Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In November 2013, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to felony murder and armed robbery, based on which the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced her to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder and a concurrent 20-year term in prison for armed robbery. She did not file a timely appeal, but more than six years later, she filed a motion for out-of-time appeal, contending that she was deprived of her right to appeal because of her plea counsel’s ineffective assistance. After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion for out-of-time appeal on the merits, and she timely appealed that decision. In this case, the Georgia Supreme Court examined the difficult question of whether it should overrule precedent allowing a criminal defendant who alleges she was unconstitutionally deprived of her appeal as of right to file a motion for out-of-time appeal in the trial court, as opposed to seeking a writ of habeas corpus as an exclusive remedy. After explaining the underpinnings of the precedent and engaging in an exhaustive stare decisis analysis, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court out-of-time appeal procedure was not a legally cognizable vehicle for a convicted defendant to seek relief for alleged constitutional violations. View "Cook v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kristine and Jeffrey McInerney were married in 2003, and had two minor children. Kristine, who resided in Indiana with the two children, filed a complaint for divorce on May 1, 2020, in Bryan County, Georgia. At the time of the filing, the marital residence was in Bryan County, and Kristine believed Jeffrey resided there. However, Jeffrey moved to Chatham County shortly before Kristine filed for divorce. On July 2, 2020, Jeffrey sold the marital residence in Bryan County, and the sale proceeds were placed in a trust account as agreed to by the parties. In his answer and counterclaim, Jeffrey consented to venue and jurisdiction, and admitted he was a Georgia resident who resided in Bryan County within six months of the filing of the complaint for divorce. Approximately two months after she initiated the divorce action in Georgia, Kristine initiated a child custody action in Indiana. The parties agreed that Indiana had exclusive jurisdiction over the child custody action and all child custody and visitation issues. The parties later participated in mediation in Georgia in an attempt to resolve all issues relating to their divorce and the custody of their children, but were unable to come to an agreement. Jeffrey then filed a motion to dismiss the divorce case in Bryan County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1 (a). This appeal presented the question of whether a superior court could transfer or dismiss a divorce case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1(a) without offending Article VI, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution. The Georgia Supreme Court held that with respect to the question of transfer of venue, OCGA 9-10-31.1(a) was consistent with the authority vested in the General Assembly by the Georgia Constitution to enact statutes that direct the superior courts on how to exercise their power to change venue. As to the question of dismissal, OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a) was an exercise of the General Assembly’s plenary legislative power, not a matter of venue subject to the constitutional venue provisions. "The venue provisions do not limit the General Assembly’s authority to provide for the dismissal of a divorce case based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens." However, because the trial court incorrectly analyzed some of the factors set forth in OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a), the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "McInerney v. McInerney" on Justia Law

While driving over 100 miles per hour, Christal McGee rear-ended a car driven by Wentworth Maynard, causing him to suffer severe injuries. When the collision occurred, McGee was using a “Speed Filter” feature within Snapchat, a mobile phone application, to record her real-life speed on a photo or video that she could then share with other Snapchat users. Wentworth and his wife, Karen Maynard, sued McGee and Snapchat, Inc. (“Snap”), alleging that Snap negligently designed Snapchat’s Speed Filter. The trial court dismissed the design-defect claim against Snap, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Snap did not owe a legal duty to the Maynards because a manufacturer’s duty to design reasonably safe products does not extend to people injured by a third party’s intentional and tortious misuse of the manufacturer’s product. On certiorari, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred: "a manufacturer has a duty under our decisional law to use reasonable care in selecting from alternative designs to reduce reasonably foreseeable risks of harm posed by its products. When a particular risk of harm from a product is not reasonably foreseeable, a manufacturer owes no design duty to reduce that risk. How a product was being used (e.g., intentionally, negligently, properly, improperly, or not at all) and who was using it (the plaintiff or a third party) when an injury occurred are relevant considerations in determining whether a manufacturer could reasonably foresee a particular risk of harm from its product. Nevertheless, our decisional law does not recognize a blanket exception to a manufacturer’s design duty in all cases of intentional or tortious third-party use." Because the holding of the Court of Appeals conflicted with these principles, and because the Maynards adequately alleged Snap could have reasonably foreseen the particular risk of harm from the Speed Filter at issue here, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maynard, et al. v. Snapchat, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Marcus Rutledge pled guilty to malice murder in connection with the April 2016 shooting death of Brian Williams. Appellant filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal to the trial court, which entered an order denying the motion. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motion. Therefore judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for entry of the appropriate dismissal order. View "Rutledge v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Stephen Alexander was convicted by jury of sexual offenses against his stepdaughters, both of whom were minors during Alexander’s trial. At trial, the two victims and a child advocate testified in a courtroom that was partially closed to spectators at the direction of the trial court. Alexander sought to challenge the closure of the courtroom solely through a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (1984). The improper closure of a courtroom was considered a “structural” error that results in reversal of a defendant’s conviction on direct appeal if the error was committed over objection. Alexander’s trial counsel did not object. The trial court and the Court of Appeals determined that the proper Strickland analysis required a defendant in this posture to demonstrate actual prejudice to prevail, and rejected Alexander’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to show any such prejudice. To this, the Georgia Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the lower courts' decisions. View "Alexander v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Allen Williams appealed his conviction for felony murder in connection with the death of his girlfriend, Betty Ranow. Williams argued on appeal that the trial court erred in admitting evidence concerning his alleged beating of another person, and in failing to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether his statements to the police in connection with that incident were freely and voluntarily given before they were introduced at trial. Because the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that any error in the admission of this evidence was harmless, judgment was affirmed. View "Williams v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Timone Hooper was convicted by jury of murder, attempted armed robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime arising out of a shooting that killed Lawrence Bryan and wounded Keron Brown. On appeal, Hooper contended he received ineffective assistance based on his counsel’s failure to request a jury instruction on the requirement that confessions be corroborated, and he contended the trial court plainly erred in failing to give that instruction sua sponte. Hooper also argued the trial court violated his constitutional right to a public trial by excluding spectators from the courtroom in order to question a juror about her acquaintance with a potential witness. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Hooper's convictions. View "Hooper v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In February 2019, Haleem Graham was tried jointly with Brantley Washington and Chrishon Siders and found guilty of felony murder, home invasion in the first degree, and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Seine Yale Jackson. On appeal, Graham argued: (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; and (3) that he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to testimony from a detective that, based on his investigation, he believed that Graham and his co-defendants committed the crimes. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Graham v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kevonta Daniels was convicted by jury of felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Kenneth Moore; the aggravated assaults of Jai Williams, Jamal Williams, and James Williams; the theft of vehicles belonging to Jamal Williams, Marcus Jones, and Alvin Walker; and other offenses. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Daniels argued on appeal that the trial court erred by admitting statements he made to the police into evidence at trial. Daniels, who was 14 years old at the time of the crimes and when he was interviewed by the police, specifically argued the State failed to prove that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his constitutional rights before speaking with the police and that his statements should also have been excluded because the police failed to comply with provisions of the Juvenile Code relating to custody of juvenile arrestees. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Daniels v. Georgia" on Justia Law

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia certified three questions of law to the Georgia Supreme Court. The questions sought interpretation of OCGA 40-6-248.1(b). The Supreme Court's responses to the questions certified were: (1) OCGA § 40-6-248.1(b) imposed a duty on a person assisting the operator of a vehicle with loading merchandise onto the vehicle to securely fasten the load; (2) a person assisting in loading a vehicle may be liable in tort for injuries to a third party resulting from a breach of his or her duty to secure that load (and any covering thereon); and (3) when serving as the basis for a civil tort suit, a violation of OCGA 40-6-248.1(b)(1) was subject to ordinary tort principles and defenses. View "McIntyre v. Sam's East, Inc." on Justia Law