Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether a locked entry door to a homeowner’s residence provided sufficient notice to a would-be trespasser that he or she is forbidden from entering the premises. The Court of Appeals held that David Harper, a bail recovery agent, could not be found guilty of trespass under OCGA 16-7-21(b)(2) as a matter of law after he entered the residence of Tina McDaniel through a locked door from her backyard without McDaniel’s knowledge or permission to arrest Stephen Collier, a man whose criminal bond had been forfeited. Harper gained access to the residence by either reaching his hand through a doggy door attached to the larger locked door and unlocking it, or crawling through the doggy door to do so. Collier did not live at the house, and was there only to work on a vehicle. Harper was a stranger to McDaniel, as he had not been given any access to McDaniel’s home on any prior occasion and had no prior relationship with her. The Court of Appeals concluded that, because a finding of guilt under OCGA 16-7-21(b)(2) “requires proof that the accused entered [the premises in question] knowingly and without authority after having received express notice that the entry was forbidden,” and because “[t]he State failed to produce any evidence showing that Harper was given the required prior express notice not to enter McDaniel’s premises,” Harper could not be found guilty of criminal trespass under the statute. The Supreme Court concluded that the locked door to the residence provided reasonable and sufficiently explicit notice to Harper that entry into McDaniel’s residence was forbidden under the circumstances of this case, and as such, reversed. View "Georgia v. Harper" on Justia Law

Appellant Cassandra Norwood appealed her convictions for crimes related to the death of her newborn child, Josiah Lucas Norwood. Appellant attempted to conceal the child's birth; a sister, who happened to be a trained nurse, discovered a garbage bag filled with bedding in a corner of appellant's room. Trying to dismiss the amount of blood as associated with her menstrual cycle, the sister insisted appellant go to the hospital due to the "abnormal" amount of blood. Once away, the sister discovered a newborn baby, placenta and umbilical cord inside the bag. In her sole enumeration, Appellant alleged the trial court erred by admitting her two statements made to law enforcement officers. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Norwood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Cassandra Norwood appealed her convictions for crimes related to the death of her newborn child, Josiah Lucas Norwood. Appellant attempted to conceal the child's birth; a sister, who happened to be a trained nurse, discovered a garbage bag filled with bedding in a corner of appellant's room. Trying to dismiss the amount of blood as associated with her menstrual cycle, the sister insisted appellant go to the hospital due to the "abnormal" amount of blood. Once away, the sister discovered a newborn baby, placenta and umbilical cord inside the bag. In her sole enumeration, Appellant alleged the trial court erred by admitting her two statements made to law enforcement officers. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Norwood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Suzzett Calloway was convicted in a federal court of several crimes related to manufacturing methamphetamine. She then was convicted in a state court of felony murder predicated on manufacturing meth; the state charges arose from the same conduct as the federal charges. Calloway argued on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court that the State’s prosecution was barred by OCGA 16-1-8 (c), which, in some instances, prohibits a successive prosecution when the accused was previously acquitted or convicted in federal court for the same conduct. Calloway also argued the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s verdicts and that the trial court erred in allowing the prosecutor to “read the law” to the jury during closing arguments. The Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s verdicts, but Calloway’s federal conviction for attempt to manufacture meth barred a successive prosecution for the state crime of felony murder predicated on manufacturing meth. Therefore, the Court reversed her felony murder conviction, which unmerged her other convictions. Of those unmerged convictions, all counts were barred except possession of meth with intent to distribute, and this case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing on that count. The Court’s reversal of Calloway’s felony murder conviction rendered moot her argument about the prosecutor’s reading of the law on the issue of causation as an element of felony murder. View "Calloway v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In a case of first impression for the Georgia Supreme Court, the United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court. The matter at the federal court turned on the interpretation of the 2016 amendment to Chapter 4 of Title 18 relating to garnishment proceedings. Specifically, the federal court asked whether an insurance company is a “financial institution” under the Georgia garnishment statute when the insurance company is garnished based on earnings that it owes the defendant as the defendant’s employer. Harold Blach filed a garnishment action against AFLAC to collect a $158,343.40 judgment that he obtained against Sal Diaz-Verson.He sought to garnish funds that AFLAC periodically pays to Diaz-Verson based on Diaz-Verson’s former employment with the company. Since December 2015, Blach has regularly filed summonses of garnishment against AFLAC, and AFLAC has deposited more than $140,000 into the court’s registry. Diaz-Verson filed motions to dismiss all garnishments filed after May 12, 2016, arguing that because Blach used the general form instead of the form for financial institutions, a portion of the funds in the court’s registry had to be released back to Diaz-Verson. The Georgia Supreme Court answered the federal court’s question in the negative: “viewing the garnishment statutory scheme as a whole, it is clear that ‘financial institution’ in OCGA 18-4-1 (4),for purposes of garnishments served on a financial institution subject to the five-day garnishment period, is limited to entities that are “held out to the public as a place of deposit of funds or medium of savings or collective investment’ and are garnished in that capacity. . . . therefore, an insurance company is not a ‘financial institution’ for purposes of OCGA 18-4-4 (c) (2) when the insurance company is garnished based on earnings that it owes the defendant as the defendant’s employer.” View "Blach v. Diaz-Verson" on Justia Law

Appellant Patrick Fletcher was found guilty of two counts each of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the April 2013 shooting deaths of Wayne and Octavia Brown. Fletcher appealed, contending erroneous admission of “other acts” evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b). Because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded any error in the admission of that evidence was harmless, it affirmed. View "Fletcher v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Eduardo De La Cruz was tried and convicted of the 1996 murder of Brenda Gibbs. On appeal, Appellant claimed four instances of trial court error and two claims of error by the motion for new trial court. Finding no reversible error after review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "De La Cruz v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jamad Jacque Wallace appealed his convictions for murder and other crimes arising from the fatal shooting of Alex Delgado-Ramos (“Delgado”) in a drug store parking lot. Wallace argued on appeal to the Georgia Supreme Court that the trial court erred by: (1) failing to conduct an adequate inquiry prior to replacing a holdout juror with an alternate; and (2) informing the jury that two witnesses were held in contempt for refusing to testify on behalf of the State. He also argued his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to prepare adequately for cross-examination of the State’s primary witness. To the extent that Wallace has preserved these claims for appellate review, the Supreme Court found they lacked merit and affirmed his convictions. View "Wallace v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Samuel Stork was convicted of malice murder in connection with the 2014 shooting death of Rodney Pate. In this appeal, he claimed the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to call a witness. The Georgia Supreme Court determined neither of these claims had merit, so the Court affirmed. View "Stork v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, Kynodious Walton appealed his convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, among other crimes, contending that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel and that the trial court made certain erroneous evidentiary rulings. Finding no reversible error with respect to the convictions themselves, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. But discovering an error in the calculation of his sentence, the Supreme Court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing. View "Walton v. Georgia" on Justia Law