Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Marcella Fletcher was diagnosed with malignant pleural mesothelioma, which she attributed to years of laundering her father’s asbestos-dust-covered work clothing, and she sued Appellant CertainTeed Corporation, who manufactured the asbestos-laden water pipes with which her father had worked. In her complaint, she alleged, inter alia, negligent design and negligent failure to warn. Before the completion of discovery, the trial court granted CertainTeed’s motion for summary judgment, and Fletcher appealed. A majority of the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment, concluding that CertainTeed had failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, the absence of evidence that its product was defectively designed. The Court of Appeals also found that a jury question existed as to whether CertainTeed had a duty to warn Fletcher of the risks associated with inhaling asbestos dust. After its review, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that CertainTeed owed no duty to warn Fletcher of the possible hazards of asbestos-dust from its products, but that the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the trial court’s judgment with respect to Fletcher’s defective design claim. View "CertainTeed Corp. v. Fletcher" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the refusal of Richard Alexander, in his capacity as clerk of court in Gwinnett County, to file a motion to compel discovery under a particular case number requested by the filing party, Thomas Gibson. The requested case number had previously been assigned to a case to which the motion to compel was directly related, and Gibson filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in an effort to force Alexander to file the motion to compel under this case number. The trial court granted the mandamus petition, and Alexander appealed that ruling. Because the Supreme Court found that Alexander had a clear duty as the Clerk of the court to file the motion to compel under the requested case number without making an independent determination about whether a new case number should be assigned, it affirmed. View "Alexander v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Former DeKalb County Chief Executive Officer W. Burrell Ellis, Jr. was indicted in 2013 on fifteen counts of attempted extortion and other acts of alleged corruption. He was re=indicted in early 2014 on thirteen counts relating to attempted extortion, theft, coercion, bribery and perjury. The first indictment was nolle prossed, and his first trial ended in a mistrial. Ellis was retried in 2015 on nine counts: four counts of attempt to commit theft by extortion, three counts of perjury, one count of bribery and one count of theft by extortion. The extortion charge came from Ellis' alleged attempt to procure a $2500 political campaign contribution from a DeKalb County vendor by threatening to cut the vendor's contract with the County if the Vendor did not pay. The perjury charges stemmed from Ellis allegedly lying to a Special Purpose Grand Jury about his role in cutting the contract of the same DeKalb County vendor. On appeal, Ellis contended, among other things, that his rights to substantive due process and equal protection of the laws were violated based on the inapplicability of the former version of OCGA 45-11-4 to his case, and that the trial court erred with respect to various evidentiary matters at his trial. The Supreme Court found that, although the trial court properly concluded that the inapplicability of former OCGA 45-11-4 to Ellis’ case did not result in any violation of his constitutional rights, the Court nevertheless reversed Ellis’ convictions based on certain evidentiary errors that occurred at his trial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part to allow for a retrial on the charges of criminal attempt to commit theft by extortion and perjury. View "Ellis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In February 2014, Jason Dakota Baxter (who then was sixteen years old) was arrested and charged with aggravated sexual battery. Baxter was detained pending indictment and trial. About a month after his arrest, Baxter executed a written waiver of his entitlement to have his case presented to the grand jury within 180 days, and Baxter and the State filed the waiver with the superior court. In October 2014, however, Baxter filed a motion to transfer his case to juvenile court, asserting that his case had not been timely presented to the grand jury as required by OCGA 17-7-50.1 and that his waiver was ineffective. The superior court granted the motion, and the State appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that presentation to the grand jury within 180 days of detention was an absolute requirement (unless the time was extended for good cause), that such presentation was essential to the jurisdiction of the superior court, and that parties could not by agreement, consent, or waiver confer jurisdiction upon a court that otherwise was without it. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Court of Appeals misunderstood OCGA 17-7-50.1 when it concluded that the statute did not permit a detained child to waive presentation within 180 days of the date of detention. For that reason, the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the transfer from the superior court to the juvenile court. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Georgia v. Baxter" on Justia Law

Appellant was indicted on one count of child molestation, alleged to have occurred between January 1, 2009 and August 31, 2009, and two counts of sexual exploitation of children, that were alleged to have occurred on or about January 21, 2010. After a bench trial, appellant was convicted of child molestation and of one of the counts of sexual exploitation of children, and acquitted of the other count. At sentencing, the trial court opined that the law provided that it could not sentence appellant to less than the mandatory minimum of five years to serve in prison for the child molestation conviction because the conviction for sexual exploitation of children was a “relevant similar transaction,” which precluded a downward deviation under OCGA 17–10–6.2 (c) (1) (C). The court then sentenced appellant to 20 years, with five years to be served in prison, on the child molestation charge, and a concurrent sentence of five years to be served in prison for the sexual exploitation conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that the trial court had correctly applied the statute. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the appellate court was correct in construing the phrase, “relevant similar transaction,” as used in the applicable statute in this case. Finding that the appellate court was indeed correct in so holding, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. View "Evans v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Robert Morrow was tried by jury and convicted of sexual assault under OCGA 16-6-5.1(b)(1). Morrow had been employed as a paraprofessional at River Ridge High School in Woodstock, where he was assigned to attend to a student with special needs, “P.M.” Morrow appealed his conviction and the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the State failed to show that Morrow had specific authority over P.M. (as required by statute), and that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction. The Georgia Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, and concluded that the State could carry its burden of proving supervisory or disciplinary authority by evidence of general or specific authority. Here, the State came forward with evidence that Morrow had some general supervisory or disciplinary authority over students in P. M.’s math class, and so, the Court of Appeals erred when it reversed his conviction on that ground. However, the Court concluded the State failed to prove that Morrow was a “teacher, principal, assistant principal, or other administrator of any school,” and for that reason, Morrow’s conviction could not stand. The Court of Appeals was affirmed, but on different grounds. View "Georgia v. Morrow" on Justia Law

In March 2015, McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC (“McHugh Fuller”) began running a month-long, statewide Georgia advertising campaign targeting PruittHealth, Inc. and its affiliated nursing homes. PruittHealth filed suit against McHugh Fuller under Georgia’s trademark antidilution statute, and the trial court entered a permanent injunction prohibiting McHugh Fuller from running ads about PruittHealth that include the company’s trade names, service marks, or logos. The law firm appealed, and the Supreme Court found that advertisement that PruittHealth challenged did not violate the Georgia trademark anti-dilution law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court’s injunction order. View "McHugh Fuller Law Group, PLLC v. PruittHealth, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Anthony Herrington appealed his conviction for felony murder based on aggravated assault in connection with the shooting death of Curtis Howard. Appellant argued on appeal to the Supreme Court: that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction; that the trial court gave an improper jury instruction on aggravated assault; that his motion for mistrial based on the prosecutor’s questions during voir dire was improperly denied; and that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Herrington v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant John Philpot and two others were charged with murder and other crimes arising out of the 2003 drive-by shooting death of Lisa Mosby, along with the firing of gunshots toward Troy Mitchell, Anthony Floyd, and King Brown. The three co-defendants were jointly tried, and appellant and co- defendant Ernest Glass were convicted of all charges. Co-defendant Lizzie Philpot, appellant’s younger sister, was found not guilty. Appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants, and contended the trial court erred in failing to exclude his custodial statement, claiming it was made involuntarily with the hope of benefit. After review of the record and appellant’s arguments on appeal, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Philpot v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Lonnie Dawson was convicted by jury of malice murder, burglary, and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime, contending that the trial court made certain evidentiary errors and that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in many ways. The Supreme Court reviewed Dawson's arguments on appeal, found no reversible error and affirmed the convictions. View "Dawson v. Georgia" on Justia Law