Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed a superior court order granting a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the Sheriff of Tift County, Gene Scarbrough, in this action brought by Sherrie McBrayer for the wrongful death of her husband, James McBrayer (“the decedent”). The Court of Appeals held that Scarbrough was immune from suit because McBrayer’s complaint did not show that the decedent’s death, which occurred while he was restrained in the back seat of a patrol car, arose from the sheriff’s deputies’ “use” of the patrol car “as a vehicle,” which, under Court of Appeals case law construing OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2, was a prerequisite for a waiver of sovereign immunity for injuries arising from the “negligent use of a covered motor vehicle.” In so holding, the Court of Appeals noted that McBrayer’s complaint did not allege “that the car was running; that any deputy was seated in the car; that any deputy was poised to start the car or transport the decedent to any location;” or that the deputies were otherwise “actively” using the patrol car “as a vehicle. McBrayer thereafter timely petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for certiorari review. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting the meaning of the word “use” in the phrase “use of a covered motor vehicle” by reading into OCGA §§ 33-24-51 (b) and 36-92-2 the words “actively” and “as a vehicle.” Therefore, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "McBrayer, et al. v. Scarbrough" on Justia Law

In January 2018, Bianca Bouie was returning from her lunch break to her workplace, Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC, also known as University Childcare Center (“University Childcare”), when she looked away from the road to scroll through the contacts in her cell phone so that she could call her manager to report that she was running late. While Bouie was distracted, her car crossed the median and caused an accident with a truck that was driven by Andrea Cotton. Cotton filed a personal injury lawsuit against Bouie and later added University Childcare as a defendant, alleging, among other things, that Bouie was acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident and that University Childcare was therefore liable under the legal theory of respondeat superior. University Childcare moved for summary judgment, and the trial court granted the motion, concluding, in pertinent part, that Bouie was not acting in furtherance of University Childcare’s business and within the scope of her employment when the accident occurred. Cotton appealed, and a divided Court of Appeals panel reversed, holding that under the “special circumstances exception” to the general rule that employees do not act in furtherance of an employer’s business and within the scope of employment when they are commuting to and from work or when they are on a lunch break, and under two of its cases applying that “exception,” there was sufficient evidence to raise a jury question as to the issue of liability under respondeat superior. The Georgia Supreme Court rejected the Court of Appeals’ “special circumstances exception,” as well as the multi-factor test the court developed for applying that “exception.” The Supreme Court also concluded that the two cases on which the Court of Appeals relied in applying the “special circumstances exception” used imprecise language regarding the respondeat-superior test, and the Supreme Court disapproved such language. In light of these conclusions, the Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals’s opinion and remanded the case to that court so that it could apply the proper respondeat-superior test in the first instance. View "Prodigies Child Care Management, LLC v. Cotton" on Justia Law

The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Georgia certified two questions to the Georgia Supreme Court regarding OCGA § 51-1-11(c). Although product-liability claims were generally subject to a ten-year statute of repose in Georgia, the statute of repose did not apply to negligence claims “arising out of conduct which manifests a willful, reckless, or wanton disregard for life or property.” The federal district court asked: (1) whether, under OCGA § 51-1-11(c), “reckless” conduct was a standalone exception to OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2)’s ten-year statute of repose; and (2) if so, how “reckless” conduct was defined. The Supreme Court answered the first question in the affirmative: under OCGA § 51-1-11(c), reckless disregard for life or property was a standalone exception to OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2)’s ten-year statute of repose. Thus, OCGA § 51-1-11(b)(2)’s statute of repose does not apply to a product-liability claim sounding in negligence that “aris[es] out of conduct which manifests . . . reckless . . . disregard for life or property.” The Court answered the second question that “reckless . . . disregard for life or property,” under OCGA § 51-1-11(c), carries a meaning that closely resembles the Restatement (First) of Torts’ definition of “Reckless Disregard of Safety.” Specifically, an actor’s “conduct . . . manifests a . . . reckless . . . disregard for life or property,” under OCGA § 51-1-11(c), if the actor “intentionally does an act or fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a reasonable [person] to realize that the actor’s conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of [harm to another’s life or property] but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial harm will result to [the other’s life or property].” View "Ford Motor Co. v. Cosper" on Justia Law

Leon Adams IV (“Leon”) was convicted by jury of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Laron Lowe and the aggravated assault of Ronda Dobson. Leon contended: (1) the evidence was constitutionally insufficient to support his convictions; and (2) his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective because counsel had an actual conflict of interest arising out of his joint representation of Leon and his co-defendant and brother, Isaiah Adams. For the reasons set forth below, we discern no reversible error and affirm the judgment of conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Adams' convictions. View "Adams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Nuwrulhaqq Hamilton was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Antonio Felton. On appeal, Hamilton argued: (1) the trial court erred by denying his motion for directed verdict as to the counts of felony murder, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; and (2) the trial court plainly erred by failing to give, and his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request, a jury charge on Hamilton’s good character. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Hamilton’s convictions. View "Hamilton v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In April 2019, Kevin Roberts applied to Judge Clarence Cuthpert, Jr., probate judge for Rockdale County, for a weapons carry license pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129. Judge Cuthpert denied Roberts’s application, finding that Roberts’s criminal history revealed five arrests between 1992 and 2004 for aggravated assault, affray, obstruction of the judiciary, cruelty to children in the first degree, simple battery, battery, and family violence battery. Judge Cuthpert noted that Roberts’s criminal history did not list the dispositions of Roberts’s arrests for obstruction of the judiciary or simple battery, but the other arrests had dispositions of not prosecuted, dismissed, or nolle prossed. Judge Cuthpert concluded that Roberts “lack[ed] good moral character[4] . . . [d]ue to his arrest[s] for several violent offenses” and that “the court need[ed] additional information[, including police reports,] to determine if this application should be approved.” After reconsideration, Judge Cuthpert again denied the petition, concluding that, “[b]ased upon [Roberts’s] history of violent offenses and failure to comply with the Court’s instructions to provide the incident reports and dispositions for [his previous five arrests],” Roberts was “not of good moral character.” Roberts thereafter filed a complaint seeking mandamus relief against Judge Cuthpert “in his official capacity,” declaratory judgment against Judge Cuthpert “in both his official and individual capacities,” and costs and attorney’s fees. The Georgia Supreme Court held that the General Assembly waived sovereign immunity for claims brought under OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) and that the Separation of Powers Provision of the Georgia Constitution was not implicated by the recovery of costs, including reasonable attorney’s fees, against a probate judge pursuant to OCGA § 16-11-129 (j) because processing a weapons carry license did not involve the exercise of judicial power. The Court also concluded the probate judge in this case waived the defense of judicial immunity on the costs-and-fees claim asserted against him in his official capacity. View "Roberts v. Cuthper" on Justia Law

Following a reversal of his convictions on appeal and a retrial, Appellant Phillip Kennebrew was convicted of malice murder and related crimes in connection with the 2011 beating and stabbing death of Breyon Alexander. On appeal, Appellant argued that the trial court erred in allowing the State to introduce into evidence testimony from a witness who testified at Appellant’s first trial but was unavailable to testify at his second trial. Appellant contended the witness’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay that did not fall within the prior testimony hearsay exception, OCGA § 24-8-804 (b) (1), and that violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant further argued that, even if the witness’s prior testimony was not altogether inadmissible, the trial court abused its discretion in failing to exclude double hearsay within that testimony. Appellant also challenged the trial court’s admission of hearsay statements made by the victim, which were admitted under the residual hearsay exception, OCGA § 24-8-807. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Kennebrew v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Rafael Carter appealed the trial court’s dismissal of his pro se motion to withdraw his guilty plea stemming from the murder of Terrance Fields during an armed robbery. The January 2016 term of court in which Carter entered his guilty plea expired on Friday, March 4, 2016, and a new term of court commenced on Monday, March 7, 2016. So both his March 11, 2016 and his October 11, 2021 motions to withdraw were filed after the expiration of the term of court in which he entered his plea. Nonetheless, Carter maintains that his convictions and sentences are void and illegal due to merger errors, thus providing the trial court with jurisdiction to permit the withdrawal of his guilty plea. The Georgia Supreme Court found Carter’s sentence was not void because his felony murder convictions were vacated by operation of law despite the trial court’s purported merger of those counts; the trial court has properly merged Carter’s conviction for the aggravated assault of Fields (Count 9) into his malice murder conviction (Count 1); no other merger error appeared; and each sentence imposed was within the range that the law allows. Therefore, the Court found the trial court properly dismissed Carter's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. View "Carter v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Walter Salvesen, III was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2015 shooting death of Johnathan Martin. On appeal, Salvesen contended: (1) the trial court admitted unduly prejudicial photographs from Martin’s autopsy and the scene where Martin’s body was found; (2) the trial court erred by failing to recharge the jury on the lesser offenses of voluntary and involuntary manslaughter when it recharged on malice murder and felony murder; and (3) trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance to the extent the foregoing alleged errors were not preserved for appellate review. The Georgia Supreme Court was not persuaded: (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the photographs; (2) the trial court acted within its discretion in solely recharging the jury on the definitions it requested and not the lesser offenses; and (3) Salvesen has not demonstrated that his trial counsel was deficient. The Court therefore affirmed Salvesen’s convictions. View "Salvesen v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether revenue generated from the lease of a bona fide coin operated amusement machine (“COAM”) qualified as “gross revenues” exempt from taxation under OCGA § 48-8-3 (43). Funvestment Group, LLC, the lessee of the COAMs at issue and the owner of the location where the COAMs were available for play, argued that revenues generated from the lease of COAMs were considered “gross revenues” exempt from sales and use tax. The Court of Appeals concluded that the subject lease revenues were not “gross revenues” and that the exemption only applied to money inserted into COAMs for play. The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in reaching this conclusion, and thus reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment. View "Funvestment Group, LLC v. Crittenden" on Justia Law