Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Carl Jones was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the 2015 shooting death of John Jones. On appeal, Appellant contended the trial court: (1) erred in denying his motion to suppress certain evidence collected from his back yard; (2) abused its discretion in failing to properly question and remove a juror who disclosed mid-trial that she went to school with one of the witnesses; (3) erred by refusing to permit Appellant to cross-examine a witness about her pending criminal charge; and (4) that Appellant was entitled to a new trial due to the cumulative effect of multiple errors at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Appellant's convictions. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Brandon Warren was convicted by jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with killing Samuel Poss and hiding his body. On appeal, Warren contended that his trial counsel gave ineffective assistance for failing to object when the prosecutor argued during closing that the State’s burden of proof “beyond a reasonable doubt” did not require “mathematical certainty” like “95 percent [or] 85 percent,” and for failing to give Warren adequate advice about the risks of testifying. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded Warren did not establish a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of his trial would have been different if his counsel had objected to the prosecutor’s remark, given the strong evidence against him. "And he has not shown that trial counsel’s advice to Warren about his right to testify, which included explaining the pros and cons of testifying and telling him the decision was his to make, fell outside the wide range of reasonable professional conduct." So the Court affirmed Warren’s convictions. View "Warren v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellee Terrell Brown and co-defendants Milton Rufus Hall and Andrew Dontavius Glass were indicted by grand jury with malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, aggravated battery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The charges arose from the fatal shooting of Stacey Monts and the shooting of Mario Roscoe. Brown filed a pretrial motion for immunity from prosecution based on self-defense. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court issued an order granting Brown immunity on most of the charges against him. The court’s ruling, however, omitted any reference to Count 6, which charged Brown and his co- defendants with committing an armed robbery by “tak[ing] a handgun” from Monts. On appeal, the State argues that the court’s failure to grant immunity on the armed-robbery charge conflicted with its grant of immunity on the other charges because, under OCGA § 16-3-21 (b) (2), a person could not be justified in using force while “attempting to commit, committing, or fleeing after the commission or attempted commission of a felony,” such as armed robbery. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the State correctly identified a potential conflict within the trial court’s ruling. However, the record on appeal did not permit the Supreme Court to determine whether the trial court erred because it could not discern whether the court even ruled on whether Brown was entitled to immunity on Count 6, much less that the court denied Brown immunity on that count. Because the record on appeal was insufficient for meaningful appellate review, the judgment was vacated and the case remanded for further clarification and analysis. View "Georgia v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s grant of a directed verdict in favor of Appellees, a court administrator and two municipal court case managers, based on quasi-judicial immunity. Appellees failed to remove a bind-over order from a stack of case files bound for the state court solicitor’s office, catalyzing a chain reaction that eventually led to the improper arrest and jailing of Appellant. The Supreme Court held that Appellees were not protected by quasi-judicial immunity because their alleged negligence was not committed during the performance of a “function normally performed by a judge.” The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Stanley v. Patterson et al." on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to determine whether a trial court’s order denying a motion to withdraw as counsel based on alleged conflicts of interest was immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Defendants Diane Buckner-Webb, Theresia Copeland, Sharon Davis-Williams, Tabeeka Jordan, Michael Pitts, and Shani Robinson were indicted by a grand jury, along with 35 other educators and administrators of the Atlanta Public Schools (“APS”), for conspiracy to violate the Georgia Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) Act and other crimes arising out of their alleged participation in a conspiracy to alter students’ standardized test scores. Of the 35 indicted, 12 APS employees, including Defendants, were tried together between August 2014 and April 2015. In April 2015, the jury found Defendants and five others guilty of at least one count of conspiracy to violate the RICO Act. In April and May 2015, Defendants moved for a new trial through their respective trial attorneys. Despite the fact that each Defendant was represented by a separate attorney at trial, the Circuit Public Defender appointed only one attorney, Stephen R. Scarborough, to jointly represent Defendants as appellate counsel, and he formally entered an appearance on Defendants’ behalf on April 26, 2017. More than two years after Scarborough’s appointment as appellate counsel for Defendants and around the time Defendants’ particularized motions for new trial were due for filing, Scarborough filed a “Motion for Rule 1.7[1] Determinations” to address alleged conflicts of interest arising from his joint representation of Defendants. Scarborough also filed a motion to withdraw as counsel based upon this conflict of interest. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that such orders did not fall within “the very small class” of trial court orders that were appealable under the collateral source doctrine, and thus affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision in Buckner-Webb v. State, 360 Ga. App. 329 (861 SE2d 181) (2021), but for different reasons. View "Buckner-Webb et al. v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kashawn Mitchell was convicted by jury of malice murder and related offenses in connection with the shooting death of Jaron Acklin. Mitchell claimed the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions, the trial court erred by admitting his custodial statements into evidence, and that the trial court erred during sentencing. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Mitchell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Ylarrio Garcia-Jarquin was convicted by jury of malice murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Edel Mendoza and the aggravated assault of Miguel Canil. Appellant claimed the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his conviction for the aggravated assault of Canil. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Garcia-Jarquin v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jeffrey Peacock was convicted of five counts of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting deaths of Jonathan Edwards, Jr., Alecia Norman, Reid Williams, Jones Pidcock, and Jordan Croft; the burning of their home; and the killing of three dogs. On appeal, he contended: (1) the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain his convictions for malice murder and the associated possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence found during the search of his truck; (3) his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to seek to suppress his statements to a GBI agent who allegedly provided him a hope of benefit in violation of OCGA § 24-8-824; and (4) his cruelty-to-animals convictions and sentences should have been for misdemeanors rather than felonies based on the rule of lenity. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Peacock v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jaquavious Reed appealed his conviction for murder and other charges in connection with the death of Antwan Curry. On appeal, Reed argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) he was denied due process due to an inordinate delay in the appellate process; (3) he was denied the right to be present at every critical stage of the trial when the trial court conferred with counsel at 26 bench conferences; (4) the Fulton County District Attorney’s Office (the “DA’s office”) should have been disqualified because his attorney of record was employed by the DA’s office at the time of trial; (5) he was denied due process when the State failed to preserve a true and correct copy of the full trial transcript including the bench conferences; (6) he was denied the right to effectively confront his accusers when the State failed to turn over exculpatory Crime Stoppers reports in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); (7) the trial court committed reversible error by refusing his request for a continuance to allow time to investigate a “surprise witness” presented by the State; (8) he received ineffective assistance of counsel with regard to the bench conferences, the incomplete transcript, and his trial counsel’s failure to object to the “presumption of truthfulness” jury charge; and (9) the trial court erred in sentencing him for both murder and felony murder. Although the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with Reed that the trial court erred in imposing his sentence and it vacated his conviction for felony murder and remand for resentencing, the Supreme Court otherwise affirmed. View "Reed v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2002, Douglas Coe, Jacqueline Coe, and GFLIRB, LLC (collectively the “Coes”) were involved in the sale of a company in which they held a substantial interest. Their accountants, BDO Seidman, LLP (“BDO”), advised them of a proposed tax strategy in which the Coes could invest in distressed debt from a foreign company in order to offset their tax obligations. In connection with the proposed tax strategy, BDO advised the Coes to obtain a legal opinion from an independent law firm, Proskauer Rose LLP (“Proskauer”). The Coes followed BDO’s advice, obtained a legal opinion from Proskauer, and claimed losses on their tax returns as a result. But in 2005, the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) initiated an audit, which ultimately led to a settlement in 2012. After settling with the IRS, the Coes filed suit against Proskauer in December 2015, asserting legal malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and other claims. After limited discovery on whether the statute of limitation barred the Coes’ claims, the trial court concluded that it did and granted summary judgment in favor of Proskauer, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the Coes failed, as a matter of law, to exercise reasonable diligence to discover Proskauer’s allegedly fraudulent acts. Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Coe, et al. v. Proskauer Rose, LLP" on Justia Law