Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Georgia appealed a habeas court’s order granting relief to appellee Thomas Addaquay on the ground that his plea counsel was constitutionally ineffective in incorrectly advising him of the immigration consequences of his plea of guilty. In 2012, Addaquay pled guilty to criminal damage to property in the second degree for conduct that occurred in 2002 and was sentenced as for a misdemeanor to 11 months and 29 days on probation. At that time, Addaquay was a “green card” holder and lawful permanent resident of the United States. Addaquay did not claim that the deportation consequences of his plea were unclear or uncertain, but instead claimed that he was clearly deportable based on his plea of guilty to criminal damage to property in the second degree and that plea counsel performed deficiently in telling him that he would not be deported. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded this claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was without merit: the decisive issue was whether Addaquay committed the crime within five years of his “date of admission” to this country. Addaquay failed to show that he was deportable under the removal statute, 8 USC 1227. View "Georgia v. Addaquay" on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Pierce was tried by jury and found guilty on six counts of aggravated child molestation, two counts of child molestation, two counts of sexual battery, and one count each of sexual exploitation of a child, distribution of Hydromorphone, and distribution of Alprazolam. The crimes involved acts with three teenage boys, B.M., M.T., and D.D. Pierce appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Georgia Supreme Court because it raised an issue of the constitutionality of a statute, an issue over which the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction. In addition to his constitutional claims, Pierce argued the trial court erred in admitting a videotaped interview of B.M. and photographs of text messages from D.D.’s cell phone. Finding no merit to any of Pierce’s claims, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Pierce v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Brodrick Williams was convicted of malice murder, armed robbery, and a firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of Daniel McGee. Appellant appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) he was deprived of his right to conflict-free counsel. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded: (1) the evidence was legally sufficient to support Appellant’s murder and firearm convictions, but not his armed robbery conviction; and (2) Appellant had not shown his trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest that adversely affected counsel’s representation. The Court therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, remanding the case for further proceedings. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2011, Georgia Trust Bank secured a judgment against Virgil Lovell for $1.2 million. The next year, Georgia Trust failed, and its assets went into receivership with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which later sold the judgment to Community & Southern Bank. When CSB was unable to collect the full amount of the judgment, it discovered a number of recent transactions in which Lovell and his companies had conveyed their respective interests in properties that, CSB believed, otherwise would have been available to satisfy the judgment. In 2015, CSB filed a lawsuit against Lovell, his wife, and several of his companies, asserting claims under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfers Act (UFTA) to set aside those conveyances as fraudulent transfers. The trial court dismissed some of those claims on the ground that they did not state claims upon which relief might properly be granted. After reviewing the transfers, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed in part, and reversed in part. The Court found that trial court erred when it dismissed a claim under the UFTA against Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land, LLC, relating to property in Habersham County: the trial court rested its dismissal of the claim upon the time bar of former OCGA 18-2-79 (1), and did not consider the other grounds asserted by Lovell, his wife, and Ankony Land for dismissing the claim. The trial court reasoned that former Section 18-2-79 (1) was a statute of repose, not a statute of limitation, and the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) did not, it concluded, preempt statutes of repose. CSB contended that this conclusion was in error, and with that contention, the Supreme Court agreed. The Court reversed the trial court on this point, affirmed in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Community & Southern Bank v. Lovell" on Justia Law

This case presented challenges to a municipal zoning ordinance. Because the property owners abandoned their claim that the ordinance was unconstitutionally enacted and did not show that it was unconstitutionally vague as applied to them or that it unconstitutionally interfered with their property rights, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the superior court’s grant of summary judgment to the city. View "Edwards v. City of Warner Robins" on Justia Law

Thomas McBee and his wife Mary (the “McBees”) and Aspire at West Midtown Apartments, L.P. (“Aspire”) were adjoining landowners. The McBees claimed title by prescription to a rectangular strip of land measuring about 24 feet by 58 feet located on a lot to which Aspire held record title. Aspire used this lot and several adjoining properties it owned to develop an apartment complex, thereby depriving the McBees of the use of it. The McBees sued Aspire, and the trial court granted Aspire’s motion for summary judgment on the McBees’ adverse possession claim. Two appeals followed. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court: (1) summarily affirmed the trial court’s order denying Aspire’s motion to dismiss the McBees’ appeal for delay in filing the record appendix; and (2) found that the trial court record did not reflect evidence conclusively rebutting the presumption that the McBee’s had a good faith claim of right to the disputed area. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the order granting summary judgment to Aspire on the McBees’ adverse possession claim, and remanded the case for the trial court to consider Aspire’s other arguments for summary judgment. View "McBee v. Aspire at West Midtown Apartments, L.P." on Justia Law

Matthew Benton was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Christopher “Black Magic” Ramsay and the wounding of several others. Benton’s motion for a new trial was denied, and he appealed, primarily arguing the trial court erred when it refused to suppress incriminating statements he made while in police custody. Because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded Benton’s custodial statements were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights (Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966)), it reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Benton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following the death of Ben Everson, his parents sued Brian Jordan, the emergency room physician who attended to Ben two days before his death. Jordan’s motion for summary judgment was denied by the trial court, and he appealed to the Court of Appeals. In Everson v. Phoebe Sumter Medical Center, 798 SE2d 667 (2017), the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment. In reaching its decision, the Court of Appeals held that an independent, intervening act breaks the chain of causation in a wrongful death case only to the extent that the independent, intervening act was “wrongful or negligent.” Because this holding was erroneous and was in conflict with longstanding precedent of the Georgia Supreme Court, the Supreme Court granted certiorari review and reversed that portion of “Everson.” View "Jordan v. Everson" on Justia Law

In May 2007, the Medical Center Hospital Authority (“Hospital Authority”) filed an action against the Columbus Board of Tax Assessors and related parties (together, “the Tax Board”) in which it sought a declaration that its leasehold interest in a building located on real property owned by a private entity constituted public property exempt from ad valorem taxation under OCGA 48-5-41 (a) (1). The superior court granted summary judgment to the Hospital Authority, finding that the Hospital Authority’s leasehold interest qualified as “public property,” and was thus exempt from ad valorem property taxation. The Tax Board appealed this decision to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in determining that two prior bond validation orders conclusively determined, for purposes of OCGA 48-5-41 (a) (1) (A), that the property at issue was “public property” exempt from ad valorem taxation. The Court held that these orders did not conclusively establish that the Hospital Authority’s leasehold interest was “public property” exempt from ad valorem taxes and therefore reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Columbus Board of Tax Assessors v. Medical Center Hospital Authority" on Justia Law

The issue before the Georgia Supreme Court in this case was whether an employer has to show the availability of suitable employment to justify suspension of workers’ compensation benefits after already establishing that an employee’s work-related aggravation to a preexisting condition has ceased to be the cause of the employee’s disability. The Court of Appeals held the answer was yes; the Supreme Court disagreed, finding the Court of Appeals erred in remanding this case for the ALJ court to determine if the employer demonstrated suitable employment for the injured employee. View "Ocmulgee EMC v. McDuffie" on Justia Law