Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding OCGA § 51-1-11(c). Although product-liability claims were generally subject to a ten-year statute of repose in Georgia, the statute of repose did not apply to negligence claims “arising out of conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property.” The federal district court asked: (1) whether, under OCGA § 51-1-11(c), “reckless” conduct was a standalone exception to OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2)’s ten-year statute of repose; and (2) if so, how “reckless” conduct was defined. The Supreme Court answered the first question in the affirmative: under OCGA § 51-1-11(c), reckless disregard for life or property was a standalone exception to OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2)’s ten-year statute of repose. Thus, OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2)’s statute of repose does not apply to a product-liability claim sounding in negligence that “aris[es] out of conduct which manifests . . . reckless . . . disregard for life or property.” The Court answered the second question that “reckless . . . disregard for life or property,” under OCGA § 51-1-11(c), carries a meaning that closely resembles the Restatement (First) of Torts’ definition of “Reckless Disregard of Safety.” Specifically, an actor’s “conduct . . . manifests a . . . reckless . . . disregard for life or property,” under OCGA § 51-1-11(c), if the actor “intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable [person] to realize that the actor’s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of [harm to another’s life or property] but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to [the other’s life or property].” View "Ford Motor Co. v. Cosper" on Justia Law

Leon Adams IV (“Leon”) was convicted by jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Laron Lowe and the aggravated assault of Ronda Dobson. Leon contended: (1) the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel had an actual conflict of interest arising out of his joint representation of Leon and his co-defendant and brother, Isaiah Adams. For the reasons set forth below, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Adams' convictions. View "Adams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Nuwrulhaqq Hamilton was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Antonio Felton. On appeal, Hamilton argued: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict as to the counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; and (2) the trial court plainly erred by failing to give, and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request, a jury charge on Hamilton’s good character. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Hamilton’s convictions. View "Hamilton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In April 2019, Kevin Roberts applied to Judge Clarence Cuthpert, Jr., probate judge for Rockdale County, for a weapons carry license pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129. Judge Cuthpert denied Roberts’s application, finding that Roberts’s criminal history revealed five arrests between 1992 and 2004 for aggravated assault, affray, obstruction of the judiciary, cruelty to children in the first degree, simple battery, battery, and family violence battery. Judge Cuthpert noted that Roberts’s criminal history did not list the dispositions of Roberts’s arrests for obstruction of the judiciary or simple battery, but the other arrests had dispositions of not prosecuted, dismissed, or nolle prossed. Judge Cuthpert concluded that Roberts “lack[ed] good moral character[4] . . . [d]ue to his arrest[s] for several violent offenses” and that “the court need[ed] additional information[, including police reports,] to determine if this application should be approved.” After reconsideration, Judge Cuthpert again denied the petition, concluding that, “[b]ased upon [Roberts’s] history of violent offenses and failure to comply with the Court’s instructions to provide the incident reports and dispositions for [his previous five arrests],” Roberts was “not of good moral character.” Roberts thereafter filed a complaint seeking mandamus relief against Judge Cuthpert “in his official capacity,” declaratory judgment against Judge Cuthpert “in both his official and individual capacities,” and costs and attorney’s fees. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity for claims brought under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) and that the Separation of Powers Provision of the Georgia Constitution was not implicated by the recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, against a probate judge pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) because processing a weapons carry license did not involve the exercise of judicial power. The Court also concluded the probate judge in this case waived the defense of judicial immunity on the costs-and-fees claim asserted against him in his official capacity. View "Roberts v. Cuthper" on Justia Law

Following a reversal of his convictions on appeal and a retrial, Appellant Phillip Kennebrew was convicted of malice murder and related crimes in connection with the 2011 beating and stabbing death of Breyon Alexander. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce into evidence testimony from a witness who testified at Appellant’s first trial but was unavailable to testify at his second trial. Appellant contended the witness’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay that did not fall within the prior testimony hearsay exception, OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (1), and that violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant further argued that, even if the witness’s prior testimony was not altogether inadmissible, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exclude double hearsay within that testimony. Appellant also challenged the trial court’s admission of hearsay statements made by the victim, which were admitted under the residual hearsay exception, OCGA § 24-8-807. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kennebrew v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Rafael Carter appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea stemming from the murder of Terrance Fields during an armed robbery. The January 2016 term of court in which Carter entered his guilty plea expired on Friday, March 4, 2016, and a new term of court commenced on Monday, March 7, 2016. So both his March 11, 2016 and his October 11, 2021 motions to withdraw were filed after the expiration of the term of court in which he entered his plea. Nonetheless, Carter maintains that his convictions and sentences are void and illegal due to merger errors, thus providing the trial court with jurisdiction to permit the withdrawal of his guilty plea. The Georgia Supreme Court found Carter’s sentence was not void because his felony murder convictions were vacated by operation of law despite the trial court’s purported merger of those counts; the trial court has properly merged Carter’s conviction for the aggravated assault of Fields (Count 9) into his malice murder conviction (Count 1); no other merger error appeared; and each sentence imposed was within the range that the law allows. Therefore, the Court found the trial court properly dismissed Carter's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "Carter v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Walter Salvesen, III was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Johnathan Martin. On appeal, Salvesen contended: (1) the trial court admitted unduly prejudicial photographs from Martin’s autopsy and the scene where Martin’s body was found; (2) the trial court erred by failing to recharge the jury on the lesser offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter when it recharged on malice murder and felony murder; and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance to the extent the foregoing alleged errors were not preserved for appellate review. The Georgia Supreme Court was not persuaded: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs; (2) the trial court acted within its discretion in solely recharging the jury on the definitions it requested and not the lesser offenses; and (3) Salvesen has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was deficient. The Court therefore affirmed Salvesen’s convictions. View "Salvesen v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether revenue generated from the lease of a bona fide coin operated amusement machine (“COAM”) qualified as “gross revenues” exempt from taxation under OCGA § 48-8-3 (43). Funvestment Group, LLC, the lessee of the COAMs at issue and the owner of the location where the COAMs were available for play, argued that revenues generated from the lease of COAMs were considered “gross revenues” exempt from sales and use tax. The Court of Appeals concluded that the subject lease revenues were not “gross revenues” and that the exemption only applied to money inserted into COAMs for play. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in reaching this conclusion, and thus reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment. View "Funvestment Group, LLC v. Crittenden" on Justia Law

Wise Business Forms, Inc. (“Wise”) was the nation’s fourth largest printer of business forms, and was headquartered in Forsyth County, Georgia. A 36-inch metal pipe (“Subject Pipe”) ran underneath Wise’s property and had been in place since 1985. Approximately twenty-five feet of the drainage pipe extended into a two-acre tract of land west of Wise’s property (“Corner Tract”). The Corner Tract was undeveloped and forms a natural detention basin into which a large vertical concrete drainage structure with a large stormwater outlet pipe (“Feeder Structure”) was constructed. Wise asserted in its complaint that water from the Feeder Structure on the Corner Tract was designed to flow through the Subject Pipe underneath Wise’s property. The McFarland Parkway Widening Project extended McFarland Road from two lanes to four lanes and was completed in 2000. Wise alleged in its complaint that this project resulted in a substantial increase of the surface and stormwater runoff flowing underneath its property. In 2020, Wise filed a complaint against Forsyth County and the Georgia Department of Transportation (the “DOT”) raising claims for per se taking of Wise’s property, inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance, attorney fees. Wise amended its complaint to add a claim for inverse condemnation by abatable nuisance. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to clarify the standards for determining when a claim for inverse condemnation by permanent nuisance accrues for purposes of applying the four-year statute of limitation set forth in OCGA § 9-3-30 (a). The Court concluded that, although the Court of Appeals articulated one of the correct standards to apply in determining when the applicable statute of limitation begins to run on a permanent nuisance claim, the Court of Appeals failed to construe the allegations of the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-moving party; erred in concluding there was only one harm in this case that was “immediately observable” to the plaintiff when the nuisance at issue was completed; and erred in concluding that the statute of limitation had run on the plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law. View "Wise Business Forms, Inc. v. Forsyth County, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Tarus Green was convicted of felony murder in connection with the 2012 shooting death of Gregory Bivin. On appeal, Green argued: (1) the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to sustain his conviction; (2) the trial court erred by allowing the jury during deliberations to review cell phone records that were admitted as evidence but were neither published nor explained to the jury during the trial; and (3) the trial court erred in allowing admission of a witness’s alleged prior inconsistent statement without first affording the witness the opportunity to explain or deny the substance of the statement pursuant to OCGA § 24-6-613 (b). The Georgia Supreme Court found each of these claims failed and affirmed Green's conviction. View "Green v. Georgia" on Justia Law