Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

John Doe, a patient at Ridgeview Institute – Monroe, sued the facility's owners, operators, and CEO after a former employee, Rhonda Rithmire, disclosed patient information without authorization. Doe sought to represent a class of affected patients, alleging multiple claims including breach of contract and negligence. The trial court denied Doe's motion for class certification, finding that he failed to meet the commonality and typicality requirements under OCGA § 9-11-23 (a). Specifically, the court noted that Doe's disclosed information did not include diagnosis or treatment details, unlike other patients whose more sensitive information was revealed.Doe appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that Doe's claims and those of the putative class arose from the same events and were based on the same legal theories, thus satisfying the typicality requirement. One judge dissented, disagreeing with the majority's interpretation of the typicality and commonality requirements.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine if the trial court abused its discretion in denying class certification. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court acted within its discretion in finding a lack of typicality. The court noted that the differences in the type of information disclosed among class members could lead to different legal theories and defenses, making Doe's claims not typical of the class. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision, upholding the trial court's denial of class certification. The court did not address the commonality issue, as the lack of typicality alone was sufficient to deny class certification. View "VEST MONROE, LLC v. DOE" on Justia Law

In 2018, North American Senior Benefits, LLC (NASB) entered into employment contracts with Ryan and Alisha Wimmer, which included a restrictive covenant prohibiting them from recruiting NASB employees for two years post-termination. In 2021, after the Wimmers left NASB and allegedly started a competing business, NASB sued to enforce the covenant. The Wimmers argued that the covenant was unenforceable due to the lack of an express geographic term.The Statewide Business Court agreed with the Wimmers and granted their motion for judgment on the pleadings, finding the covenant unenforceable without an express geographic term. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, relying on its prior ruling in CarpetCare Multiservices v. Carle, which held that a restrictive covenant must include an express geographic term to comply with OCGA § 13-8-53 (a). One judge dissented, arguing that the GRCA does not require an express geographic term for non-recruitment provisions.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the Court of Appeals erred. The Supreme Court held that OCGA § 13-8-53 (a) does not mandate an express geographic term for a restrictive covenant to be enforceable. Instead, the statute requires that the restrictions be reasonable in time, geographic area, and scope of prohibited activities. The Court emphasized that the reasonableness of a covenant's geographic scope should be assessed based on the totality of the circumstances, not solely on the presence of an express geographic term.The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the reasonableness of the non-recruitment provision under the GRCA. View "NORTH AMERICAN SENIOR BENEFITS, LLC v. WIMMER" on Justia Law

A group of property owners sued Columbia County over stormwater drainage issues that caused damage to their property. The property, purchased in 1996, contained a metal pipe used in the County's stormwater system. Over the years, heavy rains caused the pipe to fail multiple times, leading to significant property damage. The property owners sent a notice to the County in October 2013, outlining their claims, but the County declined to make repairs. The property owners then filed a lawsuit in March 2014, seeking damages and an injunction to prevent further damage.The trial court found in favor of the property owners, ruling that the County maintained a nuisance that amounted to a taking without just compensation. The court awarded damages and issued a permanent injunction against the County. The County appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed some parts of the trial court's decision and vacated others. The Court of Appeals vacated the damages award for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice and reversed the award of attorneys' fees. However, it upheld the injunction against the County.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals' decision to uphold the injunction, ruling that it exceeded the bounds of the Georgia Constitution's limited waiver of sovereign immunity. The Court directed the Court of Appeals to remand the case to the trial court to consider a new injunction within the constitutional limits. The Supreme Court also concluded that it should not have granted certiorari on the issue of damages for harms incurred after the October 2013 notice, as the Court of Appeals' ruling was specific to the facts of this case and did not establish a general rule of law. The petition for certiorari on this issue was therefore denied. View "Satcher v. Columbia County" on Justia Law

Ryan Milliron submitted an Open Records Act request to Manos Antonakakis, a professor at Georgia Tech, seeking records related to Antonakakis’s services to Georgia Tech as a private contractor. Milliron also sent a similar request to Georgia Tech. Antonakakis did not respond individually, but Georgia Tech provided some documents. Unsatisfied, Milliron sued Antonakakis, alleging he held additional public records in his capacity as a private contractor. Milliron claimed Antonakakis’s companies, formed to receive DARPA funding for Georgia Tech, maintained relevant records.The trial court dismissed Milliron’s complaint, ruling that only agencies, not individual employees or private contractors, are obligated to produce public records under the Open Records Act. The court also found that Milliron’s request to Antonakakis was improper because Georgia Tech had a designated open records officer. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, agreeing that Milliron’s request was not properly submitted to the designated officer.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the Open Records Act applies to records held by private contractors performing services for public agencies. The Court held that requests for such records can be made directly to the custodian of the records, including private contractors, even if the agency has a designated open records officer. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded the case for further proceedings to determine what records Antonakakis may hold and whether they are public records under the Act. View "Milliron v. Antonakakis" on Justia Law

On November 15, 2018, Misty Michelle Garrison was involved in a traffic accident, leading to charges of DUI (less safe) (alcohol), failure to maintain lane, and improper tires. The State initially filed an accusation on May 29, 2019, and later amended it on January 12, 2021, to include additional charges. At trial, evidence included testimony from witnesses and officers, with a focus on Garrison's behavior and the results of a horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test conducted by Trooper Kyle McSween.The trial court denied Garrison's motion in arrest of judgment, which argued that the accusation was filed beyond the statute of limitations. The court found that the Chief Justice’s emergency orders during the COVID-19 pandemic extended the limitations period. The jury found Garrison guilty on all counts, and she was sentenced accordingly. Garrison appealed to the Court of Appeals of Georgia, which affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the emergency orders tolled the statute of limitations and that the HGN test evidence was admissible under the Harper standard.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and concluded that the State was not required to allege and prove the tolling of the statute of limitations due to the emergency orders. The Court reasoned that such orders are effective as a matter of law and do not require factual proof. However, the Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the Harper standard to the HGN test evidence instead of the Daubert standard, which became applicable in criminal cases as of July 1, 2022. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the admissibility of the HGN test evidence under the Daubert standard. If the evidence is found inadmissible, a new trial will be necessary. View "Garrison v. State" on Justia Law

A Georgia State Patrol trooper observed Christopher James Newsom making an illegal left turn into the right lane of Georgia Highway 61 southbound. Following the traffic stop, the trooper determined that Newsom was driving under the influence of alcohol. The State charged Newsom with DUI less safe, DUI per se, and improper turn at an intersection. Newsom filed a motion to suppress, arguing that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) was unconstitutionally vague under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, making the traffic stop unlawful.The trial court agreed with Newsom, ruling that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) was unconstitutionally vague when read in conjunction with OCGA § 40-6-40 (c). The court found that the statutes provided conflicting directions to drivers, making it unclear whether Newsom had to complete his turn in the left lane. Consequently, the trial court dismissed the charges against Newsom, concluding that the traffic stop lacked probable cause.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that OCGA § 40-6-120 (2) (B) is not unconstitutionally vague as applied to Newsom. The statute provides clear notice that a driver making a left turn must complete the turn in the far-left lane. The court found that the trial court erred in interpreting Georgia Highway 61 as a single roadway, which led to the incorrect application of OCGA § 40-6-40 (c). The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the statute's language was clear and did not conflict with other statutory provisions. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "State v. Newsom" on Justia Law

The case involves Nathanieo Pinquez Pinkins, who was convicted of malice murder and related offenses following the shooting death of Cheryl Loving and the shooting of Desiraee Clay. Pinkins and Clay had a tumultuous relationship, and after a series of confrontations, Pinkins shot at Clay in a parking lot, injuring her. Shortly thereafter, he went to Loving's house, where he shot and killed her. Evidence included surveillance footage, forensic analysis, and Pinkins' own admissions.The Gwinnett County grand jury indicted Pinkins on nine counts, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, home invasion, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and aggravated battery. The jury found him not guilty of home invasion but guilty of the other charges. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder, along with additional consecutive sentences for other charges. Pinkins filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the convictions. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support the malice murder conviction, noting that the jury could reasonably infer Pinkins' intent to kill from his actions and the circumstances of the crime. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Pinkins' motion to sever the counts related to Loving from those related to Clay, as the offenses were part of a connected series of acts. The court concluded that the jury was capable of distinguishing the evidence and applying the law to each offense, as evidenced by their verdicts. View "Pinkins v. State" on Justia Law

Aimee Glover Heyward shot and killed her husband, Bruce Heyward, and was charged with malice murder and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, among other crimes. At trial, Heyward requested a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of malice murder, which the trial court provided. However, at the request of Heyward's counsel, the court did not instruct the jury that it could find Heyward guilty of voluntary manslaughter as a lesser offense of felony murder. The jury acquitted Heyward of malice murder but convicted her of felony murder.The DeKalb County grand jury indicted Heyward on multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder. After a jury trial, Heyward was found guilty of all charges except malice murder and was sentenced to life in prison plus additional years for other charges. Heyward filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. She then appealed, arguing that her trial counsel was ineffective for not requesting a voluntary manslaughter instruction for the felony murder charge.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed Heyward's convictions. The court held that Heyward did not demonstrate prejudice from her counsel's decision regarding the jury instructions. The evidence presented at trial indicated a long history of difficulties between Heyward and Bruce, culminating in a series of altercations on the day of the shooting. The court found that the jury was unlikely to conclude that Heyward experienced the kind of sudden and severe provocation necessary to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. Therefore, even if the jury had been given the option to convict Heyward of voluntary manslaughter instead of felony murder, there was no reasonable probability that it would have done so. Consequently, Heyward's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed, and her convictions and sentence were affirmed. View "Heyward v. State" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the death of Tammy Wolfe. The evidence presented at trial showed that Wolfe and the appellant had a tumultuous romantic relationship, marked by instances of jealousy and violence from the appellant. On the morning of Wolfe's death, cell phone records indicated that Wolfe's phone communicated with a phone linked to the appellant shortly before she was found dead. Wolfe's body was discovered with gunshot and stab wounds, and the letters "R" and "O" were written in blood on her car windshield. The appellant was arrested and found with weapons, despite previously telling police he did not carry any due to a medical condition.The trial court sentenced the appellant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for malice murder and additional time for possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The appellant filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. The appellant then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective on several grounds and that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of his prior acts of violence.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the appellant's claims and found that his trial counsel's performance was not deficient. The court held that the decisions made by counsel, such as not calling certain witnesses or presenting specific evidence, were strategic and reasonable under the circumstances. The court also concluded that any potential errors in admitting evidence of the appellant's prior acts of violence were harmless given the substantial evidence of his guilt. Consequently, the court affirmed the trial court's judgment, upholding the appellant's convictions and sentences. View "Bowman v. State" on Justia Law

Deand’re Dwayne Johnson was convicted for the stabbing death of Louis Tyler and the non-fatal assault of Vicki Robinson. The incidents occurred on November 10, 2018, following a series of conflicts between Johnson and Tyler’s family, particularly over the custody and care of Johnson’s son, K.J. Johnson had previously been involved in altercations with Tyler and Robinson, including forcibly taking K.J. and breaking windows at their residence. On the night of the stabbing, Johnson approached Tyler’s apartment with a knife, leading to a confrontation where Tyler was fatally stabbed.A DeKalb County grand jury indicted Johnson on multiple charges, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, burglary, aggravated stalking, and possession of a knife during the commission of a felony. In October 2019, a jury found Johnson guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced him to life without the possibility of parole plus 25 years. Johnson’s motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court in September 2023.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Johnson argued that the trial court erred by not instructing the jury on the impeachment of a witness based on bias, knowledge, and the defense of accident, and by allowing hearsay testimony. The Supreme Court found no plain error in the trial court’s jury instructions, noting that the instructions given sufficiently covered the necessary legal principles. The court also determined that any error in admitting the hearsay testimony did not affect the trial's outcome, as the evidence of Johnson’s guilt was overwhelming and the contested testimony was cumulative of other evidence. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Johnson’s convictions. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law