Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Georgia Supreme Court granted Gregory Davenport’s application for a certificate of probable cause to appeal the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Davenport asked whether the habeas court erred in finding that a count of aggravated assault predicated on the use of a deadly weapon did not merge with his conviction for armed robbery. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded that the habeas court indeed erred with respect to that question, and reversed judgment in part. View "Davenport v. Ward" on Justia Law

Appellant Kaovion Dickey challenged his convictions for malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2018 shooting death of Tony McGowan and the shooting of Mikeem Jackson. Appellant’s sole enumeration of error was that the evidence was legally insufficient to support his convictions. The Georgia Supreme Court found the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Appellant was guilty, so judgment was affirmed. View "Dickey v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Following the Georgia Supreme Court’s grant of his application for discretionary appeal, Donnel Rawls appealed the trial court’s denial of his motion seeking a copy of his trial transcripts at public expense. Based on the Supreme Court’s review of the record, the parties’ briefs, and the representations of counsel at oral argument, Rawls obtained the relief he sought. Rawls’s appeal therefore became moot and was therefore dismissed. View "Rawls v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jared Smith was convicted of malice murder and theft by taking in connection with the 2018 stabbing death of Ronald Roach. Smith’s sole contention on appeal was that the trial court erred in allowing the medical examiner to provide expert opinion testimony about blood-spatter evidence depicted in photographs of the crime scene. Seeing no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Smith v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Robert Price, III was convicted of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Ronnie Cantrell, Sr., and the non- fatal shooting of Ronnie Cantrell, Jr. Price’s sole contention on appeal was that the trial court erred by failing to merge his convictions for aggravated assault and aggravated battery committed against Cantrell Junior because the underlying acts occurred in quick succession and arose out of the same transaction. Although the Georgia Supreme Court found some evidence to support Price’s argument, there was also evidence to support the trial court’s factual finding that the acts were separated by sufficient time to constitute a deliberate interval. “The existence of a deliberate interval dooms Price’s argument.” Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Price v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kevon Watkins was convicted in a bench trial for felony murder in connection with the death of his sister, Alexus. On appeal, Watkins argued the trial court erred in declining to find him guilty of voluntary manslaughter instead of felony murder. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Watkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In November 2013, defendant entered a negotiated plea of guilty to felony murder and armed robbery, based on which the trial court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced her to life in prison with the possibility of parole for felony murder and a concurrent 20-year term in prison for armed robbery. She did not file a timely appeal, but more than six years later, she filed a motion for out-of-time appeal, contending that she was deprived of her right to appeal because of her plea counsel’s ineffective assistance. After a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion for out-of-time appeal on the merits, and she timely appealed that decision. In this case, the Georgia Supreme Court examined the difficult question of whether it should overrule precedent allowing a criminal defendant who alleges she was unconstitutionally deprived of her appeal as of right to file a motion for out-of-time appeal in the trial court, as opposed to seeking a writ of habeas corpus as an exclusive remedy. After explaining the underpinnings of the precedent and engaging in an exhaustive stare decisis analysis, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court out-of-time appeal procedure was not a legally cognizable vehicle for a convicted defendant to seek relief for alleged constitutional violations. View "Cook v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Kristine and Jeffrey McInerney were married in 2003, and had two minor children. Kristine, who resided in Indiana with the two children, filed a complaint for divorce on May 1, 2020, in Bryan County, Georgia. At the time of the filing, the marital residence was in Bryan County, and Kristine believed Jeffrey resided there. However, Jeffrey moved to Chatham County shortly before Kristine filed for divorce. On July 2, 2020, Jeffrey sold the marital residence in Bryan County, and the sale proceeds were placed in a trust account as agreed to by the parties. In his answer and counterclaim, Jeffrey consented to venue and jurisdiction, and admitted he was a Georgia resident who resided in Bryan County within six months of the filing of the complaint for divorce. Approximately two months after she initiated the divorce action in Georgia, Kristine initiated a child custody action in Indiana. The parties agreed that Indiana had exclusive jurisdiction over the child custody action and all child custody and visitation issues. The parties later participated in mediation in Georgia in an attempt to resolve all issues relating to their divorce and the custody of their children, but were unable to come to an agreement. Jeffrey then filed a motion to dismiss the divorce case in Bryan County under the doctrine of forum non conveniens pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1 (a). This appeal presented the question of whether a superior court could transfer or dismiss a divorce case under the doctrine of forum non conveniens pursuant to OCGA 9-10-31.1(a) without offending Article VI, Section II, Paragraph I of the Georgia Constitution. The Georgia Supreme Court held that with respect to the question of transfer of venue, OCGA 9-10-31.1(a) was consistent with the authority vested in the General Assembly by the Georgia Constitution to enact statutes that direct the superior courts on how to exercise their power to change venue. As to the question of dismissal, OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a) was an exercise of the General Assembly’s plenary legislative power, not a matter of venue subject to the constitutional venue provisions. "The venue provisions do not limit the General Assembly’s authority to provide for the dismissal of a divorce case based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens." However, because the trial court incorrectly analyzed some of the factors set forth in OCGA § 9-10-31.1(a), the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration. View "McInerney v. McInerney" on Justia Law

While driving over 100 miles per hour, Christal McGee rear-ended a car driven by Wentworth Maynard, causing him to suffer severe injuries. When the collision occurred, McGee was using a “Speed Filter” feature within Snapchat, a mobile phone application, to record her real-life speed on a photo or video that she could then share with other Snapchat users. Wentworth and his wife, Karen Maynard, sued McGee and Snapchat, Inc. (“Snap”), alleging that Snap negligently designed Snapchat’s Speed Filter. The trial court dismissed the design-defect claim against Snap, and a divided panel of the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Snap did not owe a legal duty to the Maynards because a manufacturer’s duty to design reasonably safe products does not extend to people injured by a third party’s intentional and tortious misuse of the manufacturer’s product. On certiorari, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred: "a manufacturer has a duty under our decisional law to use reasonable care in selecting from alternative designs to reduce reasonably foreseeable risks of harm posed by its products. When a particular risk of harm from a product is not reasonably foreseeable, a manufacturer owes no design duty to reduce that risk. How a product was being used (e.g., intentionally, negligently, properly, improperly, or not at all) and who was using it (the plaintiff or a third party) when an injury occurred are relevant considerations in determining whether a manufacturer could reasonably foresee a particular risk of harm from its product. Nevertheless, our decisional law does not recognize a blanket exception to a manufacturer’s design duty in all cases of intentional or tortious third-party use." Because the holding of the Court of Appeals conflicted with these principles, and because the Maynards adequately alleged Snap could have reasonably foreseen the particular risk of harm from the Speed Filter at issue here, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. View "Maynard, et al. v. Snapchat, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Marcus Rutledge pled guilty to malice murder in connection with the April 2016 shooting death of Brian Williams. Appellant filed a motion for an out-of-time appeal to the trial court, which entered an order denying the motion. The Georgia Supreme Court determined the trial court should have dismissed, rather than denied, the motion. Therefore judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for entry of the appropriate dismissal order. View "Rutledge v. Georgia" on Justia Law