Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia upheld the convictions of Milton Nathaniel Scott for felony murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Jerrica Porter. Scott had appealed his conviction on the basis that the trial court erred in admitting into evidence one of his custodial statements in which he admitted to shooting Porter but claimed the shooting was an accident. He also contended that the trial court abused its discretion in overruling a hearsay objection to testimony that characterized his initial statement that Porter shot herself as implausible and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective in failing to object to testimony and evidence that suggested he was involved in a gang.The Supreme Court found that even if there was error in the admission of Scott's custodial statement, Scott failed to show harm from the admission because the State introduced into evidence a recording of a jailhouse phone call in which Scott repeated his claim that his shooting of Porter was an accident. The court also found that because Scott's defense was accident and the admission of the hearsay testimony and the evidence to which his trial counsel did not object was not relevant to that defense, these claims did not warrant a reversal.Lastly, the court determined that even if Scott's trial counsel was deficient in failing to object to evidence and testimony suggesting Scott's gang involvement, Scott failed to establish that this alleged deficiency prejudiced him. Therefore, the court affirmed Scott's convictions. View "SCOTT v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the appellants, London Clements and Eric Velazquez, were jointly tried for murder and other offenses connected to the shooting death of Hall County Deputy Sheriff Blane Dixon on July 7, 2019. Clements was convicted of felony murder, and Velazquez was convicted of malice murder and other crimes. On appeal, Clements argued that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict on the conspiracy to commit robbery and burglary count and the felony murder count predicated thereon and that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion to grant his motion for new trial on the general grounds. Velazquez contended on appeal that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for malice murder and felony murder predicated on aggravated assault on a peace officer, that the trial court erred by denying his motion for a directed verdict as there was insufficient corroboration of his co-conspirators’ testimony, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution. The court affirmed the convictions in both cases. View "CLEMENTS v. THE STATE (two cases)" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, Raymond Chambliss was convicted of felony murder for the shooting death of his girlfriend, Tonia Herring, during an argument. On appeal, Chambliss raised several claims. He argued that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the court erred in its instructions to the jury on simple assault and lesser offenses, and his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request charges for these lesser offenses.The Supreme Court of Georgia, however, disagreed with Chambliss's arguments. The court found that the evidence was sufficient to support Chambliss's felony murder conviction. Regarding the instructional errors, the court concluded that Chambliss had not shown that the given instruction on simple assault contained any obvious legal error and had not established that the trial court obviously erred by failing to charge the lesser offenses of felony or misdemeanor involuntary manslaughter. Lastly, the court found no merit in Chambliss's claims of ineffective assistance since he had not established that counsel performed deficiently by failing to request charges on lesser offenses that were not available to him.Consequently, the court affirmed Chambliss's conviction. View "CHAMBLISS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia had to determine whether a unit-of-prosecution analysis or a required evidence analysis should be used to address the question of merger as to one count of aggravated child molestation and two counts of child molestation. Tony Shropshire was convicted of aggravated child molestation, two counts of child molestation, incest, and first-degree cruelty to children, based on incidents that occurred in 2001 with his five- or six-year-old niece. Shropshire argued on appeal that the two child molestation counts should have merged into the aggravated child molestation conviction. The Court of Appeals applied a unit-of-prosecution analysis and agreed, merging the counts and vacating Shropshire's convictions and sentences for aggravated child molestation and child molestation. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated this part of the Court of Appeals's judgment and remanded the case. The Supreme Court held that a unit-of-prosecution analysis should be applied to determine whether the two counts of child molestation (the same crime) merge. However, as child molestation and aggravated child molestation are different crimes, a required evidence analysis should be applied to determine whether these two different crimes merge. The Court of Appeals erred in applying a unit-of-prosecution analysis rather than a required evidence analysis to this question. The case was remanded for the Court of Appeals to apply the correct analyses. View "THE STATE v. SHROPSHIRE" on Justia Law

In this case, property owners and residents of the Statham Lakefront Subdivision in Sumter County, Georgia, sought to require the county to repair roads in their subdivision. The county had not expressly accepted the roads as public roads, but the residents argued that the county had an obligation to maintain the roads because they had been open to the public since their creation. The trial court ruled that the county had no obligation to maintain the roads. The Court of Appeals vacated this decision, and remanded the case back to the trial court to determine whether there was evidence of "recognition of the streets as public streets or acceptance of the dedication by the public."The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Sumter County's petition for certiorari. The court held that a county is not obligated to repair and maintain a road if county authorities have not accepted the land owner’s offer to dedicate the road to public use. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in directing the trial court to consider whether the public accepted the road as a public road. However, the Supreme Court of Georgia found ambiguity in the Court of Appeals's decision and remanded the case back to the Court of Appeals to clarify whether it was directing the trial court to consider if the county authorities or the general public recognized the roads as public. View "SUMTER COUNTY v. MORRIS" on Justia Law

In this case, Arlene James filed a premises liability lawsuit against Brixmor New Chastain Corners SC, LLC, after she tripped on a parking bumper in a parking lot owned by Brixmor and sustained injuries. The parking bumper was not in its usual location but was instead laid out to separate the parking space from a motorcycle parking area. After the incident, Brixmor painted the parking bumper yellow. The trial court denied Brixmor's motion for summary judgment due to disputed facts about whether the structure James tripped on was a hazard and whether she had previously encountered it. The trial court also granted James's motion for sanctions for spoliation of evidence, barring Brixmor from arguing that the parking bumper was not a potential hazard. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of summary judgment but vacated the order imposing spoliation sanctions, remanding the matter to the trial court to apply the correct legal standard.The Supreme Court of Georgia granted Brixmor's petition for a writ of certiorari but chose to address a different issue: the Court of Appeals' determination that Brixmor failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion by the trial court in considering the subsequent remedial measures rule in its analysis of the spoliation issue. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that once the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court applied the incorrect standard on spoliation, consideration of the remedial measure rule was unnecessary and thus dicta. The Supreme Court of Georgia vacated Division 3 of the opinion to the extent that it purports to make a legal determination on the subsequent remedial measures rule and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BRIXMOR NEW CHASTAIN CORNERS SC, LLC v. JAMES" on Justia Law

Latoya Bray filed an action against sheriff’s lieutenant Stormie Watkins, in her official and individual capacities, for damages allegedly caused by her failure to activate a tornado warning system while working in a county emergency center. The trial court granted summary judgment to Watkins, concluding in part that the public duty doctrine negated any duty owed to Bray. In a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed: the majority opinion, the specially concurring opinion, and the dissenting opinion disagreed about whether the trial court erred by not considering whether sovereign immunity barred the official-capacity claim and whether the official capacity claim needed to be remanded for the trial court to resolve the sovereign immunity issue in the first instance. In her petition for certiorari to the Georgia Supreme Court, Bray contended: (1) the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the public duty doctrine foreclosed her lawsuit; and (2) the court’s discussion concerning sovereign immunity was “misplaced.” Because the applicability of the public duty doctrine was a merits question, the Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s ruling on the official-capacity claims on the ground that the public duty doctrine barred all of Bray’s claims without considering the threshold jurisdictional question of whether sovereign immunity barred Bray’s claims against Watkins in her official capacity. The Court therefore granted the petition for writ of certiorari, vacated the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Bray, et al. v. Watkins" on Justia Law

Appellant Larry Thomas appealed his convictions for felony murder in connection with the vehicular deaths of Krystof Krawczynski and Elizbieta Gurtler-Krawczynski. On appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in sentencing him for two counts of felony murder (Counts 1 and 2) rather than for two counts of homicide by vehicle (Counts 7 and 8) because both sets of charges were predicated on fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and thus the rule of lenity required that he receive the lesser penalty. This argument, however, was foreclosed by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in Sosebee v. Georgia, __ Ga. __, __ (1) (__ SE2d __) (2023) As explained in Sosebee, the felony-murder and homicide-by-vehicle statutes “are not ambiguous and do not require different punishments for the same conduct” because “[t]he offense of felony murder . . . criminalizes causing the death of a human being ‘in the commission of a felony,’ but the offense of homicide by vehicle in the first degree under OCGA § 40-6-393 (a) does not.” Accordingly, as in Sosebee, “[t]he rule of lenity simply has no application in this case, and this claim of error fails.” View "Thomas v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Armetrius Neason was convicted of malice murder and a related charge in connection with the shooting death of Teresa Carter. On appeal, Neason contended the evidence was insufficient as a matter of federal constitutional due process. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Neason v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Pacer Sebastian Carter appealed his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2017 shooting death of Aramis O’Brad Peterson. Carter argued the trial court erred in omitting a jury instruction on the statutory requirement of corroboration of accomplice testimony in felony cases, and that his trial attorney rendered ineffective assistance by failing to object to it. In addition, Carter argued his attorney was ineffective in admitting a document entitled “Proof of Incarceration.” Because both claims of trial court error were subject to review only for plain error, and Carter failed to carry his burden of showing either plain error or the ineffective assistance of his trial counsel, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction. View "Carter v. Georgia" on Justia Law