Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Rico Lamar Ballard was convicted of malice murder for the shooting death of Jason Pitts. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in 1998. Since then, Ballard has made multiple attempts to overturn his conviction, including filing various post-conviction motions in 2022 and 2023. These motions included a "Motion to Correct a Clerical Error to Conform to Oral Pronouncement," a "Petition for Exoneration and Discharge; Hearing; Retroactive Grant of First Offender Status," and an extraordinary motion for a new trial.The trial court denied or dismissed all of Ballard's motions. Specifically, the court rejected his petition for retroactive first-offender treatment, noting that first-offender treatment for murder would be inappropriate. The court also dismissed his extraordinary motion for a new trial as impermissibly successive, given that Ballard had already filed such a motion in 2002. Additionally, the court dismissed his motions to correct "clerical errors," determining that these motions were improperly used to challenge his conviction substantively.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decisions. The court held that Ballard's petition for retroactive first-offender treatment was properly denied because he did not obtain the required consent from the prosecuting attorney. The court also upheld the dismissal of his extraordinary motion for a new trial, citing the statutory limitation that only one such motion is allowed. Furthermore, the court agreed that Ballard's motions to correct "clerical errors" were not appropriate vehicles for challenging his conviction. Lastly, the court found no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Ballard's motion to recuse the judge, as there was no evidence of personal bias against Ballard. View "BALLARD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant, Jaquez Cooper, was convicted of malice murder and a related firearm offense in connection with the shooting death of Rene Betancourt on November 28, 2018. Cooper, who was 16 at the time of the crime, was arrested on December 21, 2018. A DeKalb County grand jury indicted him on April 18, 2019, and a superseding indictment was issued on February 25, 2020. The jury found Cooper guilty of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, but not guilty of theft by taking. He was sentenced to life in prison with the possibility of parole for malice murder and an additional five years for the firearm offense.Cooper filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed, arguing that the superior court lacked jurisdiction because the superseding indictment was not returned within the 180-day period required by OCGA § 17-7-50.1. He also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to timely file the plea in bar.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed Cooper's convictions. The court held that the superior court retained jurisdiction because the original indictment was returned within the 180-day period, as required by OCGA § 17-7-50.1. The court also found that Cooper's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed because he did not demonstrate prejudice. The trial court had considered the plea in bar on its merits, and the plea was ultimately meritless based on the court's precedent in State v. Harris, which clarified that a reindictment outside the 180-day period does not deprive the superior court of jurisdiction. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's denial of Cooper's plea in bar and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "COOPER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Brendan Riley was charged and convicted of murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Glentis Wheeler. The State appealed the trial court's decision to grant Riley's amended motion for a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel for all counts except one. Riley argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for not challenging the charging document, which he claimed was ambiguous and could have led to the dismissal of most charges if a general demurrer had been filed.The trial court, after a hearing, agreed with Riley and granted a new trial for Counts 1 to 4 and Count 6, determining that the charging document did not meet the statutory requirements for an indictment and instead resembled an accusation. The court found that Riley's trial counsel was deficient in not challenging the document, which prejudiced the outcome of the case. However, the court upheld the conviction for Count 5, as it could be lawfully brought by accusation.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that the charging document, while ambiguous, contained indications that it could be considered an indictment. The court found no controlling precedent that would have required the dismissal of the charges if a general demurrer had been filed. Therefore, Riley's trial counsel was not deficient for failing to challenge the document, and Riley's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel failed. The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision to grant a new trial for Counts 1 to 4 and Count 6. View "THE STATE v. RILEY" on Justia Law

Henry Lamar Willis was admitted to the Bar in 2006 and established a law firm. In 2012, he failed to respond to a Formal Complaint by the State Bar regarding his improper handling and conversion of $30,000 in settlement funds. The special master entered a default judgment, and the Supreme Court of Georgia disbarred Willis in 2013 for violations of several Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct, including acting with reasonable diligence, keeping client funds separate, and not engaging in dishonest conduct.Willis sought readmission to the Bar, claiming a twelve-year rehabilitation process. The Board to Determine Fitness of Bar Applicants reviewed his application and recommended granting it. Willis provided a statement of rehabilitation, explaining personal and professional hardships, including a divorce and loss of a city council re-election bid. He detailed his efforts to rebuild his life, including paying all due funds, engaging in various personal development activities, and receiving support from several attorneys and a city council member.The Fitness Board conducted an investigation, including notifying the State Bar, the public, and the judiciary. The State Bar noted a pending grievance at the time of Willis's disbarment, which was declared moot. Willis paid $4,800 owed to the Clients' Security Fund. At an informal conference, Willis took responsibility for his past conduct and demonstrated his rehabilitation.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the record and concluded that Willis had demonstrated rehabilitation by clear and convincing evidence. The Court granted Willis's Application for Certification of Fitness, allowing him to be readmitted to the Bar upon satisfying all requirements, including passing the Georgia Bar Examination. View "In re Willis" on Justia Law

Frederick Marsalia Rosenau was convicted of felony murder and a violation of the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act in connection with the shooting death of Quincy Suggs. Suggs was shot and killed on September 16, 2014. Rosenau, along with co-defendants Lavarr Pierce, Khadijah Jenkins, and Julius Lofton, was charged with multiple offenses, including malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, arson, and gang-related activities. Lofton pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and testified against the others. Rosenau, Pierce, and Jenkins were tried together, and the jury found Rosenau guilty of felony murder, aggravated assault, and a gang act violation. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole for felony murder and an additional 15 years for the gang act violation.Rosenau filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his gang act conviction, that the trial court erred in denying his motion for mistrial after the prosecutor commented on his silence, and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not retaining a gang expert and for not objecting to certain testimony.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the evidence was sufficient to support Rosenau's gang act conviction. The court held that the trial evidence established the existence of a criminal street gang, Rosenau's association with the gang, and that the aggravated assault of Suggs was intended to further the gang's interests. The court also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Rosenau's motion for mistrial, as the curative instruction given to the jury was sufficient. Lastly, the court concluded that Rosenau's trial counsel was not ineffective, as the decisions made were reasonable trial strategies. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Rosenau's convictions. View "Rosenau v. State" on Justia Law

Shawn Hylton was indicted for felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Lathan Davenport. Hylton filed a motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA § 16-3-24.2, which the trial court granted. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court's order lacked sufficient findings of fact and conclusions of law for meaningful appellate review and that the evidence did not support Hylton's claim of self-defense.The DeKalb County grand jury indicted Hylton on December 19, 2023. Hylton filed his motion for immunity on March 12, 2024, and after an evidentiary hearing on July 2, 2024, the trial court granted the motion on July 10, 2024. The State filed a timely notice of appeal, and the case was submitted to the Supreme Court of Georgia for a decision on the briefs.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. The evidence showed that Davenport had a violent reputation and had previously attacked Hylton. On the day of the shooting, Davenport severely beat Hylton and later approached him aggressively, prompting Hylton to shoot Davenport in self-defense. The Supreme Court found that the trial court's implicit findings were supported by the evidence and that Hylton had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed deadly force was necessary to prevent death or great bodily injury.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision to grant Hylton immunity from prosecution, concluding that the trial court did not err in its findings. View "State v. Hylton" on Justia Law

Petitioner Deandre Arnold, an indigent pro se litigant, attempted to file a civil complaint with an affidavit of indigence through the Fulton County Superior Court’s mandatory e-filing system. His complaint was rejected because it lacked an order authorizing him to file using a waiver payment account. The Clerk’s office informed him that he needed to obtain an order authorizing indigent status by presenting the complaint in person before a superior court judge. Arnold, unable to travel the 25 miles to the Clerk’s office, argued that the Clerk’s policy violated OCGA § 9-15-2 and his constitutional rights.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case after Arnold filed a petition for a writ of mandamus against the Clerk. Arnold contended that he had no adequate remedy other than filing an original petition in the Supreme Court because he could not appear in person to present a writ of mandanus and affidavit of indigence, and the Clerk would not accept such a filing by mail.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it lacked original jurisdiction to grant the relief Arnold sought, as its authority to issue writs of mandamus is limited to matters related to its appellate jurisdiction. The Court determined that the case did not fall within its appellate jurisdiction and transferred the petition to the Court of Appeals for resolution. The Court of Appeals has the authority to grant writs of mandamus in aid of its jurisdiction and will decide whether to require the Clerk to accept Arnold’s affidavit of indigence and civil complaint by mail. View "Arnold v. Alexander" on Justia Law

Christine Dias was arrested in Fulton County on suspicion of driving under the influence of alcohol. She refused to submit to a blood test after being read the statutory Implied Consent notice. Dias moved to suppress evidence of her refusal and challenged the constitutionality of OCGA § 40-6-392 (d), which allows such refusal to be admissible in court. The trial court ruled in her favor, declaring the statute unconstitutional and the refusal evidence inadmissible.The State Court of Fulton County's decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the constitutional question involved. The trial court had relied on precedents from Olevik v. State and Williams v. State, which established that a warrant is required for a blood draw unless there are exigent circumstances or consent. The trial court found no such circumstances in Dias's case and ruled that her refusal to submit to the blood test could not be used against her at trial.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in its interpretation of Elliott v. State, which only precludes the admission of breath test refusals under Paragraph XVI of the Georgia Constitution. The court noted that the novel constitutional question of whether blood test refusal evidence is inadmissible on other grounds was not directly addressed by the trial court.The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated the trial court's judgment and remanded the case for further consideration of any other basis for excluding the blood-test refusal evidence. View "THE STATE v. DIAS" on Justia Law

David Nesbit, Jr. was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Gregory Gabriel and the aggravated assault of Cachino Minor. On June 17, 2020, Nesbit and his girlfriend, Jamonda Kirkland, went to a Texaco gas station where Nesbit encountered Gabriel and Minor. A confrontation ensued, resulting in Nesbit shooting Gabriel, who later died from his injuries. Nesbit was indicted on multiple counts, including malice murder and aggravated assault. The jury found Nesbit guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to life without parole for malice murder, with additional consecutive sentences for other charges.Nesbit filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court after an evidentiary hearing. Nesbit then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert a defense of habitation and for not objecting to the State’s closing argument.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the defense of habitation was not applicable because there was no evidence that Gabriel or Minor attempted to enter Nesbit’s vehicle. The court also determined that Nesbit’s trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision not to object to the State’s closing argument, which was a response to the defense’s claims about witness preparation. The court concluded that Nesbit’s trial counsel was not constitutionally ineffective and affirmed Nesbit’s convictions. View "NESBIT v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Christopher Berry was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Cordeldrick Laquinn Brooks. The crimes occurred on September 22, 2015, and Berry was indicted on multiple counts, including malice murder, felony murder, kidnapping, and possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. A jury trial was held in April 2018, where Berry was found guilty on all counts except one, which was nol prossed. Berry was sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and kidnapping, along with additional concurrent and consecutive sentences for other charges.Berry moved for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a directed verdict and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to hearsay evidence. The trial court had denied Berry's motion for a directed verdict, and Berry's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was not raised in his amended motion for a new trial, thus it was waived.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the evidence and found that the jury was properly instructed and could reasonably conclude that co-defendant Kameron Reese was not an accomplice, making corroboration of his testimony unnecessary. The court held that the trial court did not err in denying Berry's motion for a directed verdict. Additionally, Berry's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was not properly before the court as it was not raised in the trial court. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed Berry's convictions. View "BERRY v. THE STATE" on Justia Law