Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Michael Jordan was convicted of felony murder and related offenses arising out of the shooting death of Stacy Johnson and the aggravated assaults of Rodney Miles and Shatik Bryant. On appeal, Jordan argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdicts; (2) the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence; (3) he was entitled to a mistrial; and (4) that the trial court should have granted his motion for new trial. Though the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error, it did find error in certain aspects of Jordan's sentence. The Court vacated and remanded for resentencing. View "Jordan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Maurice Thomas was tried by a jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the fatal shooting of Eugene Grier. Thomas appealed, contending that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his lawyer opened the door and failed to object to evidence of a statement made by his codefendant, which, Thomas says, violated Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968). Finding no such violation or other reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Thomas' conviction. View "Thomas v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following the Court of Appeals’ decision in RL BB ACQ I-GA CVL, LLC v. Workman, 798 SE2d 677 (2017), the Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider two questions: (1) whether attorney fees and costs are available under OCGA 9-15-14 for conduct that occurs during the course of post-judgment discovery; and (2) whether an entity is barred from seeking sanctions under OCGA 9-11-37 by failing to request sanctions at the time it sought and obtained a protective order under OCGA 9-11-26. The Court of Appeals reversed that portion of the order awarding fees pursuant to OCGA 9-15-14, concluding that the statute spoke only to conduct occurring during the course of a “lawsuit,” which concludes at judgment, and, thus, did not apply to post-judgment discovery proceedings. The appellate court also noted, without discussion, that OCGA 9-15-14 did not apply to non-parties. With respect to the fee award made pursuant to OCGA 9-11-37(a)(4)(A), the Court of Appeals questioned whether Appellants’ “failure to request their expenses at the time they sought the protective order barred them from seeking those expenses by way of a separate motion, filed more than 40 days after the protective order was entered,” and remanded the case to the trial court to consider the waiver issue. The Supreme Court answered the first question in the affirmative, the second in the negative, and, in so doing, affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals. View "Workman et al. v. RL BB ACQ I-GA CVL, LLC et al." on Justia Law

In 1995, Barry Davis pled guilty to aggravated sodomy against his six-year-old daughter and was sentenced to ten years with two to serve in confinement. After the enactment of OCGA 42-1-12 in 1996, he was required to register for life as a sex offender upon his release on probation. After his release from prison, Davis’ probation terminated on July 15, 2005. On February 13, 2013, Davis obtained a pardon from the Board of Pardons and Paroles. Shortly after receiving the pardon, Davis moved to North Carolina without providing notice within 72 hours to the Chatham County Sheriff as required of sex offenders by OCGA 42-1-12 (f) (5). He was indicted for violation of that Code section by “fail[ing] to update his address, required registration information, with the Sheriff of Chatham County. . . within 72 hours prior to such change of residence . . . .” He filed a general demurrer to the indictment for failure to charge a criminal offense, contending that the requirement to register as a sex offender was removed by the pardon. The trial court found that, in the absence of express language in the Board’s decree, Davis’ pardon did not release him from the obligation to register as a sex offender. It therefore denied the general demurrer. The Georgia Supreme Court granted this petition for certiorari to consider two questions: (1) whether the Georgia Supreme Court’s constitutional question jurisdiction was invoked by the issue of the authority of the Board of Pardons and Paroles to remove the requirements imposed upon sex offenders by OCGA 42-1-12 under its constitutional power “to remove disabilities imposed by law;” and (2) if yes, then whether the trial court erred in concluding that the registration and reporting requirements of that Code section were not a “disability” within the meaning of the Board’s constitutional powers, and therefore denying Davis’ general demurrer. The Supreme Court answered both questions in the affirmative, therefore finding it had to vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals, decide the constitutional claims presented by this petition, and reverse the trial court’s judgment. View "Georgia v. Davis" on Justia Law

Margarita Leanos appealed after she was convicted for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the killing of a taxi driver, Isaias Tovar Murillo. On appeal, Leanos challenged the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict her. She also argued trial counsel was ineffective for failing to: (1) notice that Leanos had been medicated into incompetence; (2) present a cohesive defense theory; (3) object to references to Leanos’s character; and (4) request a severance of the gang charges. The Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error, finding the evidence was sufficient to sustain the convictions and Leanos did not show her trial counsel was ineffective. View "Leanos v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Candice Reis and Melvin Williams appealed the grant of summary judgment to defendant OOIDA Risk Retention Group, Inc. (“OOIDA”) in a direct action against OOIDA and others arising from a vehicular collision involving Plaintiffs and a motor carrier insured by OOIDA. At issue was whether provisions in the federal Liability Risk Retention Act of 1986 (“the LRRA”), 15 USC 3901, et seq., preempted Georgia’s motor carrier and insurance carrier direct action statutes, OCGA sections 40-1-112 (c),1 40-2-140 (d) (4), in regard to risk retention groups, thereby precluding this direct action against OOIDA. After review of the statutes at issue here, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded there was indeed federal preemption of this action against OOIDA, and consequently, affirmed summary judgment. View "Reis et al. v. OOIDA Risk Retention Group, Inc. et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Allen Watson was convicted of felony murder and possession of a firearm in connection with the 2014 shooting death of Jackise McKie. On appeal, he contended the trial court erred by allowing the lead detective to testify as a firearms expert, and raised two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Watson’s conviction. View "Watson v.Georgia" on Justia Law

Matthew Pike (“Pike”), and Daniel Slaton (“Daniel”), and appellant William Slaton, were jointly indicted for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of Justin Klaffka. Daniel, appellant’s brother, pled guilty to several crimes and testified for the State at appellant’s trial. Appellant was tried along with Pike, and both were convicted of malice murder. The Georgia Supreme Court previously affirmed Pike’s conviction; following the denial of appellant’s motion for new trial, as amended, he appealed, contending, among other things, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in numerous respects. Finding no such ineffective assistance, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant’s conviction. View "Slaton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2005, a jury found Jordan Warbington guilty of murder, felony murder, and aggravated assault in the bludgeoning death of Kenneth “Tate” Cain in the break room of the Warbington family mortuary. The judgment of conviction was affirmed in 2007. Warbington alleged that, after indictment and before his trial and conviction for murder, he was incarcerated in the state prison system for an unrelated offense after his parole was revoked. In 2017, Warbington filed a pro se “Motion for Jail-Credit Time” in his original criminal proceeding, seeking to have the time served on the unrelated offense after his parole was revoked credited against his subsequently imposed sentence for murder. The motion was denied by the trial court, and Warbington appeals to this Court. The Georgia Supreme Court determined that raising a motion in his original criminal proceeding was not the appropriate avenue through which Warbington should have sought relief: a prisoner seeking credit fortime served should generally seek relief through a petition for writ of mandamus against the official responsible for calculation of the time. The Georgia Court “[has] made clear that the proper procedure for seeking relief is not a point to be overlooked, even if the claim is clearly meritless.” While the trial court recognized this issue, noting that “pursuant to OCGA 17-10-12, the duty to award credit for time served is the duty of the Georgia Department of Corrections,” it denied the motion when it should have been dismissed as a nullity. Because the motion was a nullity, it presented nothing to appeal, and Warbington’s appeal was therefore dismissed. View "Warbington v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Deion Smith was found guilty of malice murder and arson in connection with the violent death of 15-year-old Jasmine Moore. Smith appealed, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the sufficiency of the indictment and failing to thoroughly cross-examine Smith’s codefendant, Tyberius Murchinson. Because the Georgia Supreme Court found Smith’s trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective, it affirmed his conviction. View "Smith v. Georgia" on Justia Law