Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2013 while he was in custody, investigators questioned a then- 18-year-old Tyler Estrada abut a Gwinnett County homicide. Estrada had been in custody in DeKalb County. At an evidentiary hearing, audio recordings of Estrada’s custodial statement were placed into evidence, the trial court determined that though Estrada invoked his right to counsel, he never waived his Miranda rights either in writing or verbally. Accordingly, the trial court granted Estrada’s motion to suppress the statement. The State appealed. Finding no reversible error to that suppression order, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Georgia v. Estrada" on Justia Law

In 2011, Charles Case entered a negotiated guilty plea to aggravated assault and simple battery against his niece to resolve an original charge of child molestation. He did not appeal. After being directed to register as a sex offender, in 2014, aided by new counsel, Case filed a habeas petition alleging that his guilty plea was not knowingly and voluntarily entered and that his plea counsel provided ineffective assistance. In early 2015, the habeas court entered an order scheduling a final hearing, which was set for February 24, 2015. However, after neither Case nor his counsel appeared at the final hearing, the habeas court entered an order dismissing the petition for want of prosecution and, in the alternative, denying the petition on the merits. Case moved to set aside, asserting that his habeas counsel had not received notice of the final habeas hearing and first became aware of the hearing when counsel received the final order denying habeas relief. The habeas court denied the motion and Case filed an application for discretionary appeal without filing a notice of appeal. Case did not follow the required procedures for petitioners to appeal adverse “final orders” in habeas cases. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Case’s application to appeal to resolve: (1) whether a habeas petitioner was required to follow the procedures of OCGA 9-14-52 (b) to appeal an order denying a motion to set aside a final order denying habeas relief, or instead must follow the procedures of OCGA 5-6-35 (a) (8); and (2) whether the habeas court erred in denying Case’s motion to set aside the final order denying his habeas petition. The Supreme Court concluded that this appeal was properly before the Court. However, the petitioner’s motion here was better classified as a motion to set aside to correct a clerical error pursuant to OCGA 9-11-60 (g), which entitled Case to a direct, rather than a motion to set aside based on an amendable defect appearing on the face of the record pursuant to OCGA 9-11-60 (d) (3) (which would have needed to come by application). Additionally, the Court found that in this case, the habeas court did not properly consider all the relevant circumstances in reaching its decision to deny Case’s motion to set aside the court’s order on his petition for habeas corpus relief. Accordingly, the Court vacated the decision on Case’s motion and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Case v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case centered on the potential effects on the territory of school systems and the ownership of school property stemming from the annexation of parts of Fulton County by the City of Atlanta. In 1950, the Georgia General Assembly passed a local constitutional amendment addressing these issues (1950 LCA). In 1950, the independent school system of Atlanta (APS) was part of the City’s municipal government, not a separate political entity. In 1973, however, the General Assembly separated APS from the City’s municipal government by enacting separate charters for the two entities and removing most educational powers and responsibilities from the City government. In 2015, the City initiated this case by filing a declaratory judgment action in which it sought guidance on whether: (1) the City could annex Fulton County property without also expanding the boundaries of APS to cover the newly annexed area; and (2) the City could exercise its own delegated authority to determine if it wanted to expand the boundaries of APS after the City annexed new property. The City argued that HB 1620 (the pertinent legislation) did not properly continue the 1950 LCA, and, as a result, it stood repealed. The Fulton County School District (“FCS”) intervened, then the City moved for summary judgment, APS moved for judgment in its favor on the pleadings, and FCS moved to dismiss the City’s action. The trial court entered a final order denying the City’s motion, granting APS’s motion, and granting FCS’s motion, treating all of them as summary judgment motions. Ultimately, the trial court determined that: (1) the City’s declaratory action, in part, was not barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity; and (2) the 1950 LCA was properly continued by HB 1620. The City appealed the trial court’s ruling that the 1950 LCA was properly continued, and APS has cross-appealed to contend that the trial court erred by not finding that the City’s declaratory judgment action was barred in its entirety by sovereign immunity. Because this matter was not ripe for consideration at the time that the trial court considered the City’s action, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s opinion. View "City of Atlanta v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys." on Justia Law

Anthony Williams appealed his conviction and sentence for malice murder in connection with the 1992 fatal shooting of Jeanette Woodson. He challenged the admission at trial of similar transaction evidence and a portion of the State’s closing argument, which he contended constituted improper comment on his failure to testify. Finding the challenges to be unavailing, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2006, appellant Carla Christian and appellee Ben Christian, Jr. signed a Separation Agreement. The agreement was approved by a trial court in 2008. Carla filed a complaint for divorce in 2013. By October 2014, she moved for partial summary judgment, asking the trial court to rule that Paragraph VII of the Agreement entitled her to one-half of Ben’s retirement, 401(k) and other employment benefits as valued on the date of divorce. In early 2015, the trial court denied the motion, calling it an attempt to replace an “or” with an “and” in the language of the Separation Agreement. The trial court found no ambiguity in Paragraph VII and did not consider any parol evidence Carla sought to introduce to explain the paragraph further. The court later reconsidered its prior holding, and ruled that Carla was entitled to one-half of Ben’s 401(k) and retirement pension plan or one-half of his other employment benefits. Months later, the court issued a “clarifying” order, holding that Carla was “entitled to choose from the 401(k) or other employment benefits.” Carla appealed once the final divorce decree was entered. The Supreme Court reversed in part, vacated in part and affirmed in part. The Court reversed the trial court’s ruling that the date of valuation under Paragraph VII was the date of the Separation Agreement rather than the date of the divorce. The Court vacated the trial court’s ruling that the Paragraph was unambiguous “as a matter of law,” because it found two viable interpretations of it. The Court affirmed the trial court in all other respects, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Christian v. Christian" on Justia Law

In 2014, Brooks Keel, president of Georgia Southern University, terminated the employment contract of tenured professor Lorne Wolfe for violation of University policies, and the Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia denied Wolfe’s application for review of his termination. Wolfe then filed a complaint for breach of contract and mandamus against the Board and Keel seeking reinstatement and other relief. The superior court granted the Board’s motion for summary judgment, and Wolfe again appealed. The Supreme Court found that this appeal fell within the scope of OCGA 5-6-35 (a) (1), and an application to appeal was therefore required. Because Wolfe did not file a discretionary application, the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of his case. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the appeal. View "Wolfe v. Regents of the University Sys. of Georgia" on Justia Law

Larry Lupoe, Kyshawn Williams, and Jacobey Carter were found guilty at trial of the 2012 malice murder of Tavares Moses, the aggravated assault and armed robbery of Carlos Wilson, the aggravated assault of Deandre Miller and Jumario Booker, and related crimes. All appealed, and the Supreme Court affirmed the three appellants’ convictions. However, the Court identified merger errors in sentencing that required vacating their sentences in part and remanding for resentencing View "Lupoe v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Sherwin Johnson was awaiting trial on felony murder and other charges in connection with the April 2014 shooting death of Kevin Pierre. In May 2015, the trial court entered an order denying Appellant’s motion for discharge and acquittal on speedy trial grounds, and on June 5, 2015, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal of that order. The Supreme Court found that the trial court properly denied Appellant’s motion with respect to his statutory right to a speedy trial, and affirmed that portion of the trial court’s ruling. However, the court failed to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law to enable the Supreme Court to evaluate the denial of Appellant’s motion with respect to his constitutional speedy trial right. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s ruling in that regard and remanded for the entry of an order containing appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law. The Court did not address Appellant’s many other enumerations of error, finding they all lacked merit. View "Johnson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Cleve McCain was convicted of malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony and possession of a firearm by a first offender probationer, all relating to the 2007 shooting death of Whitt Timms. The trial court denied appellant’s motion for new trial, and he appealed, arguing the evidence presented against him at trial was insufficient to sustain his conviction. After review of the trial court record and finding no error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "McCain v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Elliot Sheard was convicted of murder and associated crimes in connection with the stabbing death of Charles Elder. A grand jury indicted Sheard – along with two co-defendants – on the charges of murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, felony murder predicated on armed robbery, felony murder predicated on burglary, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and burglary. Following a joint trial conducted in late August and early September 1998, a jury acquitted Sheard of murder but found him guilty of all other offenses. After merging the felony murder and aggravated assault verdicts, the trial court sentenced Sheard to life imprisonment for felony murder predicated on aggravated assault and to consecutive terms of 20 years’ imprisonment for armed robbery and burglary, for a total sentence of life plus 40 years. A jury acquitted one co-defendant of all offenses and found Sheard guilty of all offenses. In its May 2014 order denying Sheard’s motion for new trial, the trial court found – based on its own recollection of the 1998 trial and its standard practice – that the closing arguments of the parties were unremarkable, that the transcript of the charge conference established that the jury was adequately and appropriately charged, that testimony recounting a number of questions from the jury was not credible and was, in fact, unlikely, and that it was unlikely the jury was given an "Allen" charge but, if one were to have been given, it would have been a pattern charge. Sheard appealed, arguing that missing portions of his trial transcript rendered his appeal meaningless. In light of a number of factors complicating the absence of portions of the trial transcript, the Supreme Court agreed that Sheard was entitled to a new trial and reversed the judgment of the trial court. View "Sheard v. Georgia" on Justia Law