Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Husband Imran Rasheed appealed the trial court’s grant of a motion to enforce a settlement agreement filed by wife Maryam Sarwat and its incorporation into a final decree of divorce. Husband contended that no settlement had ever been reached and that, in any event, the trial court’s order setting forth what it found as a complete settlement and the subsequent decree of divorce incorporating that settlement were too incomplete to be enforced. After review, the Supreme Court agreed that the terms of the settlement agreement as found by the trial court were incomplete, and those terms did not address all required aspects of the divorce: “Though visitation is cursorily addressed, the word custody never even appears in the order. Furthermore, the order setting forth the settlement does not contain a permanent parenting plan that complies with OCGA 19-9-1. The order regarding settlement terms also appears to be incomplete with regard to property holdings, or, at the very least, requires a great deal of inferences from unspecified sources to determine who actually owns what, what must be sold, and how any proceeds should be split between the parties. A trial court errs when it seeks to enforce what amounts to a settlement containing incomplete terms of a divorce. By incorporating such an incomplete settlement into the parties’ divorce decree and using that settlement as the decree’s operative terms, the infirmities of the incomplete settlement agreement became the infirmities of the divorce decree, which omits fundamental considerations such as the custody of the minor children.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Rasheed v. Sarwat" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, appellant Kiera Graham pled guilty to felony murder, armed robbery, and arson in the first degree. Less than a month after she was sentenced for her crimes, appellant filed a motion to withdraw her guilty plea, asserting that it was coerced by her attorney. The trial court denied the motion, and she appealed. After review, the Supreme Court found that appellant’s plea was voluntary, and affirmed. View "Graham v. Georgia" on Justia Law

During the course of investigating the murder of Earl Clemons, investigators learned through a witness and cellular telephone records that appellant Andrew Troutman may have met with Clemons on the day of the murder. In this pre-trial appeal, the State challenged the trial court’s order suppressing Troutman’s inculpatory statement. The trial court determined that Troutman was in custody prior to the beginning of a third interview and that, because investigators never advised Troutman of his Miranda rights, Troutman’s subsequent inculpatory statement was inadmissible. On appeal, the State contended that Miranda warnings were unnecessary because Troutman was not in custody. The Supreme Court found that under the circumstances of this case, in which Troutman was sequestered for hours, repeatedly interviewed, and never given any indication that he was free to leave or terminate the interview (and advised the he could not go), the Supreme Court could not say that the trial court erred in its determination that a reasonable person in Troutman’s position would have believed that he was in custody before the start of the third interview and, thus, that Troutman’s unwarned statement given during that third interview was due to be suppressed. With respect to the issue of whether the in-custody statement admitted in violation of Miranda was, nevertheless, voluntary under traditional due process standards, the trial court concluded that Troutman’s statement to investigators was involuntary and, thus, could not be used at trial for any purpose. On appeal, the States contended that these facts were insufficient to conclude that Troutman’s statement was involuntary. With that contention, the Supreme Court agreed. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Georgia v. Troutman" on Justia Law

In 2010, Daryl Jones was tried by jury on charges of malice murder, felony murder, and cruelty to children in the first degree in the death of his girlfriend’s 17-month-old daughter. The jury acquitted Jones of malice murder and was unable to reach a verdict on the charges of felony murder and cruelty to children, resulting in a mistrial on those counts. When the State retried Jones in 2012, the jury found him guilty of both felony murder and cruelty to children in the first degree. Jones appealed the denial of his motion for new trial, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions, and asserting that the trial court erred in denying his plea in bar on double jeopardy grounds. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Jones’ convictions. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following the denial of his motion for new trial, as amended, Timothy Cain appealed his convictions and sentences for felony murder while in the commission of an aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. He challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, an evidentiary ruling, and the effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Cain v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Adrian Burdette was seriously injured when he fell while attempting a controlled descent from a cell-phone tower in contravention of instructions by his employer, Chandler Telecom, LLC (“Chandler”), that technicians must climb down from towers. This case presented the question of whether an employee could, in deliberate disobedience of his employer’s explicit prohibition, act in a knowingly dangerous fashion with disregard for the probable consequences of that act, and still recover workers’ compensation when injured by that disobedient act. The Supreme Court concluded that OCGA 34-9-17(a) could bar recovery in such cases. View "Chandler Telecom, LLC v. Burdette" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellee J.B. was injured when certified registered nurse anesthetist (“CRNA”) Paul Serdula sexually assaulted her in a surgical suite in the dental practice of defendant-appellant Goldstein, Garber and Salama, LLC (GGS). Serdula was hired by GGS as an independent contractor through anesthesia staffing agency Certified Anesthesia Providers; in accordance with its standard practice, that agency conducted an independent credentialing process on Serdula prior to placing him in any medical or dental facilities. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that a reasonable jury could find that a third party’s sexual molestation of J.B. was an act foreseeable by GGS, whether the appellate court erred in affirming the trial court’s denial of GGS’s motion for a directed verdict on the issue of negligence per se, and whether GGS waived any objection to the jury verdict’s apportionment of fault. Finding that appellate court misinterpreted OCGA 43-11-21.1, GGS’s motion for a directed verdict should have been granted. View "Goldstein, Garber & Salama, LLC v. J.B." on Justia Law

Appellant Nick Roberson was convicted of family-violence simple battery after a trial in which she was represented by a public defender. Wishing to appeal her conviction, Roberson filed a motion seeking a transcript without charge as an indigent defendant under OCGA 9-15-2. The trial court held a hearing, but denied her motion. Roberson appealed. The Court of Appeals held that the authority to determine indigence for the purpose of requiring the county to pay for a transcript lay exclusively with the trial court, and thus could not be considered on appeal. Because the Court of Appeals was correct in its determination that the statute reserves this particular determination of indigence to the trial court alone, and because the record before the Supreme Court did not support Roberson’s assertion of a procedural violation, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Roberson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Carol Hornbuckle was convicted of murder in connection with a domestic dispute that ended in the stabbing death of Charles Raburn. The trial court denied Hornbuckle’s amended motion for new trial, and she appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in denying her motion for immunity under OCGA 16-3-24.2, erred in its charge to the jury, and that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Hornbuckle v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Steven Barnett was convicted of malice murder in the stabbing death of George “Bubba” Bennett. The trial court denied Barnett’s amended motion for new trial, and he appealed. Barnett argued to the Supreme Court he received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial judge should have recused herself. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Barnett v. Georgia" on Justia Law