Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC leased land from Whitaker Farms, LLC for a peach orchard. After being locked out of the leased premises, Fitzgerald Farms sued Whitaker Farms for damages. A jury awarded compensatory damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the trial court’s ruling that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages. On remand, a second jury awarded punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that statements made during a settlement negotiation by Whitaker Farms’s Chief Operating Officer to Fitzgerald Farms’s owner were properly admitted under OCGA § 24-4-408.The trial court initially ruled that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. On remand, the trial court conducted a second jury trial focused on punitive damages, where the jury awarded $500,000 in punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. Whitaker Farms appealed again, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements made during a settlement negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the statements were admissible to show Whitaker’s intent and state of mind.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals’s judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the statements made during the settlement negotiation were inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-408. The Court concluded that the statements were offered to prove Whitaker Farms’s liability for punitive damages, which is not permissible under the statute. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the admission of the statements was harmful and if a new trial on punitive damages is required. View "Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

An attorney, Brian Steel, was found in contempt of court for refusing to disclose how he learned about an ex parte hearing involving a witness, the witness's counsel, and prosecutors in a case where Steel represented a defendant. The trial judge, Judge Glanville, repeatedly asked Steel to reveal his source, but Steel claimed the information was protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work product. Judge Glanville held Steel in contempt and ordered him into custody, although Steel was later allowed to return to the courtroom.The Fulton County Superior Court initially found Steel in contempt and ordered him to be taken into custody. Steel argued that the information was privileged and that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. Despite these arguments, Judge Glanville sentenced Steel to 20 days in jail to be served on weekends and denied him a supersedeas bond.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. The court held that because the punishment was delayed and the alleged disobedience was directed toward the judge, a different judge should have presided over the contempt hearing. The court reversed the judgment of contempt imposed by the trial court. View "STEEL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Jarrod Miller, a resident of Athens-Clarke County, filed a complaint against Deborah Gonzalez, the District Attorney for the Western Judicial Circuit, alleging violations of the Open Records Act (ORA). Miller claimed that Gonzalez, in her official capacity as district attorney and custodian of public records, failed to produce requested public records related to the district attorney’s office. Gonzalez argued that neither she nor her office is subject to the ORA because district attorneys are constitutional officers of the judicial branch. She also contended that Miller lacked standing to bring the enforcement action and that prosecutorial immunity barred the suit.The Superior Court of Clarke County denied Gonzalez’s motion to dismiss Miller’s complaint. The court rejected Gonzalez’s argument that district attorneys are judicial officers exempt from the ORA, concluding that district attorneys perform executive functions. The court also found that Miller had standing to bring the enforcement action and that prosecutorial immunity did not bar Miller’s claims. Gonzalez then sought an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the ORA applies to district attorneys’ offices, as they are considered “offices” under the statute. The court also determined that district attorneys exercise executive power, not judicial power, and thus are subject to the ORA. Additionally, the court found that Miller had standing to sue because he directed his attorney to make the records requests on his behalf. The court further held that prosecutorial immunity does not bar official-capacity claims under the ORA, as the statute waives sovereign immunity for such claims. The court did not address the merits of Miller’s individual-capacity claims against Gonzalez. View "GONZALEZ v. MILLER" on Justia Law

Prentice Baker and Verlaine Laguerre were convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for the shooting death of Matthew Hardeman. The evidence showed that Hardeman and Laguerre had a fistfight earlier in the day, which Hardeman won. Later, Laguerre returned with Baker and others to Hardeman’s neighborhood, where they encountered Hardeman and shot him multiple times, resulting in his death.A Fulton County grand jury indicted Baker and Laguerre on multiple counts, including malice murder and firearm possession. Their first trial ended in a mistrial, but a second joint trial in April 2018 resulted in guilty verdicts on all counts. Both defendants were sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and an additional five years for firearm possession. Their motions for a new trial were denied by the trial court in March 2022, leading to their appeals.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found no plain error in the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration, as the evidence did not clearly indicate that Ellis was an accomplice. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Baker’s convictions, including Ellis’s identification of Baker as one of the shooters. Laguerre’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected because his counsel’s decision not to object to certain testimony was deemed a reasonable strategic choice. Finally, the court dismissed Laguerre’s claim of cumulative error due to the lack of any established errors. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and sentences of both Baker and Laguerre. View "BAKER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

In November 2018, four defendants were convicted of various crimes related to two separate incidents. Jordan Campbell and Roderick Parrish were convicted of felony murder and other charges related to the death of Rebecca Foley in January 2013. Shacqeal Sanders and Henry Speaks were convicted of malice murder and other charges related to the death of James Pastures and the aggravated assault of Maurice Harris in January 2015. All four were also convicted of gang-related charges.The case was initially tried in October 2018, but a mistrial was declared after a juror was threatened. The retrial took place from October to November 2018. The jury found Campbell and Parrish guilty on all counts except malice murder and related gang charges. Sanders was found guilty on all counts except criminal attempt to commit a felony and two gang violations. Speaks was found guilty on all counts except criminal attempt to commit a felony, one count of aggravated assault, two counts of firearm possession during a felony, and three gang counts. The trial court sentenced each defendant to life without parole plus additional years for other counts.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. The court affirmed the convictions, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever the trials of the defendants and counts related to the two murders. The court also found that the trial court erred in admitting evidence of juror intimidation and in giving a deliberate ignorance instruction, but these errors were deemed harmless. The court concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions and that the trial court did not err in disqualifying Sanders’s counsel or in its jury instructions. The cumulative effect of the errors did not affect the jury’s verdicts. View "CAMPBELL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Richard Andrew Justice filed a claim against the Georgia Department of Public Safety (DPS) for breach of an employment contract, alleging that DPS failed to pay him for overtime hours as required under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Justice argued that the FLSA provisions were incorporated into his employment contract. The central issue was whether Justice had demonstrated the existence of a written contract sufficient to overcome DPS’s motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds.The trial court allowed limited discovery and reviewed documents submitted by Justice, including a written offer of employment and subsequent communications. The trial court ultimately granted DPS’s motion to dismiss, finding that the documents did not constitute a valid written contract and that there was no meeting of the minds regarding FLSA overtime compensation provisions. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the documents did form a written contract that included FLSA provisions, thereby waiving sovereign immunity.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that Justice had shown the existence of a written contract with DPS, which established a waiver of sovereign immunity under the ex contractu clause of the Georgia Constitution. The Court held that the question of whether the FLSA obligations were part of the written contract was a merits question, not a sovereign immunity question, and thus was not properly before the trial court on a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY v. JUSTICE" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, who operate restaurants under franchise agreements, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition based on advice from their legal counsel. This led to the franchisor terminating the franchise agreements. The plaintiffs then sued their lawyers and law firms for legal malpractice and breach of written contracts for legal services, alleging that the lawyers' advice constituted malpractice. The defendants moved to dismiss both claims, arguing they were barred by a four-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-25.The trial court dismissed the legal-malpractice claims but denied the motion to dismiss the breach-of-contract claims. Later, it granted summary judgment for a subset of defendants, ruling that the breach-of-contract claims were also barred by the four-year statute of limitation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the legal-malpractice claims and concluded that the breach-of-contract claims were duplicative and should be dismissed as well.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case to determine which statute of limitation applies to breach-of-contract-for-legal-services claims and whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing these claims as duplicative. The Supreme Court concluded that such claims could be governed by either a six-year statute of limitation under OCGA § 9-3-24 or a four-year statute under OCGA § 9-3-25, depending on whether the breach arose directly from a written contract. The Court also held that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the breach-of-contract claims as duplicative without applying the proper motion-to-dismiss standard.The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, emphasizing that plaintiffs can pursue alternative theories of relief based on the same conduct. View "TITSHAW v. GEER" on Justia Law

Alfred Moore was convicted in 2016 of first-degree burglary and other crimes, resulting in a total sentence of 45 years. On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions. Moore then filed a habeas corpus petition, later amended, arguing that his appellate counsel was ineffective for not claiming that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the first-degree burglary count in the indictment. Moore contended that the indictment did not allege an essential element of first-degree burglary, specifically that he entered a "dwelling house" or a building "designed for use as [a] dwelling."The habeas court denied Moore's petition, concluding that the indictment was sufficient because it referenced the first-degree burglary statute. Moore appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, which granted his application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, focusing on whether the habeas court erred in its ruling.The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the indictment failed to allege all essential elements of first-degree burglary, as it only mentioned that Moore entered a "business." The court determined that trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a special demurrer to challenge the indictment. This failure was not a reasonable trial strategy, and it was reasonably probable that the outcome of the trial would have been different if the indictment had been challenged. The court also found that appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue on appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reversed the habeas court's denial of relief regarding Moore's first-degree burglary conviction and remanded the case with directions to vacate that conviction and grant appropriate relief. View "MOORE v. WHITE" on Justia Law

Andy Espinosa pleaded guilty to the malice murder of Zachary Mejia and other related offenses. Espinosa was living with his girlfriend and her four children, including Zachary. On December 8, 2020, Espinosa and Zachary had a physical altercation, which left Espinosa feeling humiliated. The next day, Espinosa searched online about what it feels like to murder someone. Later that day, he returned home, grabbed a knife, and fatally stabbed Zachary. Espinosa called 9-1-1 and was arrested. He later claimed he was overtaken by a "demon" during the stabbing.Espinosa was indicted by a Chattooga County grand jury and pleaded guilty to all counts without a sentencing recommendation from the State. The trial court sentenced him to life without parole for malice murder, a consecutive five-year term for possession of a knife during the commission of a felony, and a concurrent 12-month term for cruelty to children in the third degree. Espinosa filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for not advising him of an insanity defense.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case. Espinosa claimed his plea counsel was ineffective for not investigating his mental state and advising him of a potential insanity defense. Plea counsel testified that he did not see a viable defense and believed a plea was in Espinosa's best interest. The court found that counsel's performance was not deficient, as his strategic decisions were based on his professional judgment and experience. The court also noted that Espinosa did not provide evidence of past mental health issues or expert testimony supporting an insanity defense.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Espinosa's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court held that Espinosa failed to demonstrate that his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient. View "Espinosa v. State" on Justia Law

Denarius Harris was convicted of felony murder and a firearm charge in connection with the shooting death of Dallas Spruill. Harris claimed he acted in self-defense, but the jury rejected this claim. The incident occurred when Spruill, along with Christian Boss and Pamela Blue, was selling TVs around Atlanta. They met Harris at an apartment complex, where a confrontation ensued, resulting in Harris shooting Spruill. Witnesses provided differing accounts of the events, but all agreed that Harris shot Spruill.The Fulton County grand jury indicted Harris on multiple charges, including malice murder and felony murder. The jury found him guilty of felony murder predicated on aggravated assault, aggravated assault, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, but acquitted him of other charges. Harris was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder and an additional five years for the firearm charge. His motion for a new trial was denied by the trial court, leading to this appeal.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed Harris's appeal, focusing on his claims regarding the trial court's jury instructions on self-defense. Harris argued that the instructions were erroneous and could have misled the jury. However, the Supreme Court found that the instructions were correct statements of the law and followed the pattern jury instructions. The court held that the instructions did not confuse the jury as Harris claimed and affirmed his convictions and sentence. The court also rejected Harris's argument that the instructions placed undue emphasis on the use of deadly force, finding no error in the trial court's explanation of self-defense. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the judgment. View "HARRIS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law