Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellee Daniel Massey, who was serving his third consecutive term as Chatham County Superior Court Clerk, filed a writ of mandamus against Chatham County and its Board of Commissioners, and later amended the petition to add a claim for declaratory judgment. The petition sought, among other things, an order declaring him to be entitled to cost-of-living adjustments (“COLAs”) to his salary as provided by general statute (“State COLAs”) as well as by special local legislation (“County COLAs”), and to longevity increases as provided by statute. Massey argued the County deprived him of some of the compensation increases to which he was entitled over his years of service by setting off the COLAs the County claims it paid to him by improperly decreasing, in a corresponding sum, the amount the County was paying to supplement his salary over the statutory minimum. In response, the County argued, among other things, that since it was paying Massey in excess of the statutory minimum, he was not entitled to County COLAs in addition to State COLAs and longevity increases. The County asserted in its counterclaim that Massey had, in fact, been overpaid. The parties agreed that the sole issue in dispute was a matter of statutory interpretation regarding Massey’s entitlement to County COLAs. After reviewing the evidence and arguments presented, the trial court entered an order finding Massey was entitled not only to state-mandated longevity increases and State COLAs provided by general statute but also to County COLAs provided by local legislation. The County appealed, but finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Chatham County v. Massey" on Justia Law

Appellants Johnny McClendon and Marquice Burks were tried jointly and convicted of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the April 2007 shooting death of Christopher Crawford. Both men appealed. After review, the Supreme Court found no merit in any of the alleged pre-trial and trial phase issues raised by Appellants, though the Court agreed with Burks that the trial court erred during sentencing when it failed to recognize that his felony murder verdicts were vacated by operation of law. Further, although not raised by McClendon, the trial court’s purported merger of his felony murder verdicts was similarly made in error. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated those aspects of the sentences and remanded for further proceedings. View "McClendon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Prisoner Lester Waller appealed pro se the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal following his convictions and sentences for malice murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony in connection with the May 2009 killing of his former girlfriend. Waller argued that he should have been granted an out-of-time appeal because his right to a direct appeal was frustrated in that pursuant to OCGA 5-6-38 (a), he was entitled to 30 days to file his notice of appeal after the denial of his supplemented motion for new trial but he was given only 24 days in which to timely file his notice of appeal. Waller claimed he did not receive the denial order until November 27, 2013. He further argued that he should have been able to take advantage of the “mailbox rule” to make his notice of appeal timely. He also argued that he was not adequately advised of the perils of proceeding pro se, that he should have had “standby” counsel, that he should have been appointed yet another attorney, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no merit to any of these contentions, the Supreme court affirmed the denial of Waller's motion. View "Waller v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The owners of residential properties in Lowndes County appealed a final superior court order that declared OCGA 48-5-2(3) (B.1), which excluded low-income housing income tax credits from consideration for the purpose of assessing ad valorem tax, was unconstitutional for violating the taxation uniformity provision of the Georgia Constitution. The properties at issue were eligible to receive federal and state low-income housing income tax credits. In exchange for receiving a ten-year award of tax credits, the property owners agreed to lease their rental units to eligible low-income tenants at below-market rents set by the state Department of Community Affairs (GDCA) for thirty years or more. During the credit period, the owner may not sell, transfer, or exchange the property without first requesting GDCA’s approval of the proposed sale, transfer, or exchange. After being awarded state and federal income tax credits by the GDCA, the property owners in this case “sold” the tax credits to investors in that they allowed investors to purchase limited partnership interests. The tax credits would “flow through” the partnerships to the limited partners, who would then use the tax credits to reduce their individual income tax liabilities. The Lowdnes County Board of Tax Assessors filed for a declaration as to the constitutionality of OCGA 48-5-2 (3) (B.1), which precluded the Assessors from considering the tax credits in determining the fair market value of the real property at issue. After review of the trial court's judgment, the Supreme Court affirmed: "inasmuch as OCGA 48-5-2 (3) (B.1) exempts these income tax credits from consideration in determining the fair market value of the properties at issue, the statute grants preferential treatment for ad valorem taxation purposes and creates a subclass of tangible property other than as permitted by the State Constitution." View "Heron Lake II Apartments, L.P. v. Lowndes Cty Bd. of Tax Assessors" on Justia Law

Warden Brad Hooks appealed the grant of Ray Walley’s application for a writ of habeas corpus after the habeas court ruled that Walley’s appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance by trial counsel. Walley was indicted by grand jury of one count of aggravated sexual battery and one count of child molestation. The State’s articulated plea offer included a recommendation that he serve seven years in prison. His original trial counsel was Billy Spruell, but during what was scheduled to be a plea hearing, the trial court declared that it would allow Spruell to withdraw from representing Walley after Spruell stated to the court that he did not believe that it was in Walley’s best interest to plead guilty, and after Walley told the court that Spruell had not conveyed to him any plea offer from the State that included a recommendation that Walley be sentenced to serve five years in prison. Walley was tried before a jury with new counsel, Charles Haldi, and convicted on both counts; he subsequently received a sentence totaling twenty years, of which 15 were to be served in prison, with the remainder to be served on probation. After trial, Walley was represented by Brian Steel, who raised various issues in an amended motion for new trial, which was denied. One issue raised was that Spruell failed to convey the plea offer to Walley, a claim he withdrew during the hearing on the amended motion. In 2013, Walley petitioned for habeas relief, alleging ineffective assistance on Steel’s part in that Steel abandoned a claim that Walley had been afforded ineffective assistance by Spruell, which claim was based on Walley’s assertion that Spruell did not communicate the five-year plea offer. The Supreme Court reversed. "[W]hile part of Walley’s burden in the habeas court included showing that trial counsel failed to convey the plea offer, and was ineffective in doing so, those deficiencies alone do not demonstrate that appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to pursue a claim based upon trial counsel’s performance. [. . .] on the question of Steel’s abandoning any claim of ineffective assistance on Spruell’s part in failing to convey the plea offer, it was Walley’s burden in the habeas court to overcome the presumption that Steel’s decision not to pursue such a ground was reasonable, and instead show that this 'decision was an unreasonable one which only an incompetent attorney would adopt.' And this Walley simply failed to do." View "Hooks v. Walley" on Justia Law

In 2011, a jury found Marlina Hamilton guilty of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of her ex-husband Christopher Donaldson. In 2015, the trial court granted Hamilton's motion for a new trial on the general and other grounds. At trial, Hamilton argued she shot Donaldson I self-defense and that she suffered from battered-person syndrome. The defense presented an expert witness who testified about battered person syndrome; the State cross-examined the expert but did not present any contrary expert testimony. The State argued that Hamilton had obtained a gun for the purpose of committing an aggravated assault against Donaldson, that she was the initial aggressor in the fatal altercation, and that she did not suffer from battered person syndrome. The jury acquitted Hamilton of malice murder, but found her guilty of the other charges. The trial court then sentenced her to serve life in prison for felony murder and five consecutive years for the firearm charge; the two aggravated assault verdicts merged with the felony murder count. After review, the Supreme Court found that the evidence presented at trial was, when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, legally sufficient to authorize a rational jury to reject Hamilton’s claim of self-defense and find her guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crimes for which she was convicted. The State argued that because the evidence was sufficient under the due process standard, the trial court erred in granting a new trial. The Supreme Court held that assertion was incorrect. In this case, the trial court explained that after it carefully reviewed the trial transcript and exhibits and “considered the conflicts in the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of their testimony,” it had concluded that the jury’s guilty verdicts were “decidedly and strongly against the weight of the evidence” and “contrary to the principles of justice and equity.” The court therefore exercised its discretion to grant a new trial. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's decision was not an abuse of the trial court’s substantial discretion to act as the “thirteenth juror” in the case. The decision was therefore affirmed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Georgia v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

In 2008, Bernard Robinson was convicted by jury of malice murder, felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, voluntary manslaughter, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. He appealed the malice murder and possession charges, arguing the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and the trial court erred by not removing a certain juror. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed Robinson's convictions. View "Robinson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Homer Bryson, in his capacity as commissioner, appealed the grant of habeas relief to Fanoris Jackson. Bryson argued the habeas court erred by finding that Jackson's appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve for direct appeal any claim that trial counsel performed deficiently. Finding that the habeas court record did not support the finding that trial counsel provided ineffective assistance, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded. View "Bryson v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Rickey Patterson was convicted on "aggravated assault with an object" when after an argument with his girlfriend's adult son ended with Patterson going to his vehicle, putting it into gear, revving the engine, and rapidly driving directly toward the end of the home, near the son, who became pinned against the side of the home by the vehicle. The son suffered internal injuries. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to respond to two issues: (1) whether the Appeals Court erred in concluding that the crime of simple assault did not require that the defendant have the specific intent to cause the alleged victim of the assault to suffer injury or the apprehension of injury; and (2) if the Court of Appeals did so err, whether it further erred in concluding that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the crimes of reckless conduct and reckless driving as lesser included offenses of aggravated assault. The Supreme Court concluded the appellate court did not err in its conclusions, and affirmed. View "Patterson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

This was the second appeal stemming from a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by appellant Michael Lejeune. In that petition, appellant contended that his guilty plea to murder in November 2005 was not knowingly and intelligently entered because “he never was adequately advised of his privilege against self-incrimination.” The habeas court denied relief, finding that appellant was aware of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and concluding that appellant’s plea was thus constitutionally valid. In the first appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the habeas court’s findings were not supported by the record. The Court also concluded that the trial court had improperly placed the burden of proof on the warden and remanded the case for a new evidentiary hearing with appellant bearing the burden of proof. On remand, the habeas court concluded that appellant was sufficiently aware of his right against self-incrimination and that his plea was thus entered knowingly and voluntarily. The Supreme Court granted appellant’s application for certificate of probable cause to appeal, and now reversed the habeas court’s ruling that appellant’s plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. View "LeJeune v. McLaughlin" on Justia Law