Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified questions of Georgia law to the Georgia Supreme Court about life-insurance law. The basic question for the Supreme Court was whether a person could legally take out an insurance policy on his own life with the intent to turn around and sell that policy to a third party who had no “insurable interest” in the policyholder’s life. The person seeking to recover on the life-insurance policy in this case said that such a policy was legal if a third party was not involved in causing the policy to be procured. The insurance company says that with or without such third-party involvement, such a policy was an illegal wagering contract and therefore void, relying on some Georgia case law. But as it turned out, that case law was interpreting and applying old statutes. In 1960, the Georgia General Assembly repealed those statutes and replaced them with new statutory language that codified some, but not all, of the old decisional law, and the new language did not even hint at the unilateral-intent-based limitation that the insurance company advanced. So the Supreme Court answered the certified questions: under Georgia law, a life-insurance policy taken out by the insured on his own life with the intent to sell the policy to a third party with no insurable interest, but without a third party’s involvement when the policy was procured, was not void as an illegal wagering contract. View "Crum v. Jackson National Life Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In early 2019, police officers responded to a shooting where they discovered 15-year-old appellee Paris Powell standing beside the decedent, Larry “Tre” Bryant. Appellee was interviewed by Detective John Gleason on March 1, March 4, and March 25, 2019, in connection with Bryant’s death. Powell’s mother, Tiffany, was present at all relevant times. After a hearing, the trial court found that Appellee was not in custody for any of the interviews and determined that Appellee’s March 1 and March 4 statements were freely and voluntarily given. However, the trial court partially suppressed Appellee’s March 25 statement, finding that, under a totality of the circumstances, she did not knowingly and voluntarily make a statement as a matter of constitutional due process. The State appealed the trial court’s partial suppression of Appellee’s March 25 statements, contending that the trial court clearly erred in determining that Appellee’s statements were involuntary under Riley v. Georgia, 226 SE2d 922 (1976). After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with the State and affirmed the trial court's ruling. View "Georgia v. Powell" on Justia Law

Anthony Clark was convicted by jury of felony murder and related crimes in connection with the 2019 death of Stasha Baggett. On appeal, Clark argued that, during his trial, a juror improperly communicated with a member of the victim’s family who was sitting in the audience. Clark contended that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to investigate properly or otherwise address the incident, and that the trial court also failed to investigate the incident properly, depriving him of his right to a fair trial. The Georgia Supreme Court found the record showed that counsel made reasonable efforts to address the juror issue, and any error on the part of the trial court was not preserved for review. So judgment was affirmed. View "Clark v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Troy Simmons was convicted by jury of felony murder and other crimes arising out of the 2013 shooting death of Wendell Lee and the aggravated assault of April Tongol. On appeal, Simmons argued : (1) the evidence was insufficient to sustain his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury completely on corroboration for confessions as required by OCGA § 24-8-823; (3) the trial court erred in instructing the jury as to Simmons’s flight; and (4) trial counsel rendered constitutionally ineffective assistance. Because Simmons did not show reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Simmons v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Jacarey Reese challenged his conviction for felony murder in connection with the 2018 shooting death of Stacy Devero. Appellant’s first trial ended with a hung jury. At his second trial, the defense argued both that Appellant did not shoot Devero and that, even if he did, he was legally justified in doing so. Appellant contended the trial court erred when it denied his request to give a modified version of the former pattern jury instruction on affirmative defenses in light of the Georgia Supreme Court’s then-recent decision in McClure v. Georgia, 834 SE2d 96 (2019), and when it overruled his objections to the prosecutor’s repeated arguments in closing that Appellant was legally precluded from claiming justification because he never admitted that he shot Devero. Appellant also contended the trial court erred in responding to a jury note showing that the jury was swayed by the prosecutor’s improper arguments and therefore misunderstood the law of justification. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s request to give a modified version of the former pattern jury instruction on affirmative defenses in light of McClure. As a result of that initial error, the trial court overruled Appellant’s objections to the prosecutor’s repeated misstatements of the law of justification during closing arguments, which the note sent out by the jury during deliberations showed had misled the jury. Moreover, the court’s response to the jury’s note did nothing to correct the jury’s misunderstanding of the law and indeed may have worsened it. Accordingly, the Court could not say that the court’s instructional error was harmless, and it therefore reversed Appellant’s conviction and sentence for felony murder. However, the Court also concluded that the evidence presented at trial was legally sufficient to support Appellant’s conviction, so the State could retry him if it so chose. View "Reese v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Carlos Drennon appealed his convictions for malice murder and participation in criminal street gang activity stemming from the 2007 shooting death of Randy Griffin. Drennon contended, among other things: (1) the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions; (2) the trial court erred in denying his motion to sever his trial from that of his co-defendants; and (3) that he was denied his right to be present at trial when he was not included in certain bench conference discussions. With respect to the right-to-be-present claim, the Georgia Supreme Court "cannot easily reject that claim on the existing record." The Court vacated the trial court's judgment in part and remanded for a hearing on Drennon’s constitutional claim in the first instance. View "Drennon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

This appeal presented only a discrete and important threshold question to the underlying case: whether the Georgia Constitution required a plaintiff to establish some cognizable injury to bring a lawsuit in Georgia courts, i.e., to have standing to sue, separate and apart from the statutory authorization to bring suit. The Georgia Supreme Court found T. Davis Humphries, as a private citizen, had standing to assert a claim for injunctive relief against her local county government for its planned removal of a Confederate monument in alleged violation of OCGA § 50-3-1. But the other plaintiffs — the various Sons of Confederate Veterans entities — did not show that they were members of the communities the governments of which they sought to sue, and they alleged no other cognizable injury sufficient to establish their standing. The Court of Appeals was therefore wrong to affirm the dismissal of Humphries’s complaint for a lack of standing as to her claim for injunctive relief, but it was right to affirm the dismissal of the complaints filed by the various Sons of Confederate Veterans groups. The Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether Humphries had standing for her claim for damages under OCGA § 50-3-1, because the cause of action that statute purported to create had not yet arisen; by the statute’s terms, the cause of action arose only upon the occurrence of conduct prohibited by the statute, and that conduct had not yet occurred. View "Sons of Confederate Veterans, et al. v. Henry Cty. Bd of Commissioners" on Justia Law

Brian Brookins was convicted by jury of the murders of Sandra Suzanne Brookins and Samantha Rae Giles and of related crimes. The jury declined in its guilt/innocence phase verdict to find Brookins “mentally retarded” or “mentally ill.” At the conclusion of the sentencing phase, the jury found multiple statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Brookins to death for each of the two murders. Finding no reversible error in the trial court judgment, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Brookins’s convictions and sentences. View "Brookins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Vernon Beamon was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting deaths of Sylvia Watson and Samuel White. Beamon appealed, arguing that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support his convictions and that his convictions for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony should have merged. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with both contentions and affirmed. View "Beamon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Walter Lowe was convicted by jury of felony murder and other offenses in connection with the July 2017 shooting death of his wife, Erica Powell. The jury also found Lowe guilty of family violence aggravated assault and cruelty to children in the third degree, crimes that occurred in 2015. Lowe raised two claims of error, both of which were related to the joinder in one indictment of the 2015 acts of domestic violence against Powell and her 2017 murder: (1) the trial court erred in denying Lowe’s motion to sever; and (2) trial counsel’s deficient argument in support of Lowe’s motion to sever constituted ineffective assistance. The Georgia Supreme Court found that because Lowe’s 2015 criminal acts involving Powell would have been admissible in the trial of Powell’s 2017 murder pursuant to OCGA § 24-4-404 (b), Lowe did not show the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to sever. The Court found Lowe's second enumeration of error lacked merit because severance was properly denied based upon the relevant and controlling Georgia law counsel cited in his severance motion and supporting brief. Consequently, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s order denying Lowe’s motion for a new trial. However, the Court vacated Lowe’s felony murder sentences and remand for resentencing on those counts because the trial court erred in sentencing Lowe on two counts of felony murder when there was a single victim. View "Lowe v. Georgia" on Justia Law