Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Deron Williams was convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the bludgeoning death of Decarla Lomax. On appeal, Williams argued: (1) the trial court erroneously admitted the record of his first-offender plea; (2) he was entitled to a new trial because of a discovery violation; (3) his trial counsel was ineffective; and (4) he was improperly sentenced as a recidivist. Though the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error with respect to Williams’ trial, the Court agreed that the trial court erred in regard to Williams’ sentence. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Ryan Edwards was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the death of his 13-month old child. Edwards appealed, arguing the trial court: (1) erred in granting the State’s challenge to his use of peremptory strikes against certain jury members; (2) improperly prohibited him from preserving his claim that trial counsel was ineffective; and (3) made a merger error at sentencing. The Georgia Supreme Court agreed the trial court made a merger error and vacated in part and remanded for resentencing, but otherwise affirmed Edwards’s convictions. View "Edwards v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The State appealed after DeCarlos Butler was granted habeas relief on grounds that he received ineffective assistance of plea counsel. In 2010, Butler was indicted on one count of aggravated assault arising out of an altercation with his roommates. Butler was represented by counsel from the public defender’s office, appeared before the trial court and entered a non-negotiated plea pursuant to the First Offender Act. He was sentenced to 8 years to serve 18 months. Several hearings ensued with reference to Butler’s motion to withdraw or amend the plea, at which he was represented at different times by privately retained counsel and by the public defender’s office. That motion was ultimately denied. By 2012, Butler and a third attorney appeared before the court on a sentence modification agreed to by the State concerning additional restitution. Butler received a downward modification of his sentence reflected on a “Final Disposition” form. Neither the form nor the transcript of the hearing mentioned Butler’s first offender status. In 2013, Butler had failed to pay probation fees, or comply with any probation conditions. As a result, the State filed a petition to revoke. The trial court agreed to maintain Butler’s first offender probation despite his violation of the conditions, but required additional compliance on his part. Butler failed to comply again. In 2014, he was arrested for family violence battery, and again arrested and charged with felony terroristic threats, misdemeanor obstruction of a law enforcement officer, and criminal trespass. Butler’s first offender sentence was revoked, and he was re-sentenced to 20 years to serve 8, with the balance of 12 years to be served on probation. After that revocation, Butler filed various pro se motions, seeking to modify his sentence and file an out-of-time appeal. But in January 2015, Butler retained a fourth attorney, who secured Butler an amended sentence of 20 years to serve 6, with the balance of 14 years probated. Before that ruling, Butler filed a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging 25 separate grounds, primarily concerning various factual defenses to the original charges. The habeas court issued its order granting relief, construing Butler’s motions broadly as raising “concerns about whether the criminal court correctly applied the [First Offender Act] in observation that he “argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that he was subjected to double jeopardy and received punishment that was cruel and unusual” at the habeas hearing. The habeas court observed that it “entreated Petitioner to outline all his habeas claims” at the hearing, and concluded that “all of Petitioner’s habeas arguments but for those arguments based on the [First Offender Act] [were] abandoned.” The Georgia Supreme Court found the habeas court erred in granting Butler’s petition, because his allegations of ineffective assistance were procedurally barred by not having been raised at the first practicable moment. View "Georgia v. Butler" on Justia Law

Erwin Brewer was convicted by jury for the murder of Larry Strickland and related crimes. He appealed, contending that the trial court erred by denying a motion for mistrial and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Brewer’s convictions. View "Brewer v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Rodney McCarthy appealed a trial court’s order denying his request for an out-of-time appeal. In 1999, McCarthy, represented by retained counsel, was convicted of malice murder, possession of a firearm during commission of a crime, concealing the death of another, and tampering with evidence in connection with the death of Crystal Harewood. McCarthy requested and received a sentence review, but did not file a motion for new trial or a notice of appeal. McCarthy took no further action in this matter until four years later (in 2004), when he sought a trial transcript. The clerk of court informed McCarthy that the court reporter who took down the trial had suffered a stroke, and that the court did not have any transcripts from that time. At approximately the same time, McCarthy filed a petition for habeas relief, asserting: (1) McCarthy’s trial attorney was constitutionally ineffective for failing to file a notice of appeal or pursue an appeal; (2) that the trial court erred in charging the jury on whether or not the jury could infer an intent to kill; (3) that the trial court erred in failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter; and (4) that McCarthy was denied due process. The special assistant attorney general assigned to McCarthy’s habeas case also requested the transcript, and was given portions taken down by the original reporter, including the court’s charge to the jury, the verdict, and sentencing. The habeas court issued a final order denying the writ, finding that “the gravamen of Petitioner’s claim is that he received ineffective assistance of counsel for counsel’s failure to timely file a notice of appeal.” The habeas court found that McCarthy failed to show that his trial counsel was deficient, specifically finding that both the trial court and McCarthy’s trial counsel advised him of his right to appeal and that McCarthy’s “failure to pursue a direct appeal was due solely to his own inaction.” Finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for an out-of-time appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court. View "McCarthy v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Shamell Stroud was convicted of murder and related offenses in connection with the 2010 stabbing death of Wayne Jackson. Stroud appealed, contending that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of prior felonies committed by Stroud; and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance in failing to object to the prior crimes evidence. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Stroud v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Icon Technology Consulting, Inc. (“Icon”) filed suit seeking to enforce a default judgment it obtained from a Missouri court against Lemcon USA Corp. (“Lemcon”). A Georgia trial court rejected Lemcon’s attempt to set aside the default judgment, and the Georgia Court of Appeals dismissed Lemcon’s appeal on the ground that Lemcon: (1) could not invoke the Georgia trial court’s inherent power to set aside a judgment within the same term of court in which it was entered; and (2) had failed to file an application for discretionary appeal as was necessary to seek review of the trial court’s order to the extent it was based on OCGA 9-11-60 (d). The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the inherent power of a Georgia court to set aside a judgment within the same term of court in which it was entered extended to a foreign judgment domesticated under OCGA 9-12- 130 et seq. The Court concluded this inherent power did not extend to domesticated foreign judgments. View "Lemcon USA Corp. v. Icon Technology" on Justia Law

This case involved the expulsion of then-high school student S.G. by the Henry County Board of Education (“Local Board”) as discipline for fighting on school grounds in violation of the student handbook. Specifically, she was charged with physically abusing others, and with a violation that constituted a misdemeanor under Georgia law. Following an evidentiary hearing before a disciplinary hearing officer, S.G. was expelled from Locust Grove High School, and that decision was affirmed by the Local Board. S.G. then filed an appeal to the Superior Court. After considering the evidentiary record, briefs submitted by the parties, and oral argument, the superior court reversed the State Board’s decision and ordered the Local Board to remove the disciplinary findings from the student’s record and to amend the record to reflect the student’s innocence of the disciplinary charges brought against her. That prompted the Local Board’s appeal to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the superior court’s reversal of the Local Board’s ruling. The Georgia Supreme Court granted the Local Board’s petition for writ of certiorari to examine two issues: whether the Court of Appeals opinion imposed an improper burden of proof upon local school boards with respect to a student’s self-defense claim to disciplinary charges for engaging in a fight; and whether, regardless of its burden of proof analysis, the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the Local Board improperly rejected S.G.’s self-defense claim. After its review, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals for “veering off courts in substituting its own findings of fact instead of remanding the case to the Local Board to apply the proper law to the record evidence and reach its own findings.” View "Henry Cty. Bd. of Education v. S.G." on Justia Law

Appellant Valentino Jackson was convicted of felony murder and associated crimes in connection with the shooting death of Willie Bailey. On appeal, Jackson argued the State engaged in prosecutorial misconduct during closing argument and that his trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. Finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jackson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Michael Terry filed a pro se out-of-time appeal of his conviction for multiple charges involving the murder of his wife, Juanita Terry. Terry shot and killed his wife before turning the gun on himself. The police responded to a 911 call from the Terrys’ 13-year-old son and found and injured Terry and his wife. Terry pled guilty to two counts of felony murder, and one count each of aggravated assault, aggravated battery, and cruelty to children in the first degree. Terry argued he received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel and that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him to withdraw his plea. The Georgia Supreme Court determined Terry’s motion to withdraw the plea was filed outside of the term of court in which the plea was entered and was thus untimely. Pretermitting whether Terry raised a valid claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court determined he was not entitled to appointed counsel to assist with the untimely motion to withdraw his plea. As the trial court explained to Terry at the hearing on the motion, his only available means to withdraw his plea was through habeas corpus proceedings. View "Terry v. Georgia" on Justia Law