Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In Georgia, plaintiffs Kristen Lovell, Lori Tullos, and Virginia McFaddin filed complaints against Brad Raffensperger (in his official capacity as the Secretary of State of Georgia), the Columbia County Board of Elections, the Morgan County Board of Elections and Registration, and various individuals associated with these entities, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The superior courts dismissed the actions, reasoning that they were barred by sovereign immunity as they failed to name the proper defendants as required by the Georgia Constitution.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the actions. The court ruled that under the Georgia Constitution's Paragraph V, which provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity for actions seeking declaratory relief from acts of the state, actions must be brought exclusively against the state and in the name of the State of Georgia or against the relevant local government entities. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to comply with this requirement as they named as defendants the Secretary of State (not the State of Georgia) and their local boards of election and their board members (not the relevant counties). Due to this failure to comply, the trial courts were correct to dismiss the actions. View "LOVELL v. RAFFENSPERGER" on Justia Law

In the Supreme Court of Georgia, the case at hand involves Dequavius Dexter Franklin who was indicted for murder and related offenses. Franklin had made a statement to law enforcement while in a hospital, which the prosecution sought to admit as evidence. However, the trial court suppressed this statement, citing that due to Franklin's medication, medical condition, and overall physical circumstances, the statement was not voluntary. The State appealed this decision, arguing that the statement was voluntary.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that the trial court erred in its ruling. It clarified that a defendant's medical condition alone is not sufficient to render a statement involuntary. The court explained that for a statement to be deemed involuntary, there must be evidence of coercive conduct by law enforcement. In this case, the court found no such evidence of coercive police conduct. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's order suppressing Franklin's statement, ruling it as voluntary and admissible. View "STATE v. FRANKLIN" on Justia Law

In August 2018, Mary Collington was involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jesse Curney, a deputy with the Clayton County Sheriff’s Department, who was acting within the scope of his official duties at the time. Initially believing Deputy Curney was a Clayton County police officer, Collington sent notice of her claims to the Clayton County Chief of Police, the Clayton County Commissioners, and the District Attorney of Clayton County. Collington later filed a lawsuit against Clayton County, asserting that she suffered injuries caused by the negligence of Deputy Curney.Upon motion to dismiss by the defendants, the trial court dismissed Collington's claims, concluding that Collington's claims against the Sheriff should be dismissed as she had failed to present timely notice to the Sheriff's office under OCGA § 36-11-1. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to determine whether OCGA § 36-11-1 applies to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a motor vehicle, and if so, whether presenting such a claim to the county commission satisfies the claimant's duty under the statute.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that OCGA § 36-11-1 does apply to official-capacity claims against a county sheriff for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle. Furthermore, the court decided that because a claim against a county sheriff in his official capacity for the negligent use of a covered motor vehicle is a claim against a county under OCGA § 36-11-1, presenting the claim to the county governing authority satisfies the statute's presentment requirement. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals, remanding the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "COLLINGTON v. CLAYTON COUNTY" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered whether the State violated Joseph Robert Gates's right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution by obtaining his medical records through an ex parte court order. The records, which were obtained after a car accident involving Gates, contained results of blood alcohol content (BAC) tests performed by the hospital where Gates was treated. The State used these records to charge Gates with several offenses, including driving under the influence. Gates filed a motion to suppress his medical records, but the trial court denied the motion, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the trial court's decision. The court held that Gates's medical records, including the BAC test results, were protected by the right to privacy under the Georgia Constitution. The court further concluded that the State's use of an ex parte court order to obtain Gates's medical records was more akin to the use of an ex parte subpoena, which had previously been held to violate the right to privacy, rather than an ex parte search warrant, which had been deemed permissible. The fact that the court order was not based on probable cause, nor did it comply with the statutory requirements for the issuance of a search warrant, further supported this conclusion. Therefore, the court concluded that the State had violated Gates's right to privacy by obtaining his medical records through an ex parte court order. As a result, the court reversed the trial court's denial of Gates's motion to suppress. View "GATES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In Georgia, Edward Lee was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to a series of offenses committed between December 15, 2011, and January 19, 2012. On appeal, Lee argued that the trial court erred in denying his motions for a mistrial based on the grounds that his co-indictee mentioned Lee’s prior imprisonment during his testimony and that the State violated Brady v. Maryland by failing to disclose evidence about a fourth man involved in one of the crimes. Lee also claimed his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to the prosecutor's comments on the veracity of witnesses and arguments about facts not in evidence during closing arguments.The Supreme Court of Georgia held that Lee waived his right to appeal the denial of his mistrial motions because he failed to make the motions contemporaneously when the issues arose during the trial. The court also rejected Lee's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, ruling that the prosecutor's comments were permissible as they were based on reasonable inferences from the evidence and not statements about the prosecutor’s personal beliefs. The court also stated that the decision not to object to a part of a prosecutor's closing argument is a tactical one and that failure to object must be patently unreasonable to be deemed deficient. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, thereby upholding Lee's conviction. View "LEE v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In January 2018, Dorothy Warren passed away after Dr. Nirandr Inthachak allegedly misinterpreted her CT scan. Angela Wilson, Warren’s daughter, filed a lawsuit against Dr. Inthachak. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Inthachak on two grounds. First, Wilson failed to provide clear and convincing evidence of gross negligence required under OCGA § 51-1-29.5 for healthcare liability claims arising from emergency medical care. Second, Wilson couldn’t prove that the outcome would have been different if Dr. Inthachak had correctly interpreted the CT scan.Wilson appealed, and all 14 judges of the Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court’s grant of summary judgment was improper. However, they were evenly divided on why summary judgment was incorrect under OCGA § 51-1-29.5. The Court of Appeals transferred the case to the Supreme Court of Georgia due to the equal division, invoking the Court's equal-division jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Georgia concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over the case because the Court of Appeals was not equally divided on the disposition of the judgment that was appealed. The Court of Appeals had unanimously agreed that the grant of summary judgment could not stand, and their disagreement was only regarding the reasons for why one of the two grounds was faulty. The Supreme Court of Georgia held that such a disagreement did not invoke its equal-division jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court returned the case to the Court of Appeals. View "WILSON v. INTHACHAK" on Justia Law

In this case, Laquan Hasuan Jivens was convicted for malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of Kathy Henry. Jivens appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser offense of voluntary manslaughter, admitting photographs of model firearms and of Jivens with firearms, denying his motion for mistrial after the State elicited testimony of his potential gang affiliation, granting the State’s motion in limine excluding evidence of Henry’s drug use, and denying his motion for mistrial based on the State’s allegedly improper closing arguments.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions. The Court held that the trial court did not err in failing to give a voluntary manslaughter charge because the evidence did not support such a charge. The court also concluded that it is highly probable that any error in admitting the firearm-related photographs did not contribute to the verdict. The court found that Jivens did not preserve for appellate review the issue related to evidence of gang affiliation. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding evidence of Henry’s drug use, and that Jivens waived any objection to the State’s alleged improper arguments. View "JIVENS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, Cynthia Jones was convicted of malice murder and related crimes in connection to the shooting death of her husband, Kenneth Jones. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed her conviction. Cynthia appealed her conviction, arguing that the trial court erred by refusing to give a jury instruction on self-defense. The court assumed, without deciding, that there was slight evidence of self-defense and that the trial court may have erred in declining to instruct the jury on self-defense. However, the court held that even if there was such an error, it was harmless. The court explained that a nonconstitutional instructional error is harmless if it is highly probable that the jury would have reached the same verdict even if the trial court had given the instruction. After examining the evidence presented at trial, the court concluded that it was highly probable that the jury would have reached the same verdict even if the trial court had given the self-defense instruction. The court found the evidence supporting Cynthia's claim of self-defense was weak, as there was no evidence that Kenneth wielded a weapon on the night of the shooting or that Cynthia believed it was necessary to use deadly force to prevent death or great bodily harm to herself. Therefore, Cynthia failed to show that the trial court's assumed error in declining to provide a self-defense instruction contributed to the jury's verdict. View "JONES v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In this case, the appellant, James Leon Beard III, appealed his convictions for felony murder and a firearm offense resulting from the shooting death of his wife, Angela Bishop. He contested that the trial court erred by not giving the jury a no duty to retreat instruction and by providing the jury with a sequential unanimity instruction on the lesser offense of involuntary manslaughter. He also argued that he was denied effective assistance of counsel and that the cumulative prejudice from the trial court’s errors and his trial counsel’s deficiencies warranted a new trial.The Supreme Court of Georgia disagreed with the appellant's claims. The court found that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on no duty to retreat affected his substantial rights or that the court erroneously instructed the jury regarding the lesser offense, thus not showing plain error. The court also concluded that the appellant failed to show deficiency and prejudice necessary to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, the court ruled that the assumed trial court error and assumed deficiencies by trial counsel did not entitle the appellant to a new trial and affirmed the lower court's decision. View "BEARD v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In July 2015, Christopher Reid Scoggins and co-defendant Fred Jason Charles were indicted for the murder of Stephanie Daniel and other related offenses. The jury found both defendants guilty on all counts. Scoggins was sentenced to life without parole for malice murder, plus additional time for other crimes. Scoggins appealed, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions and that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a jury instruction on concealing the death of another or hindering the apprehension of a felon.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the lower court's ruling. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to sustain Scoggins' convictions. Even though it was not conclusively established which defendant shot Daniel, the court found sufficient evidence of Scoggins' involvement in the crime. This was based on the fact that Scoggins was present at the time of the shooting, fled the scene with Charles, and made no attempt to seek medical aid for Daniel, which the court viewed as an indication of shared criminal intent.Additionally, the court held that Scoggins' trial counsel was not ineffective. The court stated that neither concealing the death of another nor hindering the apprehension of a felon were included within any of the offenses with which Scoggins was charged. Therefore, it was not deficient for Scoggins' trial counsel to not request instructions on these offenses. View "SCOGGINS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law