Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court. Arthur and Barbara Sheridan owned several pre-1972 master sound recordings of certain popular songs, as well as the associated intellectual property and contract rights. iHeartMedia operated AM/FM radio stations, as well as internet radio services. These latter services allow listeners to access and listen to a song through an internet-connected device such as a tablet, computer, or smartphone. iHeartMedia streamed the Sheridans’ recordings to listeners over its internet radio platform, iHeartRadio. It was undisputed that iHeartMedia had no license, authority, or consent from the Sheridans to stream the recordings, and iHeartMedia did not compensate the Sheridans for the use of their recordings. The Sheridans claimed that iHeartMedia needed their consent to transfer their master sound recordings to iHeartRadio listeners, and that iHeartMedia engaged in racketeering activity by making unauthorized transfers. iHeartMedia moved to dismiss the Sheridans’ complaint under the radio broadcast exemption in OCGA 16-8-60 (c) (1), which stated that the statute did not apply to “any person who transfers or causes to be transferred any such sounds or visual images intended for or in connection with radio or television broadcast transmission or related uses." After review, the Supreme Court found that the type of internet radio services being offered by iHeartMedia, Inc. in this case fell under the exemption set forth in OCGA 16-8-60 (c) (l). View "iHeartMedia, Inc. v. Sheridan" on Justia Law

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The Court of Appeals, in a divided full-court (15-judge) decision, certified to the Georgia Supreme Court a single question of statutory construction: whether OCGA 15-11-521 (b) required dismissal with prejudice when the State neither filed a petition alleging juvenile delinquency within the applicable 30-day period nor seeks an extension of time in which to file such petition. At the time the Court of Appeals certified its question, the Supreme Court had granted petitions for certiorari in two other cases ("M.D.H." and "D.V.H.") to address the same question. The Court held in a single opinion that “if the State fails to file a delinquency petition within the required30 days or to seek and receive an extension of that deadline, the case must be dismissed without prejudice,” and thus affirming the decision in M.D.H. and reversing the decision in D.V.H. Because the answer to the certified question submitted by the Court of Appeals in this case “may be found in the decision of this [C]ourt in [another case,] we will not again undertake to consider the question[]submitted.” View "In the Interest of J.F." on Justia Law

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Appellant La Chona, LLC, brought a quiet title action asserting that it was the owner of property located in the City of Decatur, because it had purchased the property at a tax sale and had barred the right of other interested persons, including appellee Haddis Aberra to redeem the property pursuant to barment notices that it had sent those parties under OCGA 48-4-45. The trial court ruled in favor of Aberra, concluding that, when La Chona sent the barment notices, it did not hold a record interest in the property, was therefore not authorized by law to send the notices, and, accordingly, had not barred Aberra’s right to redeem the property. The trial court also ruled that, even if La Chona had been authorized to send the barment notices, La Chona had waived the requirement of tender as to Aberra. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling that La Chona did not have the right to send the barment notice to Aberra, and because of that ruling, it did not decide the tender issue. View "La Chona, LLC v. Aberra" on Justia Law

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Appellant Kevaughn Rainwater was acquitted of malice murder, but found guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, in the 2012 shooting death of Antavious Maddox. He appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, claiming violations of the continuing witness rule, and contending he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Rainwater v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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In 2013, a grand jury indicted Yonatan Bello for sexual exploitation of children, alleging that he unlawfully possessed video recordings that depict children engaged in sexually explicit conduct. Pursuant to OCGA 17-16-4 (a) (3), Bello demanded that the State produce the video recordings, as well as a written report that was prepared by law enforcement personnel in connection with a forensic examination of Bello’s personal computer. The prosecuting attorneys offered to make arrangements for the defense lawyers to inspect those materials at a secure law enforcement facility, but because the materials contained depictions of children engaged in sexually explicit conduct, the prosecuting attorneys refused to provide copies of the materials to the defense. Bello continued to insist that he was entitled to copies of the video recordings and forensic report, so he filed motions to compel the State to produce copies of those materials. The trial court denied the motions, and this appeal followed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that OCGA 17-16-4(a)(3)(B) was constitutional on its face, and based on the record of this case, concluded it was constitutional as applied in this case. Accordingly, the trial court properly denied the motions, and the Court affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "Bello v. Georgia" on Justia Law

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Drummond Financial Services, LLC and TMX Finance Holdings, Inc. were competitors in the automobile title loan business. Both companies were based in Georgia, with TMX doing business as “TitleMax.” In 2014, Drummond and several of its affiliated companies filed a lawsuit against TitleMax and several of its affiliated companies, alleging that TitleMax was “engaged in a nationwide campaign to systematically and illegally steal [Drummond’s] customers.” Based on these allegations, Drummond asserted claims against TitleMax under the laws of Georgia and various other states for trespass, misappropriation of trade secrets, tortious interference with contracts, and unfair competition. Drummond filed a motion for a nationwide interlocutory injunction to prevent TitleMax from continuing to engage in practices that Drummond alleged were tortious and illegal. Following a hearing, the trial court granted a nationwide interlocutory injunction that prohibited TitleMax from “[e]ntering any of [Drummond’s] [s]tores or the parking lots [or certain portions of the parking lots] of [Drummond’s] [s]tores” to solicit Drummond customers or to record their license plate numbers or vehicle identification numbers (other than for purposes permitted by the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act). In addition, the injunction prohibited TitleMax from offering compensation to Drummond employees to refer Drummond customers to TitleMax. TitleMax appealed. Those aspects of the injunction appeared to the Georgia Supreme Court to have been based on the claims for trespass and misappropriation of trade secrets, but the laws of trespass and trade secrets (at least in Georgia) did not support the scope of the injunction. Accordingly, the Court vacated the injunction in those respects, and remanded for the trial court to reconsider the scope of its injunction. To the extent that the parties on remand might rely on law that varies significantly from state to state, the Court reminded them that activities in one state are not due to be enjoined simply because they might be unlawful if done in another state. View "TMX Financial Holdings, Inc. v. Drummond Financial Services, LLC" on Justia Law

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This case centered on the procedure by which a local zoning board’s quasi-judicial decision on a variance request could be appealed to the superior court. Kerley Family Homes, LLC was granted a variance by the City of Cumming’s Board of Zoning Appeals (“BZA”). Neighboring homeowners aggrieved by the variance sought to appeal the BZA’s decision by filing a complaint seeking a writ of mandamus and an injunction with the superior court. The defendants argued that they were entitled to summary judgment against the homeowners because the zoning variance decision was a quasi-judicial decision that could be challenged in the superior court only by a petition for certiorari under OCGA 5-4-1. The Supreme Court concluded they were right, and therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of summary judgment. View "City of Cumming v. Flowers" on Justia Law

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Searless West was a former employee of the City of Albany who filed a complaint in federal court against the City and two individuals setting forth, among other things, a claim under the Georgia Whistleblower Act (“GWA”). With respect to West’s claims under the GWA, she sought economic and non-economic damages resulting from alleged retaliation for disclosing what she deemed to be certain financial irregularities in the City’s utility department. The City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings with regard to the whistleblower claim, asserting it failed as a matter of law because West did not provide ante litem notice prior to filing the complaint. The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, in an order finding no controlling precedent from the Georgia Supreme Court that addressed the legal issue raised by the City, certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court: "is a plaintiff required to provide a municipal corporation with ante litem notice pursuant to OCGA 36-33-5 in order to pursue a claim against it for money damages under the [GWA]?" The Supreme Court answered this question in the negative. View "West v. City of Albany" on Justia Law

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The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court stemming from an appeal in a personal injury case arising from an automobile accident. The Eleventh Circuit asked for the proper interpretation of OCGA 9-11-67.1, which governed the formation of settlement agreements pursuant to a pre-suit “offer to settle a tort claim for personal injury, bodily injury, or death arising from the use of a motor vehicle and prepared by or with the assistance of an attorney on behalf of a claimant or claimants” (a “Pre-Suit Offer”). The Supreme Court responded that OCGA 9-11-67.1 did not prohibit a claimant from conditioning acceptance of a Pre-Suit Offer upon the performance of some act, including a timely payment. The Court left it to the Eleventh Circuit to apply this principle to the facts of this case. View "Grange Mutual Casualty Co. v. Woodard" on Justia Law

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Appellant Trey Dinkins appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes related to the 2011 shooting death of DaJohn Milton. Appellant testified at trial. He denied shooting the victim, claiming he was at his cousin’s house at the time the shooting took place. He admitted, however, that he was at the scene of the shooting after the incident because he was getting a ride from his cousin’s house. Several witnesses confirmed appellant and another present at the shooting were together a short time afterward. Appellant made several arguments in appeal of his convictions, arguing among other things, that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions and that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed appellant's convictions. View "Dinkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law