were unenforceable under Georgia’s Statute of Frauds. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the guaranties were unenforceable because they did not reference the legal name of the corporate debtor (“Lynchar, Inc. d/b/a T & W Oil Company”), but instead referenced only the corporate debtor’s trade name (“T&W Oil, Inc.”). The Georgia Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari filed by Colonial Oil and posed two questions: (1) To what extent did a misnomer or other defect in the identification of the principal debtor render a contract of suretyship or guaranty unenforceable; and (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the guaranties sought to be enforced against appellees are unenforceable? The Supreme Court held: (1) to the extent that any misnomer or clerical defect created any ambiguity or Lynchar contended that it was not a party to the guaranty, parol evidence would be admissible to identify the parties to the guaranty; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred by holding the guaranty was unenforceable. View "Colonial Oil Industries, Inc. v. Lynchar, Inc." on Justia Law

In Lynchar, Inc. v. Colonial Oil Industries, Inc., 801 SE2d 576 (2017), the Court of Appeals found that certain individual guaranties of Lynchar, Inc.’s debt to Colonial Oil Industries, Inc. were unenforceable under Georgia’s Statute of Frauds. Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the guaranties were unenforceable because they did not reference the legal name of the corporate debtor (“Lynchar, Inc. d/b/a T & W Oil Company”), but instead referenced only the corporate debtor’s trade name (“T&W Oil, Inc.”). The Georgia Supreme Court granted a petition for certiorari filed by Colonial Oil and posed two questions: (1) To what extent did a misnomer or other defect in the identification of the principal debtor render a contract of suretyship or guaranty unenforceable; and (2) Did the Court of Appeals err in holding that the guaranties sought to be enforced against appellees are unenforceable? The Supreme Court held: (1) to the extent that any misnomer or clerical defect created any ambiguity or Lynchar contended that it was not a party to the guaranty, parol evidence would be admissible to identify the parties to the guaranty; and (2) the Court of Appeals erred by holding the guaranty was unenforceable. View "Colonial Oil Industries, Inc. v. Lynchar, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Robert Ware was found guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the December 2015 shooting death of his wife, Michelle. On appeal, Ware argued the evidence at trial was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction, and that the trial court erred in denying his request for a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter and in allowing the State to introduce a piece of “other acts” evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b). The Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed. View "Ware v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In November 2013, the Consumer Credit Research Foundation (CCRF) entered a consulting agreement with the Kennesaw State University Research and Service Foundation under which Dr. Jennifer Lewis Priestley, a professor at Kennesaw State University (KSU), would research the effects of payday loans on the financial health of their consumers. As part of this project, Dr. Priestley – but not KSU or the KSU foundation – signed a confidentiality agreement with CCRF agreeing not to disclose any information “relating in any manner to CCRF or CCRF’s contributing sponsors.” Dr. Priestley published an article about her findings in December 2014. In June 2015, the Campaign for Accountability (CFA) sent a request to KSU under Georgia’s Open Records Act, asking for copies of all correspondence, electronic or otherwise, between Dr. Priestley and a number of organizations and individuals, including CCRF and its chairman and CEO. After KSU notified CFA and CCRF that it intended to disclose the requested records subject to possible redactions, CCRF filed a complaint against the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (the Board). CCRF sought a declaratory judgment that the records requested by CFA were exempt from disclosure under OCGA 50-18-72(a)(35) and (36) and a permanent injunction prohibiting the Board from disclosing the records. The trial court granted CFA’s motion to intervene in the case as a party defendant. The Court of Appeals held, based on its reading of the Georgia Supreme Court’s decision in Bowers v. Shelton, 453 SE2d 741 (1995), Georgia’s Open Records Act prohibited the disclosure of all information that was not required to be disclosed based on the ORA exemptions listed the statute. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to address that issue, disapproved of the Court of Appeals’ broad reading of Bowers and reversed the court’s judgment. View "Campaign for Accountability v. Consumer Credit Research Foundation" on Justia Law

Amy Cazier and four other consumers of retail electrical service brought this putative class action against Georgia Power Company, asserting that Georgia Power for several years has collected municipal franchise fees from customers in amounts exceeding those approved by the Public Service Commission, and sought to recover the excess fees for themselves and a class of Georgia Power customers. The Court of Appeals held that the plaintiffs were not required to exhaust administrative remedies before bringing their putative class action. The Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment and affirmed. View "Georgia Power Company v. Cazier" on Justia Law

Willie Terrell was tried by jury and convicted of murder and related crimes in connection with a shooting that killed Anthony Thomas and Tanisha Johnson and wounded Tanisha’s one-year-old son, K.T. Terrell argued on appeal that the trial court deprived him of his constitutional right to testify. Terrell told the court that his lawyer advised him not to testify but that he (Terrell) “[didn’t] know what to do.” Terrell explained that he wanted to testify but was “too stressed out.” Upon further questioning by the court, Terrell said he was upset that no other witnesses would be called on his behalf, and he again stated: “I wish to testify, just not right at this time. I’m too upset right now. I don’t think it would be fair to me, and the prosecutor have fair shots at me — unfair shots at me.” Terrell asked the court if he could delay testifying until the following morning. The court rejected his request, stating that the jury would be present for another hour and 15 minutes, and that if Terrell wished to testify, he would have to begin that day. When Terrell refused to take the stand, the trial court found that Terrell “chose not to testify, with a complete understanding of his rights.” Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Terrell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Stevie Lamar Garner was tried by jury and found guilty of murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and other crimes in the shooting death of Patrick Marcus Edwin Wall. Garner appealed, arguing the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury on self- defense. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Garner's convictions. View "Garner v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In August 2015, Doug and Lynda Tatum applied to the Pickens County Board of Commissioners for a conditional use permit for a 75-acre parcel near Jasper. The application was referred to the Pickens County Planning Commission for a hearing. Following the publication of notice, the Planning Commission held a hearing in October 2015, at which several neighbors appeared and objected to the application. The Planning Commission nevertheless recommended that the application be approved, and in January 2016, the Board approved it. Some of the neighbors filed a petition for judicial review, asserting that they were denied a meaningful opportunity to be heard on the application. The neighbors moved for summary judgment, but the superior court denied it, agreeing with the Board that the notice of the October 2015 hearing was enough to satisfy the ZPL. The neighbors appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed, finding the problem with the Board decision was that it rested upon the premise that the October 2015 hearing before the Planning Commission (and the notice of that hearing) was enough to satisfy the notice-and-hearing requirements of the ZPL. "[T]he whole point of the statutory notice-and-hearing requirements is to afford interested citizens a meaningful opportunity to be heard on a proposed zoning decision. [. . .] when a hearing is too attenuated in time or circumstance from the final zoning decision, another hearing may be required." The Planning Commission in this case had no authority to make a final zoning decision, and it could only make recommendations to the Board. If an adequate record of the hearing before the Planning Commission had been made and transmitted to the Board — such that the final zoning decision of the Board could be said to have been meaningfully informed by what happened at the hearing — the hearing before the Planning Commission might satisfy the requirements of the ZPL. "But it appears that the only record of that hearing is a one-page memorandum to the Board" failed to disclose even the general nature of “considerable objections.” Accordingly, it could not be said that the hearing before the Planning Commission afforded interested citizens a meaningful opportunity to be heard by the Board on the application for a conditional use permit, and the October 2015 hearing does not satisfy the notice-and-hearing requirements of the ZPL. View "Hoechstetter v. Pickens County" on Justia Law

Sean Nalls and Montrella Baskin appealed their convictions for malice murder and other charges stemming from an incident in which William Hughes was killed while attempting to buy drugs. Nalls argued: (1) the trial court erred by failing to limit a jury instruction on justification as applying only to Baskin; and (2) the instruction was an improper comment on the evidence in violation of OCGA 17-8-57. Baskin argued the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it was not permitted to find him guilty of murder as a party to a crime if it found that his participation was limited to being an accessory after the fact, resulting in mutually exclusive convictions for murder and hindering the apprehension of a criminal that all must be vacated as void. The Georgia Supreme Court found that because any error in failing to limit the jury instruction on justification to Baskin did not affect the outcome of the trial and because the instruction did not violate the version of OCGA 17-8-57 in effect at the time of trial, it affirmed Nalls’ convictions. And because the Court overruled case law that held that murder and hindering convictions were always mutually exclusive, and because the other precedent cited by Baskin did not require the jury instruction he said should have been given, the Court found no reversible error on the arguments he raised. View "Nalls v. Georgia" on Justia Law