Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In October 1999, pursuant to the Service Delivery Strategy Act (SDS), Greene County, Georgia and five municipalities within the County, including the City of Union Point, entered into various intergovernmental agreements governing local services. In 2015, the City of Union Point filed a “Complaint for TRO, Interlocutory and Permanent Injunction,” alleging that Greene County had unilaterally discontinued police and fire dispatch and communications services to the City’s police and fire departments and had ignored attempts to resolve the issue. The trial court entered a temporary restraining order directing the County to resume dispatch and communications services. A month later, in response to a motion to dismiss, the City amended its complaint to seek a declaratory judgment and mediation under the SDS Act. After the County filed a second motion to dismiss on the grounds of sovereign immunity, standing, and untimely request for mediation, the City again amended its complaint to assert claims for breach of contract, mandamus, specific performance, injunction and attorney fees, and attached a certified copy of the service delivery agreements on file with the Georgia Department of Community Affairs. Before the Georgia Supreme Court, this case called into question the constitutionality of the evidentiary hearing process provided by OCGA 36-70-25.1 (d) (2). In its order entered at the end of the hearing process, the trial court found that portion of the statute unconstitutional, and further found that sovereign immunity barred all claims and remedies except those provided for in the SDS Act itself. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling on sovereign immunity, but reversed its finding on the constitutionality of OCGA 36-70-25.1 (d) (2). Furthermore, the Court found the trial court exceeded the bounds of the statutory process by going beyond the remedies provided to order particular actions by the parties and by considering matters not submitted to mediation. View "City of Union Point v. Greene County" on Justia Law

The State of Georgia appealed the grant of habeas relief in regard to appellee Jude Ebele Aduka, a citizen of Nigeria. Appellee was arrested in 2007 after being found with numerous counterfeit goods. An indictment was handed down in 2009 and thereafter the State offered a plea deal which appellee rejected because of concerns he had about how such a deal would impact his immigration status. In 2012, however, appellee pleaded guilty to a single count of offer for sale of counterfeit goods. During the plea colloquy with the trial court, appellee stated he understood that entering a guilty plea “may have an impact” on his immigration status and that he understood that his guilty plea “could mean [he] could be deported.” The trial court sentenced appellee to five years of “confinement” to be served entirely on probation and ordered him to pay a fine. In 2015, appellee was arrested by federal immigration agents. Appellee petitioned for habeas relief concerning his 2012 plea and conviction. While the habeas petition was still pending, an immigration judge issued an order for appellee’s removal from the United States due to his counterfeit goods conviction. In his habeas petition, appellee alleged that plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective because he failed to advise appellee that pleading guilty to a violation of OCGA 10-1-454 would subject him to mandatory deportation for committing an “aggravated felony” under federal law. The habeas court determined plea counsel was deficient by failing to inform appellee that he would be deported if he pleaded guilty to violating OCGA 10-1-454 (c). The habeas court found plea counsel’s informing appellee that he “may” be deported was not reasonable upon a direct reading of the federal statute at issue. The Georgia Supreme Court found appellee's plea counsel did not act outside the wide range of reasonable conduct afforded attorneys who represent criminal defendants, including those defendants who are noncitizens, when he advised appellee that he “could be” deported, rather than informing appellee that he “would be” deported if he entered the plea in question. Accordingly, the Court reversed the habeas court's judgment. View "Georgia v. Aduka" on Justia Law

In 2013, a grand jury returned an indictment charging Dijon Cortez Abbott with murder and the related crimes of aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, unlawful gang activity, criminal damage to property in the second degree, and reckless conduct, all in connection with the fatal shooting of Marques Eubanks and the wounding of two others. The superior court entered an order suppressing the entirety of Abbott’s video-recorded statements with two sheriff deputies, finding Abbott was in custody no later than the time when he was placed in an interrogation room and shackled to the floor, because no reasonable person could believe that he was free to leave under Abbott’s circumstances. Considering all of the circumstances, the superior court not only excluded Abbott’s pre-Miranda statements, it also excluded all of his post-Miranda statements as having resulted from an “interrogate first, warn later” procedure. The State of Georgia appealed the suppression of the recorded statements. In this case, the superior court did not address the existence, credibility, or weight of any such evidence, nor did the court make any findings or draw any conclusion as to whether Langford’s two-step interrogation was a deliberate strategy, used in a calculated way to undermine the Miranda warning. Accordingly, the superior court’s judgment suppressing Abbott’s post-Miranda statements was vacated, and the case remanded so that the superior court could make further findings of fact and apply the correct legal standard. View "Georgia v. Abbott" on Justia Law

Travis Graves was acquitted of armed robbery but found guilty of two counts each of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the deaths of Antonio Smith and Delaine King. His amended motion for new trial was denied, and he appealed, arguing as his sole enumeration of error the trial court’s striking of alibi testimony for failure to give notice under OCGA 17-16-5 (a). Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Graves’ conviction. View "Graves v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2012, Bryan Harrell was driving his pickup truck at more than 50 miles per hour when he rear-ended the 1999 Jeep in which four-year-old Remington Walden was a rear-seat passenger, with his aunt behind the wheel. The impact left Harrell and Remington’s aunt unhurt, but fractured Remington’s femur. The impact also caused the Jeep’s rear-mounted gas tank to rupture and catch fire. Remington burned to death trying to escape; he lived for up to a minute as he burned, and witnesses heard him screaming. Remington’s parents (“Appellees”) sued both Chrysler and Harrell for wrongful death. At trial, in March and April of 2015, Appellees challenged the Jeep’s vehicle design, arguing that Chrysler should not have used a rear-mounted fuel tank. When questioning Chrysler Chief Operating Officer Mark Chernoby at trial, Appellees’ counsel asked about the CEO’s salary, bonus, and benefits; Marchionne himself was never questioned about his income and benefits. The trial court overruled Chrysler’s repeated relevance and wealth-of-a-party objections to this line of questioning. Appellees’ counsel referenced Marchionne’s compensation testimony again in closing, arguing, “what [Chrysler’s counsel] said Remi’s life was worth, Marchionne made 43 times as much in one year.” The jury determined that Chrysler acted with a reckless or wanton disregard for human life and failed to warn of the hazard that killed Remington. In affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeal discussed admission of CEO compensation, holding “evidence of a witness’s relationship to a party is always admissible” and that the CEO’s compensation “made the existence of [the CEO’s] bias in favor of Chrysler more probable.” The Georgia Supreme Court held not that compensation evidence is always admissible to show the bias of an employee witness, or that it is never admissible, but that such evidence is subject to the Rule 403 analysis weighing the evidence’s unfair prejudice against its probative value. Because Chrysler did not raise a Rule 403 objection to the compensation evidence at issue in this appeal, the Supreme Court considered the question not under the ordinary abuse-of-discretion standard, but as a question of plain error. The Court concluded that under the particular circumstances of this case, it could not say that the prejudicial effect of the evidence so far outweighed its probative value that its admission was clear and obvious reversible error. Accordingly, although the Supreme Court disagreed with the rationale of the Court of Appeals, it ultimately affirmed its judgment. View "Chrysler Group, LLC v. Walden" on Justia Law

In 2015, Timothy Hudson turned 16. Twenty-four days later, he and two accomplices held a man at gunpoint and stole the man’s car, wallet, and cell phone. All three perpetrators were arrested later that day. Hudson was indicted as an adult for hijacking a motor vehicle, armed robbery, aggravated assault, possession of a firearm during commission of a felony, fleeing and attempting to elude, and obstruction of a law enforcement officer. Hudson entered a negotiated plea in the superior court, pleading guilty to the armed robbery, aggravated assault, firearm possession, and obstruction charges. The State nol prossed the hijacking and fleeing counts. The State agreed to a sentence of ten years, five in prison and five on probation, for the armed robbery conviction, which otherwise would have required a minimum prison sentence of ten years with no option of probation or parole. The specific question presented by this case was whether OCGA 49-4A-9 (e) gave a superior court the authority to reduce the original prison sentence imposed on a defendant who was under age 17 when he committed an armed robbery. Because the discretion given to sentencing courts by section 49-4A-9 (e) was limited by the mandatory minimum sentence requirements of OCGA 17-10- 6.1, the Georgia Supreme Court held that the superior court erred in reducing Hudson’s original prison sentence for armed robbery. The Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed to the extent that it affirmed that reduced sentence. View "Georgia v. Hudson" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals in the preceding case, Cooper Tire & Rubber Company v. Koch, 793 SE2d 564 (2016), properly articulated the legal standard for when a plaintiff’s duty to preserve evidence begins and properly applied that standard to the facts of this case. Like a defendant’s duty, a plaintiff’s duty to preserve relevant evidence in her control arises when that party actually anticipates or reasonably should anticipate litigation. Because the Court of Appeals appropriately identified and applied this standard, as did the trial court, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cooper Tire & Rubber Co. v. Koch" on Justia Law

Appellant Margie Owens was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder, felony murder based on aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, all in connection with the shooting death of her husband, Randall Owens. In June 1998, the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve life in prison for felony murder and a consecutive term of five years on the firearm count; the court merged the voluntary manslaughter verdict into the felony murder conviction. It then took 19 years for her motion for new trial to be decided and her notice of appeal and the record in the case transmitted to the Georgia Supreme Court. In this appeal, Appellant contended her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance and that her conviction and sentence for felony murder instead of voluntary manslaughter violated the modified merger rule the Georgia Supreme Court adopted in Edge v. Georgia, 414 SE2d 463 (1992). The Supreme Court found Appellant failed to show ineffective assistance of counsel, but she was correct that her conviction and sentence for felony murder violated the modified merger rule. Accordingly, the Court affirmed Appellant’s conviction and sentence on the firearm count, vacated her conviction and sentence for felony murder, and remanded the case to the trial court with direction to enter a conviction and sentence for voluntary manslaughter. View "Owens v. Georgia" on Justia Law

John Jacobs was found guilty by jury of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of his wife, Harriette. On appeal, Jacobs argued the trial court erred: (1) in allowing certain statements of Harriette to be admitted at trial under the residual hearsay exception contained in OCGA 24-8-807; (2) that the trial court erred in its instruction on good character evidence; and (3) that his trial counsel was ineffective. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Jacobs’ conviction. View "Jacobs v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Soon after Tara Grinstead went missing from Irwin County in October 2005, her disappearance attracted significant media attention. The Georgia Bureau of Investigation and other law enforcement agencies investigated her disappearance for more than eleven years, and throughout the course of that investigation, news organizations continued to show an interest, reporting from time to time on her disappearance and developments in the investigation. When Ryan Duke was arrested in 2017 and charged with Grinstead’s murder, his arrest was the subject of extensive media coverage. Media coverage was most intense in Irwin County and surrounding areas of central and south Georgia. To a lesser extent, the record showed that Duke’s arrest also was covered by television stations and newspapers in Atlanta, as well as some national news organizations. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review a gag order instituted in this case, which restrained the lawyers, the defendant and the lawyers in a related case, court personnel, and current and retired law enforcement personnel from making extrajudicial, public statements on certain subjects related to the murder case for so long as it remained pending. The Supreme Court held gag orders like this one may be constitutionally permissible in exceptional circumstances, but the record here did not reveal circumstances sufficiently exceptional to warrant such a restraint. For that reason, the Supreme Court vacated the gag order. View "WXIA-TV v. Georgia" on Justia Law