Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Roque “Rocky” De La Fuente submitted a nomination petition to the Georgia Secretary of State Brian Kemp, seeking to have his name placed upon the ballot for the 2016 general election as an independent candidate for President of the United States. That same day, De La Fuente also filed notices of candidacy for his slate of presidential electors. The Secretary of State rejected the notices of candidacy because they were submitted eleven days after the deadline set forth in OCGA 21-2-132 (d) (1). The Secretary of State also rejected the nomination petition, finding that the counties had verified only 2,964 of the signatures submitted with the petition, a number far short of the 7,500 verified signatures needed to validate the petition pursuant to a recent federal court order. After a superior court dismissed De La Fuente's subsequent lawsuit, the matter was appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error in the superior court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed dismissal of De La Fuente's suit. View "De La Fuente v. Kemp" on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for review, the issues presented for the Supreme Court involved the scope of the State’s authority to regulate so-called “payday loans” pursuant to OCGA 16-17-1, et seq., known as the Payday Lending Act. Pursuant to the statute, the State filed suit alleging that CashCall, Inc. (“CashCall”), Delbert Services Corporation (“Delbert Services”), Western Sky Financial, LLC (“Western Sky”), and Martin A. Webb (collectively “Defendants”) violated OCGA 16-17-2 (a) by engaging in a small-dollar lending enterprise that collected illegal usurious interest from Georgia borrowers. Defendants operated outside the State of Georgia and their dealings with Georgia borrowers occurred telephonically or over the Internet, and when a loan is funded, the funds are transferred to the borrower via electronic transfer to the borrower’s bank account. The State sought civil penalties and injunctive and other equitable relief. Defendants filed motions to compel arbitration and to dismiss the action. The trial court referred the case to a special master who recommended the case be dismissed, but the trial court rejected the special master’s recommendation and denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss, finding that the State’s claim was not barred by the language of OCGA 16-17-1 (d). Because the trial court found a substantial likelihood that the State would prevail on the merits of the claim at trial, and found a substantial threat existed that the State would suffer irreparable injury in that there might not be sufficient funds available to satisfy a judgment should the State prevail at trial, the trial court ordered Defendants to deposit a $15 million sum into the court’s registry and to make quarterly deposits of any additional amounts that could be collected from Georgia borrowers in the future. The trial court, however, agreed to stay the granted relief during an appeal, upon the Defendants’ deposit of an additional $1 million into the escrow account created following entry of the consent order requiring the deposit of $200,000. In a separate order, the trial court denied the State’s motion to add as defendants J. Paul Reddam and WS Funding, LLC (“WS Funding”). Defendants filed a notice of appeal and the State filed a notice of cross-appeal. After review, the Supreme Court affirmed the order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, affirmed the modification of the injunction order, and reversed the order denying the State’s motion to add defendants. View "Western Sky Financial, LLC v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Rodqucas Bowen was found guilty by a jury of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2009 shooting death of victim Henry Wright, Jr. The trial court denied appellant’s motion for new trial and he appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and alleging the trial court erred in limiting the scope of voir dire and in admitting pre-trial photographic identification evidence. Finding no error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bowen v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Phillip Kennebrew was found guilty of malice murder, armed robbery, and other crimes in connection with the death of Breyon Alexander. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions of Mason Babbage and Samuel Hall, who were tried together with Appellant, rejecting their claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. However, each defendant had his own attorney at trial, and Appellant, unlike Babbage and Hall, had shown that his trial counsel was professionally deficient in two significant respects and that, but for those errors, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been more favorable to him. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s convictions. The Court did find, however, that the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support the convictions, so the Court left it open that the State could retry him if it chose. View "Kennebrew v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide a question left open in its recent decision in "Ames v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A.," (783 SE2d 614 (2016)), with reference to the Court of Appeals’ decision in this case: whether a plaintiff property owner who alleges that he is no longer a debtor because the security deed on his property has been cancelled has standing to challenge an alleged assignment of the security deed. Appellee Bobby Johnson made concessions to the Court, however, that made it unnecessary for the Court to decide that question. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on other grounds. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Out-of-state attorney Frederick Fein appealed a final order of the Superior Court of Fulton County granting the motion of state court judge Diane Bessen, to dismiss Fein’s “Amended Petition for Writ of Mandamus” for failure to state a claim. The mandamus petition, as amended, sought to compel Judge Bessen to rule on default motions and to enter a final judgment in a civil action pending before her so that Fein might pursue his alleged “clear legal right to appeal Judge Bessen's revocation of his pro hac vice admission in that action.” In granting the motion, the superior court ruled that Fein failed to state such a claim because Judge Bessen was precluded from entering the requested orders inasmuch as a bankruptcy petition filed in the matter acted as an automatic stay, which had not been lifted, thus barring Judge Bessen from entering any other orders in the Chenault case. Finding no error in that decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Fein v. Bessen" on Justia Law

Appellant Thomas Bradford appealed his convictions for felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime in relation to the 2011 shooting death of Raymond Lee. Appellant alleged on appeal: (1) the evidence was insufficient to convict; (2) that the trial court erred by not admitting certain other evidence; (3) that the trial court erred in instructing the jury; and (4) that several bench conferences that took place during trial were not transcribed and that he was excluded from them. Finding no reversible error in the trial court proceedings, the Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. View "Bradford v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 1999, Joseph Tiger Prince was convicted of the malice murder of Edgar Reagan, and, as a recidivist, was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Prince filed a “Motion to Vacate a Void Sentence and Mere Nullity Conviction.” The trial court dismissed the motion, in part, because Prince produced no evidence to support his claim that his sentence of life in prison without the possibility of parole was void. Prince appealed. Finding that Prince did not "advance any enumeration of error in regard to the trial court’s ruling on the lack of evidence of a void sentence," and that Prince's motion did not address any issue that would result in a void sentence (and was thus outside the trial court’s jurisdiction), the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal. View "Prince v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Frederick Whitney owned a piece of property located in Habersham County. Whitney became delinquent on his property taxes. As a result, Habersham County sold the property at a tax sale to Appellee Lanier 5, LLC. Over a year later, on August 15, 2014, Lanier sent a notice of foreclosure of the right to redeem the property by certified and first class mail to Whitney at his residence in Forsyth County, giving Whitney until September 21, 2014, to exercise his right of redemption. While the certified mailing sent to Whitney went unclaimed, the first class mail notice was never returned as undeliverable. Meanwhile, on August 29, 2014, a security deed was created between Whitney and Appellant Reliance Equities, LLC. Two days after the September 21 foreclosure date, Whitney’s agent attempted to redeem the property. After confirming its certified and first class mailings were sent to the proper address, Lanier rejected the tender as untimely. Receiving no other tenders for redemption, Lanier filed a “Petition to Remove a Cloud on Title – Conventional Quia Timet” in the Superior Court of Habersham County, requesting the court remove the cloud of title in Lanier’s favor. Whitney filed a counterclaim requesting the trial court quiet title in his favor and also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that he did not receive sufficient notice of Lanier’s foreclosure of his right of redemption. The trial court denied Whitney’s motion. On November 19, 2015, the trial court entered an order granting Lanier’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, denied Reliance’s motion to intervene, Whitney’s motion for reconsideration and Whitney’s motion for summary judgment, finding all motions to be moot. On appeal, Reliance argued that the trial court erred in denying its motion to intervene; Whitney argued that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment on the pleadings and quieting title in favor of Lanier. The Supreme Court agreed with Whitney (based on the plain language of the applicable statute, Lanier could not foreclose Whitney's right to redeem until all conditions enumerated in the statute were met), and reversed the trial court in case S16A1014. Because the decision effectively ended the underlying litigation between Whitney and Lanier, Reliance’s appeal in case S16A1013 was rendered moot and dismissed. View "Reliance Equities, LLC v. Lanier 5, LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal arose out of the passage of two weapons related bills passed by the Georgia General Assembly during the 2013-2014 legislative session. Appellant GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., (“GCO”) filed a complaint against the Code Revision Commission and its members, David Ralston, in his official capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives of Georgia, Lowell Cagle, in his official capacity as President of the Senate of Georgia, and Governor Nathan Deal, seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the Code Revision Commission (CRC) to amend the text of OCGA 16-11-127.1 and a judgment declaring that it was not a crime for a person with a weapons carry license to carry a firearm within a school safety zone. After motions to dismiss filed by both the Governor and CRC were granted in separate orders, GCO appealed the order granting CRC’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court found that GCO was not entitled to relief under "any state of provable facts" alleged in its amended complaint, there was no actual controversy which would have authorized a declaratory judgment, and the trial did not err in granting CRC's motion to dismiss. View "Georgiacarry.org v. Code Revision Comm'n" on Justia Law