Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The City of Waycross (the “City”), situated primarily in Ware County, annexed property in Pierce County (the “County”) in the 1980's. The City constructed a component of its wastewater treatment facility in the annexed area, and entered into service delivery strategy agreements with the County in 1999. The agreements provided that the City would provide water and sewer services in the annexed area; they did not contain an expiration date. The City provided the agreed upon services and collected fees from the users of the services. The fees covered the costs of providing water and sewer services in the annexed area. Residents of the City did not subsidize the costs of the services. In 2015, the legislature passed House Bill 523, which was signed into law effective July 1, 2015, amending the City’s charter so that no portion of the City would “include any territory within the boundaries of Pierce County.” The City brought suit to enjoin enforcement of House Bill 523 and have it declared unconstitutional. The trial court denied interlocutory relief, partly because it determined the City was still authorized to provide water and sewer services to the formerly annexed area. In July 2015, the City notified businesses and homeowners located in the de-annexed area that new, higher user fees would be charged. The County filed a counterclaim alleging that the new fees were arbitrarily higher than fees charged Ware County residents, and therefore violated the Georgia Service Delivery Strategy Act. In August 2015, the City passed a resolution to halt the delivery of water and sewer services in the formerly annexed area. At that point, the County filed an amended counterclaim requesting the City be enjoined from discontinuing its water and sewer services. After a hearing, the trial court granted the County’s request for an interlocutory injunction. Finding no reversible error in the decision to issue an injunction, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "City of Waycross v. Pierce Cty. Bd. of Commr's" on Justia Law

Following a jury trial, J’Quante Crews was found guilty of malice murder (Count 1), two counts of felony murder (Counts 2 and 4), aggravated assault (Count 5), armed robbery (Count 6), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 7), and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon (Count 8) in connection with his role in the shooting death of Vernon Forrest. On appeal, Crews argued that his convictions should have been reversed and that he should have been granted a new trial due to alleged juror misconduct, and that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence expert testimony from a lay witness. After review, the Supreme Court found no merit to Crews’ challenges and affirmed his convictions. However, the Court also found that trial court erred with respect to the portion of Crews’ sentence relating to armed robbery (Count 6), so it vacated the erroneous portion of Crews’ sentence and remanded this case to the trial court for the imposition of an appropriate sentence on the armed robbery count. View "Crews v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Defendant Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC (“VPD”) appealed a Superior Court order granting injunctive relief and requiring an accounting in this suit by RMW Development Fund, II, LLC (“RMW”) stemming from VPD’s management of Veterans Parkway Apartments, LLC (the “Company”). The order at issue granted RMW an interlocutory injunction: (1) enjoining VPD from using funds in its possession or control to construct a second entrance to an apartment complex in Columbus (the “Property”), constructed and managed by the Company; (2) prohibiting VPD from using funds for any purpose other than the normal day-to-day expenses of the Property; and (3) requiring VPD to submit a monthly report of its expenses to the superior court, with copies to counsel for the parties. RMW filed suit against VPD alleging VPD’s breach of contract by its entering into an unauthorized management agreement and thereby paying an unauthorized management fee, and a claim for “promissory estoppel,” stemming from VPD’s alleged failure to use some of the Company’s funds for partial repayment of a development loan; RMW asked for VPD’s removal as manager of the Company and for the costs of litigation. Prior to the filing on the complaint, the Company had purchased a 60-foot strip of land for the purpose of creating a second entrance to the Property. At a hearing on the injunction, RMW argued that it could not undo any construction of the second entrance to the Property. VPD countered that RMW was, in reality, concerned about money being spent on the construction of the second entrance instead of being used to repay the loans made by RMW, and that any appropriate redress was monetary damages. Ultimately the injunction was granted and VPD appealed. The Supreme Court found after review of this matter that the trial court's injunction was not supported by the record, and that court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court and remanded this matter for further proceedings. View "Veterans Parkway Developers, LLC v. RMW Development Fund II, LLC" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a December 7, 1993 tax sale, DeKalb County sold the Property at issue here, which was owned at that time by Dorothy Kelly. DeKalb County ultimately purchased the Property at the tax sale as the highest bidder. DeKalb County did not foreclose the redemption rights to the Property after the tax sale in accordance with OCGA 48-4-45 or OCGA 48-4-48. In 1999, DeKalb County conveyed its tax deed to Geraldine Nix, and Nix conveyed her tax deed, via a deed to secure debt, to Bank of America. However, this deed to secure debt was canceled in 2009, and the tax deed reverted back to Nix on May 6, 2009. In 2003, Kelly, the owner of the Property prior to the tax sale, transferred her interest in the Property to Community Renewal and Redemption, LLC (“CRR”). CRR filed suit seeking a declaration that it was the owner of the Property by virtue of having tendered the statutory redemption amount to Nix. CRR transferred its interest in the Property to Belfare, LLC (“Belfare”). Belfare tendered $70,000 to Nix to redeem the Property, but Nix rejected tender of the redemption amount. In 2015, Belfare transferred its interest in the Property to Kirkwood Homes. Nix claimed that she had acquired full fee simple title to the Property, under OCGA 48-4-48, by virtue of the passage of four years since the time of execution of the tax deed. Kirkwood Homes then filed an action seeking declaratory judgment and quiet title relief, asserting that it was the owner of the Property. The superior court issued a final order concluding that Kirkwood Homes was the fee simple owner of the Property. Nix appealed, but after review, the Supreme Court agreed and affirmed that order. View "Nix v. 230 Kirkwood Homes, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant DeMariye Glover was indicted, along with a co-defendant, of malice murder, felony murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, all arising out of the shooting death of Demetrious Moore during an attempted armed robbery. He appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea to felony murder, arguing he had not knowingly entered the guilty plea (even though the undisputed evidence showed he was not the shooter), and that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. After review of the trial proceedings, the Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed appellant's convictions. View "Glover v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Xzarious Terrell was convicted of felony murder, aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, criminal attempt to commit armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in connection with the 2009 shooting death of victim Henry Wright, Jr. Appellant's motion for new trial was denied, and on appeal, he challenged the sufficiency of the evidence and claimed error in the trial court’s admission of statements of a non-testifying co-indictee under the co-conspirator hearsay exception. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Terrell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

These cases involved the repeated efforts of Willie Wright (“Husband”), who was incarcerated and filing pro se, to vacate and set aside the divorce decree entered in 2010 in the divorce action filed by Kenya Young Wright (“Wife”). In an earlier appearance of this case, the Georgia Supreme Court vacated the trial court order denying Husband’s motion to set aside the final decree and remanded for the trial court to make findings on the issue of whether notice of the decree was given to Husband. On remand, the trial court scheduled a hearing, and Husband filed a request for an order requiring the authorities to produce him to the court to attend the hearing, but this request was denied. The trial court denied Husband’s motion to set aside. Husband filed both a notice of appeal and an application for discretionary appeal, and the Supreme Court granted the application, stating it was concerned with whether the trial court erred in concluding it had satisfied its duty under OCGA 15-6-21 (c) to provide notice of the entry of the final judgment and decree. This appeal was docketed as Case No. S16A1250. Prior to the date the case was docketed, the trial court entered an order purporting to dismiss the "action" (apparently meaning the appeal of Husband's failing to file a notice to appeal within a ten-day deadline). Husband appealed the dismissal order and an application for discretionary appeal. The Supreme Court granted review of dismissal of the "action," which was docketed as Case No. 16A1248. Husband applied to appeal the trial court's order denying an order to produce him at the motion hearing. After review, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal in 16A1248 for lack of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court found that in case No. 16A1250, the trial court made no findings with respect to whether the trial court provided notice as required by statute. The Order was therefore reversed and the matter remanded for further consideration of Husband's motion to set aside. View "Wright v. Wright" on Justia Law

After conducting a bench trial, the trial court found appellant Norman Buford guilty but mentally ill for the shooting death of Willie Archer and the aggravated assault of Orantes Dishmond. Buford argued on appeal that the trial court erred by not finding him not guilty by reason of insanity. Finding the evidence sufficient to support the trial court's verdict, the Supreme Court affirmed in that respect. However, the Court found that the trial court erroneously sentenced Buford to life in prison for both malice murder and felony murder. The Court vacated the sentence and remanded this case for resentencing. View "Buford v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Jaylend Glispie's convictions for violation of the Georgia Controlled Substance Act and certain driving offenses. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider: (1) whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that text messages sent to the cell phone found in Glispie’s possession were admissible as party admissions; and (2) whether the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the trial court did not err in denying Glispie’s motion in limine to exclude the text messages. Glispie contended that all of the text messages from his cell phone constituted inadmissible hearsay, and that the search warrant application for his phone failed to provide probable cause enough to justify the warrant. After review of the appellate court record, the Supreme Court found that: (1) the admission of the incoming text messages, even if considered to be hearsay, did not contribute to the verdict; and (2) there was a legally sufficient basis for the magistrate to issue a search warrant for the cell phones in Glispie’s possession. View "Glispie v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellee Daniel Massey, Chatham County Superior Court Clerk, filed a writ of mandamus against Chatham County and its Board of Commissioners, seeking, among other things, an order declaring him to be entitled to cost-of-living adjustments (“COLAs”) to his salary as provided by general statute (“State COLAs”) as well as by special local legislation (“County COLAs”), and to longevity increases as provided by statute. Massey argued the County deprived him of some of the compensation increases to which he was entitled over his years of service by setting off the COLAs the County claimed it paid him by improperly decreasing, in a corresponding sum, the amount the County was paying to supplement his salary over the statutory minimum. In response, the County argued, among other things, that since it was paying Massey in excess of the statutory minimum, he was not entitled to County COLAs in addition to State COLAs and longevity increases. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court entered an order finding Massey was entitled not only to state-mandated longevity increases and State COLAs provided by general statute but also to County COLAs provided by local legislation. The County appealed that decision to the Supreme Court, but finding no reversible error, the Court affirmed. View "Chatham Cty. v. Massey" on Justia Law