Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Robert Veal was convicted for crimes committed in the course of two armed robberies on November 22, 2010. After a jury found Veal guilty of malice murder and other offenses charged in the indictment against him, the trial court sentenced him to imprisonment for life without parole (“LWOP”) for malice murder; six consecutive life sentences for rape, aggravated sodomy, and four armed robbery convictions; and sentences totaling 60 consecutive years for other convictions involved in the case. Veal argued in his first appeal that because he was under 18 years of age at the time of his crimes, his LWOP sentence was improperly imposed. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed; the trial court made no determination on the record with respect to whether Veal was “irreparably corrupt or permanently incorrigible, as necessary to put him in the narrow class of juvenile murderers for whom an LWOP sentence was proportional under the Eighth Amendment.” Accordingly, the Court vacated the LWOP sentence and remanded the case for resentencing on that count. At the sentencing hearing the trial court conducted on remand, the State announced it would forgo seeking LWOP and, instead, asked the court to impose two additional consecutive life with parole sentences (for the malice murder conviction and one of the armed robbery counts that the trial court previously incorrectly merged with the murder conviction) in addition to the other consecutive life sentences already imposed. Veal introduced published life expectancy tables to support his assertion that the recommended sentence would exceed his life expectancy. The trial court, however, rejected Veal’s assertion that this would amount to a de facto life without parole sentence, and imposed the State’s recommended sentence without making an individualized determination regarding the appropriateness of the sentence pursuant to Miller. Finding no reversible error to this sentence, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Veal v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Aaron McClain was tried by jury and convicted of murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of his wife, Betty Mulbah McClain, and the wounding of his 12-year-old stepdaughter, T.S. McClain appealed, contending: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) that the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the principle of accident and misfortune; and (3) that the court erred when it admitted certain evidence at trial. After reviewing the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "McClain v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Demario Goodrum was found guilty by jury of felony murder and related offenses in connection with the shooting death of Tarvanisha Boyd. In this appeal, Goodrum argued the trial court violated his constitutional right to be present at all critical stages of his trial, and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Goodrum v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Appellant Melvin Brown Jr. was tried and convicted of murder and related offenses committed against Javious Tucker and Cyntrelis Boggs. Brown appealed, claiming that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that other acts evidence was erroneously admitted at trial, and that the trial court erroneously failed to grant Brown’s motion for a mistrial. Because the Georgia Supreme Court found the trial court committed reversible error by admitting Brown’s other acts evidence, it reversed and remanded for a new trial. View "Brown v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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This case presented the issue of whether a trial court has authority to dismiss a prosecutor’s notice of intent to seek the death penalty prior to trial. Appellant Tracen Franklin was eighteen years old at the time of the events involved in this case. He was one of four young men indicted for malice murder and felony murder (predicated on aggravated assault) for beating and kicking to death Bobby Tillman after a teen party. Several trial witnesses identified Franklin as one of three others who joined in, and the four men severely beat, kicked, and stomped Tillman, who was later pronounced dead at the hospital as a result of a ruptured right ventricle of the heart caused by blunt impact. After a period of jury deliberation, the trial court declared the jury to be deadlocked on the issue of punishment. The trial court then sentenced Franklin to life without parole. The trial court denied Franklin’s motion for new trial. On appeal, Franklin claimed the prosecutor sought the death penalty in this case in bad faith, in an attempt to improve the odds of a conviction by seating a death-qualified jury. Even though the death penalty was not imposed, Franklin argued the Georgia Supreme Court should have granted a new trial where a bad-faith purpose for seeking the death penalty is shown. He argued that bad faith was demonstrated in this case because, pursuant to the notice of statutory aggravating circumstances and the evidence the State could (and ultimately did) present in support of these circumstances, he was not eligible for the death penalty as a matter of law. The Supreme Court determined the issue raised by Franklin’s appeal had been decided adversely to appellant’s position, and the Court was not persuaded to change its longstanding ruling on the issue. View "Franklin v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Hiram Jones was tried by jury and convicted of felony murder and armed robbery in connection with the stabbing death of J.M. “Jake” King. On appeal, Jones argued he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer opened a door for the prosecution to elicit otherwise inadmissible evidence of his bad character. Jones also argued the trial court erred when it instructed the jury about the consistency (or lack thereof) of his pretrial statements. After reviewing the record and briefs, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error, and affirmed. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Appellant Tonya Miller appeals her convictions for malice murder and concealing the death of another relating to the death of Cheryl Miranda. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence presented against her at trial, and that the trial court erred in admitting certain hearsay evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Miller’s conviction. View "Miller v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to consider whether an affidavit executed in support of an application for a search warrant that does not specifically say that the residence to be searched was the residence of the suspect could nevertheless be sufficient to establish that connection based on inferences drawn from the affidavit and thus were sufficient to establish a nexus between the evidence to be seized and the place to the searched. The Supreme Court concluded that an affidavit may be sufficient to connect the suspect to the residence based on inferences that can be drawn from the affidavit. View "Taylor v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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The State appealed a trial court’s order granting Roderick Parrish’s pretrial motion in limine to exclude a statement made by one of his codefendants, Kevin Smith. The trial court granted the motion, concluding that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004), precluded the admissibility of Smith’s statement. Parrish and several others were charged in a 59-count indictment for various crimes, including murder and attempted robbery, in the shooting death of Rebecca Foley. The State planned to show that the perpetrators were all members of a street gang; Smith was later arrested for an unrelated aggravated assault and had in his possession a firearm that ballistics testing matched to the one used to kill Foley. During questioning by police, Smith was asked where he bought the gun. He explained that he purchased it in March 2013, which was two months after Foley’s murder, from someone he met “on the street” named “Jarod or Rod” Parrish. Parrish moved to prohibit the use of Smith’s custodial statement at trial on the ground that he was implicated in the statement and had a right to confront Smith. The trial court ruled that because Smith’s statement was not clearly inculpatory, severance of defendants under Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968) was not required, but that Crawford, precluded admissibility in the event Smith did not testify and Parrish had no opportunity to cross-examine him. The Georgia Supreme Court determined Smith’s statement that he bought the gun from Parrish after the murder was not directly inculpatory of Parrish, and so it would have been admissible against Smith with an instruction to the jury to consider the statement only against Smith. The trial court therefore erred in ruling that the statement was wholly inadmissible. Therefore, the Court reversed the trial court’s ruling on the motion in limine and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Georgia v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Blake Harris appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Ray Murphy. Harris argued the trial court improperly commented on a witness’s credibility and that the trial court erred by not allowing him to ask a GBI investigator whether he used a waiver of rights form before interviewing Harris. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s isolated statement, which Harris did not object to, had no effect on the outcome of the trial. Furthermore, the Court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in limiting Harris’s cross-examination because his intended questions were not relevant to any issues at trial. View "Harris v. Georgia" on Justia Law