Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Xavier Jones appealed his convictions for felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2010 shooting death of Christopher Crumby. On appeal, Jones argued the trial court erred: (1) in not granting his motion for directed verdict at trial; (2) in not granting his motion for new trial on the general grounds; (3) by admitting a video recording of Jones’s interview in which Jones remained silent in response to some of the investigators’ questions and comments; (4) denying his motion for mistrial on that ground, and (5) by failing to meaningfully respond to a question submitted by the jury during deliberations. Jones also argued the evidence submitted at trial was insufficient to support his convictions. The Georgia Supreme Court vacated Jones' conviction for aggravated assault as it should have merged into his felony murder conviction. The Court affirmed Jones' convictions in all other respects. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Torry Bowman and his friend, Maurice Goodman, got into an argument in a bar with brothers Alec and Britian Price. They confronted the Price brothers again outside the bar, and Alec was shot and died as a result of his injuries. Bowman was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with Alec’s death. On appeal, Bowman contended the trial court erred by: (1) instructing the jury on party to a crime, conspiracy, and provocation by words alone; and (2) failing to allow him to stipulate to his prior conviction to prove the required elements of Count 9 without stipulating that the conviction involved the possession or use of a firearm. He also argued that these errors, taken together, deprived him of a fair trial under Georgia v. Lane, 838 SE2d 808 (2020). Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bowman v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Torrey Kimbro was convicted of malice murder and rape in connection with the strangling death of Diamond Shepherd. On appeal, Kimbro contended the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to support his convictions. He also claimed the trial court erred: by denying his motion for new trial on the “general grounds” set forth in OCGA §§ 5-5-20 and 5-5-21; by denying his motion for a continuance; by denying his motion to dismiss his indictment; by denying his motion for a mistrial; and by overruling his objections to certain statements that the prosecutor made during her closing argument. In addition, he claimed his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance in several respects. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kimbro v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Raekwon Pauldo was convicted of malice murder in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Jacquel Smith. On appeal, Pauldo contended his trial counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance by: (1) failing to adequately prepare the defense of accident; (2) failing to limit testimony concerning the registration of Pauldo’s gun; and (3) failing to adequately inform him of the State’s plea offer. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Pauldo v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Christopher Sosebee was convicted by jury of felony murder in the 2020 death of Brian Hayes resulting from a car wreck. A sheriff’s deputy was looking for a black car that had been spraypainted and was missing its front grill, in order to serve arrest warrants on a person who, the day before, had reportedly been driving a vehicle matching that description. After a few minutes of following a SUV at 45 to 50 mph in a 45 mph zone, the deputy activated his blue lights and siren. The SUV accelerated and pulled away from the patrol car. At a curve, the SUV’s right rear tire left the road, then the SUV veered sharply to the left, crossed the oncoming lane, traveled up an embankment, hit some boulders, flipped, landed on top of an approaching truck, and then rolled off. The driver of the truck (Hayes) showed no signs of life when the deputy reached him, and Sosebee’s girlfriend, Tiffany Franklin, who had been a passenger in the SUV during the incident, was very badly injured. A test of Sosebee’s blood after the wreck revealed methamphetamine, at an impairment level, as well as marijuana. Sosebee contended felony murder (Count 1), and homicide by vehicle in the first degree (Count 4), which were both predicated on Count 6, fleeing or attempting to elude, defined exactly the same criminal conduct. Sosebee argued that the rule of lenity therefore required that he be sentenced within the range for homicide by vehicle in the first degree, rather than for felony murder. He also contended his sentence of life without parole violated the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth Amendment because neither felony murder nor homicide by vehicle in the first degree, when predicated on fleeing and attempting to elude as in this case, requires malice or specific intent to harm, and because the prior felonies that triggered his sentencing as a recidivist were nonviolent. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Sosebee v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Harold Kinlaw was convicted by jury of the malice murder of Felipe Herrera, the aggravated stalking and kidnapping of Kinlaw’s former wife Damaris Kinlaw, and other related crimes. Kinlaw appealed, arguing: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction for aggravated stalking; (2) the trial court erred by refusing to provide an interpreter for a witness at trial; (3) the trial court erred by excluding evidence that Herrera had threatened Kinlaw; (4) the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on voluntary manslaughter and self-defense; and (5) the trial court erred by employing an improper remedy after finding that the State had violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kinlaw v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Donald Steele appealed his convictions for felony murder and aggravated assault in connection with the stabbing death of Kevin McGruder. Steele argued on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction and that the trial court should have merged his conviction for aggravated assault into his conviction for felony murder, which was based on aggravated assault. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the evidence was sufficient to support Steele’s convictions, but the State conceded his conviction for aggravated assault should have merged into his felony murder conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed Steele’s conviction for felony murder and vacated his aggravated assault conviction. View "Steele v. Georgia" on Justia Law

On May 19, 1996, the body of Bridgett Parker was discovered near an abandoned mobile home. Parker’s throat had been cut, and she had been raped. Soon after, law enforcement officers identified Appellant Octavious Rivera as a possible suspect, and over the next few weeks, they interviewed Rivera regarding Parker’s death, executed a search warrant for his car and residence, and obtained a sample of his DNA; however, they did not arrest Rivera at that time. In February 2018, following the GBI’s reexamination of Parker’s sexual assault kit using new DNA testing methods and technology, Rivera’s DNA was identified as a match for DNA found inside Parker’s vaginal area, and he was arrested. Rivera was later convicted of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, as well as rape. On appeal, Rivera contended the trial court erred: (1) by denying Rivera’s motion for directed verdict on the ground that the State failed to allege the applicable tolling provision or exception to the statute of limitation with respect to Count 3 (aggravated assault) and Count 4 (rape) in the indictment, and on the ground that the statute of limitation on those counts was not tolled; and (2) by permitting the State to admit other-acts evidence under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b) and OCGA § 24-4-413 at trial. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Rivera’s felony murder conviction and reversed his rape conviction. View "Rivera v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed a superior court order granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Sheriff of Tift County, Gene Scarbrough, in this action brought by Sherrie McBrayer for the wrongful death of her husband, James McBrayer (“the decedent”). The Court of Appeals held that Scarbrough was immune from suit because McBrayer’s complaint did not show that the decedent’s death, which occurred while he was restrained in the back seat of a patrol car, arose from the sheriff’s deputies’ “use” of the patrol car “as a vehicle,” which, under Court of Appeals case law construing OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2, was a prerequisite for a waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the “negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.” In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted that McBrayer’s complaint did not allege “that the car was running; that any deputy was seated in the car; that any deputy was poised to start the car or transport the decedent to any location;” or that the deputies were otherwise “actively” using the patrol car “as a vehicle. McBrayer thereafter timely petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the meaning of the word “use” in the phrase “use of a covered motor vehicle” by reading into OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2 the words “actively” and “as a vehicle.” Therefore, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McBrayer, et al. v. Scarbrough" on Justia Law

In January 2018, Bianca Bouie was returning from her lunch break to her workplace, Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC, also known as University Childcare Center (“University Childcare”), when she looked away from the road to scroll through the contacts in her cell phone so that she could call her manager to report that she was running late. While Bouie was distracted, her car crossed the median and caused an accident with a truck that was driven by Andrea Cotton. Cotton filed a personal injury lawsuit against Bouie and later added University Childcare as a defendant, alleging, among other things, that Bouie was acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident and that University Childcare was therefore liable under the legal theory of respondeat superior. University Childcare moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, concluding, in pertinent part, that Bouie was not acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment when the accident occurred. Cotton appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding that under the “special circumstances exception” to the general rule that employees do not act in furtherance of an employer’s business and within the scope of employment when they are commuting to and from work or when they are on a lunch break, and under two of its cases applying that “exception,” there was sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to the issue of liability under respondeat superior. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ “special circumstances exception,” as well as the multi-factor test the court developed for applying that “exception.” The Supreme Court also concluded that the two cases on which the Court of Appeals relied in applying the “special circumstances exception” used imprecise language regarding the respondeat-superior test, and the Supreme Court disapproved such language. In light of these conclusions, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’s opinion and remanded the case to that court so that it could apply the proper respondeat-superior test in the first instance. View "Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC v. Cotton" on Justia Law