Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dorothy Wright and her grandchildren (collectively, the “Decedents”) were killed when their vehicle was struck by a stolen vehicle that was being chased by College Park Police Department officers. At the time of the accident, the City of College Park had an insurance policy provided by Atlantic Specialty Insurance Company (“Atlantic”), which provided coverage for negligent acts involving the City’s motor vehicles up to $5,000,000 but also included immunity endorsements which said that Atlantic had no duty to pay damages “unless the defenses of sovereign and governmental immunity are inapplicable.” Plaintiffs filed suit against the City, raising claims of negligence and recklessness resulting in the wrongful deaths of the three Decedents, to which the City raised sovereign immunity as a defense. Plaintiffs claimed the insurance policy limit was $5,000,000 for the three deaths, while Atlantic contended the policy limit was capped at $700,000 under the relevant statutory scheme and the terms of the City’s policy. As the parties agreed, pursuant to OCGA 36-92-2 (a)(3), the sovereign immunity of local government entities was automatically waived up to $700,000 in this instance, regardless of whether the City had a liability insurance policy. Atlantic intervened in the case to litigate the limit of the insurance policy. The trial court ruled that the policy limit is $5,000,000, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Georgia Supreme Court then granted Atlantic’s petition for certiorari to decide whether the City’s insurance policy waived the City’s sovereign immunity under OCGA 36-92-2 (d)(3). The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals incorrectly ruled that the City’s insurance policy increased the sovereign immunity waiver notwithstanding the immunity endorsements, which expressly precluded coverage when a sovereign immunity defense applies. Judgment was therefore reversed. View "Atlantic Specialty Insurance Co. v. City of College Park, et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Erica Brennan was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the scalding death of her eight-year-old stepdaughter, Sarah Harris. On appeal, Appellant argued: (1) the trial court erred by conducting a pre-trial conference pursuant to Uniform Superior Court Rule (“USCR”) 33.5 (B) outside her presence in violation of her federal and state constitutional rights; (2) the trial court erred by initiating an ex parte conversation with the lead detective, and by failing to disclose this conversation to counsel; and (3) her second-chair counsel rendered ineffective assistance by being mentally and physically incapable of assisting in Appellant’s trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Brennan's conviction. View "Brennan v. Georgia" on Justia Law

An agreement between the Director of the Judicial Qualifications Commission (“JQC”) and Cary Hays III, Chief Magistrate of Crawford County, Georgia, was filed with the Georgia Supreme Court. The agreement was to resolve formal charges brought against Judge Hays arising from a physical altercation with a defendant that appeared before him. The agreement called for Judge Hays to serve an unpaid, 30-day suspension to be followed by a public reprimand. Pursuant to JQC Rule 23, the agreement was submitted to the JQC’s Hearing Panel, which voted 2-1 to accept it, and then filed it with the Supreme Court. Because the record and the limited relevant precedent the Court had found supported the proposed discipline, it accept the agreement and ordered that Judge Hays be suspended for 30 days without pay and be publicly reprimanded for his violations of the Georgia Code of Judicial Conduct. View "Inquiry Concerning Judge Cary Hays, III" on Justia Law

In 1987, Dennis Langley was convicted of murder and sentenced to serve life in prison. He was later released on parole. On July 26, 2019, a search of Langley’s home revealed a semi-automatic pistol with a loaded magazine hanging on a wall in his living room and two rifles in his bedroom closet. Langley was charged by accusation with one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in violation of OCGA 16-11-131 (b).1 The accusation specified that he had previously been convicted of a forcible felony, murder. Langley pled guilty, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment with the first six months to be served in confinement and the remainder to be served on probation. The State filed a timely notice of appeal directed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court lacked the authority to impose a probated sentence and that the sentence was therefore void. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that trial courts lacked the discretion to probate any portion of a sentence imposed for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals did err, and therefore reversed its judgment. View "Langley v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Frederick Terrell was convicted by jury of felony murder, aggravated assault, and other crimes related to the shooting death of Tashiba Matthews. On appeal, Terrell argued he was entitled to a new trial based on the inordinate delay of his appeal, the State’s improper comment on his right to remain silent, the denial of his motion to sever, the denial of his motion for mistrial, constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, and the prejudicial effect of the combined errors of the trial court and counsel. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded Terrell's aggravated assault conviction should have merged with felony murder for the purposes of sentencing; the Court remanded for the trial court to correct a sentencing error. Otherwise, it affirmed in all other respects. View "Terrell v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Carl Gardei filed a petition for declaratory judgment against R. L. “Butch” Conway, the Sheriff of Gwinnett County, Georgia, and D. Victor Reynolds, the Director of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation (“GBI”), in their individual capacities (collectively “Respondents”), alleging that Respondents’ continued enforcement against him of the statutory requirements governing Georgia’s Sex Offender Registry (the “Registry”) violated his constitutional rights. The trial court dismissed Gardei’s petition on the ground that his claims for relief were time barred under OCGA 9-3-33, the two-year statute of limitation for personal injury claims, because Gardei had initially registered under the Registry Act in 2009 and every year thereafter. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a divided opinion. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Gardei’s petition for certiorari to address whether Gardei’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were subject to the limitation period set forth in OCGA 9-3-33, and whether any applicable statute of limitation was tolled based on the requirement that Gardei annually renew his sex-offender registration. The Supreme Court concluded that although Gardei’s claims were subject to the two-year statute of limitation under OCGA 9-3-33, because he sought only prospective relief, the statute of limitation on those claims had not yet begun to run. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’s judgment holding that Gardei’s claims were time-barred, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Gardei v. Conway, et al." on Justia Law

Emanuel Ellison appealed his convictions for felony murder and other offenses stemming from the 2014 fatal shooting of Kentrealvist Malcom during an argument at an apartment complex. Ellison argued only that the trial court erred in denying his motion for immunity from prosecution under OCGA 16-3-24.2 based on a justification defense. The Georgia Supreme Court found the record supported at least one of the trial court’s two bases for its ruling — an adverse credibility determination — and so judgment was affirmed. View "Ellison v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Devon Jenkins was convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with an August 6, 2014 home invasion in which the victim was shot and killed and two other victims, including a child, were injured. On appeal, Appellant contended: (1) the evidence was legally insufficient to support his conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon; (2) the trial court erred in admitting other-act evidence prohibited by OCGA 24-4-404 (b); and (3) his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to request a limiting instruction on the other-act evidence. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions. View "Jenkins v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Rodney Noel was granted habeas relief from his conviction for murdering nine-month-old Terrell Williams (“Terrell”). The habeas court held that Noel’s appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance for two reasons: (1) counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s denial of Noel’s right to impeach his intimate partner and Terrell’s mother, Crystal Williams (“Williams”), using three prior violent acts by her; and (2) counsel failed to assert Noel’s right to use these acts as proof that Williams, not Noel, killed Terrell. The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed with the habeas court that appellate counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective. The Supreme Court found Noel’s claim regarding alleged impeachment error failed because it was not preserved at trial and so could not have been successfully raised on appeal. "And Noel has not shown that any deficiency of appellate counsel regarding proof of third-party guilt was prejudicial." Judgment was therefore reversed. View "Bowen v. Noel" on Justia Law

Odeirrek Boone pleaded guilty to malice murder and other offenses and appeals the denial of his motion for an out-of-time appeal. Boone, proceeding pro se, briefly referenced his plea counsel’s failure to consult with him regarding his right to appeal, but the bulk of his argument was that plea counsel failed to advise him of his right to withdraw his guilty plea prior to sentencing and, had he been so advised, he would have withdrawn his guilty plea. And in attacking on appeal the court’s denial of the motion for out-of-time appeal, before the Georgia Supreme Court, Boone sought only an opportunity to move to withdraw his guilty plea. The Court found "a belated motion to withdraw his guilty plea is not a remedy to which Boone would be entitled even if the court below had granted his motion for out-of-time appeal." It therefore affirmed the denial of relief. View "Boone v. Georgia" on Justia Law