Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ricky Patterson lived in a mobile home with his girlfriend, Wanda Bartley. While her adult son, Nathaniel Silvers, was present, Patterson and Bartley argued, and Bartley and Silvers urged Patterson to leave the home. When Patterson, Bartley, and Silvers were outside the home, Patterson went to his vehicle, put it into gear, revved the engine, and rapidly drove directly toward the end of the home, near Silvers, who became pinned against the side of the home by the vehicle; Silvers suffered internal injuries. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to the Court of Appeals to answer two questions: (1) whether that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the crime of simple assault as set forth in OCGA § 16-5-20 (a) (2) did not require that the defendant have the specific intent to cause the alleged victim of the assault to suffer injury or the apprehension of injury; and (2) if the Court of Appeals did so err, whether it further erred in concluding that the trial court properly refused to instruct the jury on the crimes of reckless conduct and reckless driving as lesser included offenses of aggravated assault. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Patterson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 1991, Anthony Brooks was charged with felony murder and attempted armed robbery. At a plea hearing in January 1992, Brooks, represented by two attorneys, pled guilty to both charges. Brooks was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder and a concurrent probated sentence of ten years for attempted armed robbery. On January 20, 2015, Brooks filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal from his guilty pleas and also moved for an evidentiary hearing thereon. The trial court denied both motions. Brooks appealed the denial of his motions for an out-of-time appeal, and for an evidentiary hearing. Finding no reversible error, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial. View "Brooks v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stanley Cottrell, Jr. appealed the grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”) and earlier grants of directed verdicts in this action alleging defamation and related torts, and potentially implicating the constitutionality of portions of the Georgia Computer Systems Protection Act (“GCSPA”) in favor of five defendants: Glenn and Marian Crocker (“Crockers”), Hugh Johnson (“Johnson”), Peggy Smith (“Peggy”), and Karen Smith (“Karen”). This matter arose out of some online postings and other communications by Defendants about Cottrell. For a number of years, Cottrell participated in a number of solo running exhibitions with a Christian evangelical emphasis, some of which have been portrayed in the media, and was subsequently involved in various multi-level marketing endeavors, executive leadership positions, and motivational speaking. Cottrell’s notoriety grew along with media controversy relating to his character, which questioned the authenticity and integrity of his claims and achievements. The Crockers worked for Cottrell planning two running exhibitions; Johnson was a long-time friend of Cottrell’s who came to know some women with whom Cottrell was involved outside of his marriage; Peggy is one of the women with whom Cottrell had an extra-marital affair; and Karen is Peggy’s daughter-in-law. Karen located and contacted several people she believed had information about Cottrell, including the Crockers and Johnson. Karen and her husband created a “WordPress” blog and posted stories based on this information, which portrayed Cottrell as having a long history of misrepresentation and deception for personal gain. Karen sent emails to a “list serve” group criticizing Cottrell and sharing links to the Blog posts, and Peggy sent messages to multiple Cottrell Facebook “friends” along the same lines. Cottrell sued, primarily alleging defamation and several associated claims (invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of the GCSPA). After review of Cottrell's arguments on appeal of the JNOV, the Supreme Court concluded JNOV was indeed warranted in this case, and affirmed the trial court's judgments. View "Cottrell v. Smith" on Justia Law

Gail Reed appealed a superior court order granting Kimberly McConathy’s motion to dismiss Reed’s petition for an equitable partition of real property and an accounting. Reed owned a piece of real property in Catoosa County, on which she operated a florist shop. In May 2004, she executed a conveyance of the property to her daughter, McConathy, that she contended met the requirements of then-OCGA 44-6-190, and resulted in Reed and McConathy owning the property as joint tenants with the right of survivorship. In 2007, Reed executed a quitclaim deed transferring all right, title, and interest she possessed in the property to Patricia Page; Page executed a quitclaim deed transferring to Reed any and all interest Page had in the property. Then in 2014, Reed filed a petition for an equitable partitioning of the property and an accounting. McConathy moved to dismiss, asserting that under OCGA 44-6-160, equitable partitioning was only available when property was held by tenants in common, not joint tenants with the right of survivorship, which she contended the parties were. Reed responded by citing then-OCGA 44-6-190, and arguing that the 2007 transfer of Reed’s interests to Page severed the joint tenancy under that statute. After a hearing on McConathy’s motion to dismiss, the trial court granted the motion. On appeal, McConathy argued Reed’s 2007 quitclaim deed to Page was not a “lifetime transfer” within the meaning of former OCGA 44-6-190 (a)’s severance language because it was not a transfer of the property for her lifetime, as she quickly received the property back again. The Supreme Court disagreed: when Page received a grant of Reed’s interest in the property by virtue of the quitclaim deed, it was Page’s to do with as she wished. "There was no restriction in the quitclaim deed, and had Page chosen to retain what had previously been Reed’s interest, or sell it to another, the quitclaim deed would provide Reed no basis upon which to assert that an interest in the property should be returned to her. Rather, the reference to 'lifetime transfer' in former OCGA 44-6-190 (a)’s severance language is clearly to distinguish a conveyance during the life of a joint tenant, such as the 2007 quitclaim deed to Page, from an attempted conveyance by devise." The superior court erred in granting the motion to dismiss the petition for partition and an accounting, therefore, the Supreme Court reversed its decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Reed v. McConathy" on Justia Law

A mandatory arbitration clause is contained in each deposit agreement for customers of appellee SunTrust Bank. The clause permits an individual depositor to reject the agreement’s mandatory arbitration clause by giving written notice by a certain deadline. SunTrust claimed it drafted the arbitration clause in such a way that only an individual depositor may exercise this right to reject arbitration on his or her own behalf, thereby permitting that individual to file only an individual lawsuit against the bank. But SunTrust asserted that even if, as it has been determined here, the filing of a lawsuit prior to the expiration of the rejection of arbitration deadline operated to give notice of the individual plaintiff’s rejection of arbitration, the complaint could not be brought as a class action because the filing of a class action could not serve to reject the arbitration clause on behalf of class members who have not individually given notice. Jeff Bickerstaff, Jr., who was a SunTrust Bank depositor, filed a complaint against SunTrust on behalf of himself and all others similarly situated alleging the bank’s overdraft fee constitutes the charging of usurious interest. At the time Bickerstaff opened his account (thereby agreeing to the terms of SunTrust’s deposit agreement), that agreement included a mandatory arbitration provision. In response to the ruling of a federal court in an unrelated action finding the arbitration clause in SunTrust’s deposit agreement was unconscionable at Georgia law, and after Bickerstaff’s complaint had been filed, SunTrust amended the arbitration clause to permit a window of time in which a depositor could reject arbitration by sending SunTrust written notification that complied with certain requirements. SunTrust had not notified Bickerstaff or its other customers of this change in the arbitration clause of the deposit agreement at the time Bickerstaff filed his complaint, but the complaint, as well as the first amendment to the complaint, was filed prior to the amendment’s deadline for giving SunTrust written notice of an election to reject arbitration. It was only after Bickerstaff’s complaint was filed that SunTrust notified Bickerstaff and its other existing depositors, by language printed in monthly account statements distributed on August 24, 2010, that an updated version of the deposit agreement had been adopted, that a copy of the new agreement could be obtained at any branch office or on-line, and that all future transactions would be governed by the updated agreement. SunTrust appealed the order denying its motion to compel Bickerstaff to arbitrate his claim, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, finding that the information contained in the complaint filed by Bickerstaff’s attorney substantially satisfied the notice required to reject arbitration. Bickerstaff appealed the order denying his motion for class certification, and in the same opinion the Court of Appeals affirmed that decision, holding in essence, that the contractual language in this case requiring individual notification of the decision to reject arbitration did not permit Bickerstaff to reject the deposit agreement’s arbitration clause on behalf of other putative class members by virtue of the filing of his class action complaint. The Georgia Supreme Court reversed that decision, holding that the terms of the arbitration rejection provision of SunTrust’s deposit agreement did not prevent Bickerstaff’s class action complaint from tolling the contractual limitation for rejecting that provision on behalf of all putative class members until such time as the class may be certified and each member makes the election to opt out or remain in the class. Accordingly, the numerosity requirement of OCGA 9-11-23 (a) (1) for pursuing a class complaint was not defeated on this ground. View "Bickerstaff v. SunTrust Bank" on Justia Law

Appellant Ronald Fisher was found guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Derrick Cullins. At Appellant’s trial, the bulk of the evidence against him (including the only testimony directly identifying him as the shooter) came from David Lewis, who claimed that he was not involved in the crimes even though he admitted that he drove Appellant and the victim to the crime scene, was present during the shooting, and drove Appellant away afterwards. Defense counsel sought to call a witness to impeach Lewis' testimony, but that witness did not show for trial. Defense counsel also agreed to a jury instruction that the testimony of a single witness was generally sufficient to establish a fact without requesting an instruction on an exception that if the witness was an accomplice, his testimony should have been properly corroborated. Fisher appealed when he was ultimately convicted, raising his counsel's allegedly constitutionally ineffective assistance. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that defense counsel's performance was indeed constitutionally ineffective, and reversed Appellant's convictions. However, because the evidence at trial was legally sufficient to support the guilty verdicts, the State could retry him if it chose. View "Fisher v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2012, Thad Ashley was convicted of kidnapping a seven-year-old girl, attempting to kidnap her three-year-old sister, and criminal trespass at the trailer park where his father lived. At trial, the jury heard evidence of these crimes as well as evidence of three earlier incidents at the trailer park’s pool when Ashley had behaved inappropriately towards young children. The trial court admitted the evidence of these other incidents as similar transaction evidence under Georgia’s old Evidence Code, which applied at the time of Ashley’s trial, for the purpose of showing his intent when he engaged in the acts alleged in the indictment and his desires towards young children. Ashley appealed, contending among other things that the trial court abused its discretion when it admitted the similar transaction evidence. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals agreed and reversed Ashley’s convictions on that ground. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred in its decision, reversed and remanded with direction to consider Ashley's other challenges to his convictions. View "Georgia v. Ashley" on Justia Law

In March 2012, 91-year-old Bucilla Stephenson died at the end of a two-week stay at Doctors Hospital of Augusta, LLC (“Hospital”). In May 2013, Jacqueline Alicea, Bucilla's granddaughter, acting as the administratix of her grandmother’s estate, sued defendants the Hospital and Dr. Phillip Catalano. Alicea alleged among other things that they intubated her grandmother and put her on a mechanical ventilator, which prolonged her life when she was in a terminal condition and caused her unnecessary pain and suffering, contrary to her advance directive for health care and the specific directions of Alicea, her designated health care agent. The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing among other things that OCGA 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), a part of the Georgia Advance Directive for Health Care Act, gave them immunity from liability. The trial court rejected the immunity argument and denied summary judgment. On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the portion of the order denying immunity. The Supreme Court then granted Defendants’ petition for certiorari to review that aspect of the Court of Appeals’ decision. After review, the Court concluded the appellate court skipped over one important point: "[t]he correct analysis makes it even clearer, however, that the Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on their claim of immunity under OCGA 31-32-10 (a) (2) and (3), and we therefore affirm the Court of Appeals’ judgment as to that issue." View "Doctors Hospital of Augusta v. Alicea" on Justia Law

Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. was a textile manufacturer, and in the late 1960s and early 1970s, it produced dryer felts at a manufacturing facility in Waycross. Some of the pipes and boilers in that facility were insulated with material containing asbestos, and Scapa used yarn containing asbestos in some of its manufacturing processes. Between 1967 and 1973, Roy Knight worked on multiple occasions at the Waycross facility as an independent contractor. Almost forty years later, Knight was diagnosed with mesothelioma. After his mesothelioma was diagnosed, Knight and his wife sued Scapa, claiming that Scapa negligently exposed him to asbestos at the Waycross facility and caused his mesothelioma. The case was tried in front of a jury, which returned a verdict against Scapa and awarded more than $4 million in damages to the Knights. The trial court entered a judgment upon that verdict, and Scapa appealed. At trial, the Knights bore the burden to establish not only that one of their experts, Dr. Abraham, was qualified and that his testimony was reliable, but also that his testimony would be helpful to the jury. His ultimate opinion as to causation, however, was not limited to any meaningful estimate of exposure to asbestos at the Waycross facility (whether qualitative or quantitative), and it instead invited the jury to find that causation was established by any exposure at all. In that respect, the Supreme Court concluded the testimony did not “fit” the pertinent causation inquiry under Georgia law, and it should have been excluded by the trial court, acting as gatekeeper, because it could only serve to confuse the jury on the issue of causation. "And given that Dr. Abraham’s opinion 'went to the heart' of the dispute about the extent of exposure and causation, 'the erroneous admission of the opinion requires that we reverse the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court’s judgment.'" View "Scapa Dryer Fabrics, Inc. v. Knight" on Justia Law

Appellee Mother’s parental rights were terminated on January 14, 2013. Since Mother was indigent, she was represented by appointed counsel during the termination proceedings at juvenile court. In a letter that was apparently written prior to the issuance of the final termination of rights order, trial counsel told Mother that he could not represent her in an appeal, that she was not entitled to indigent defense for the discretionary appeal of a civil case, and that she should contact the public defender if she had questions or needed the appointment of another lawyer. On February 13, 2013, Mother, who was acting pro se, filed a notice of appeal in the juvenile court; but, months later, the juvenile court dismissed the notice of appeal because Mother was required to seek review by discretionary application. Mother, now represented by a new attorney, filed an “application for an out-of-time discretionary appeal,” requesting review of the January 2013 termination of rights order. Having decided it could grant the application for out-of-time discretionary review, the Court of Appeals went on to consider the merits and ultimately affirmed the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The Supreme Court granted the Georgia Division of Family and Children Services’ (“the State’s”) petition for certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in finding that an appellate court had the authority to excuse the untimely filing of a discretionary application in a civil parental termination case. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment so that the appellate court could issue an order dismissing Mother’s application for out-of-time discretionary review. View "In the Interest of B.R.F. f/k/a B.R.M." on Justia Law