Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Waseem Daker was found guilty of malice murder and other crimes. Daker had hired or was appointed four attorneys, all of whom were allowed to withdraw before or near the beginning of the trial; he ultimately elected to expressly waive his right to counsel so that he could represent himself. After Daker was convicted, he repeatedly asked for appellate counsel to be appointed to represent him, but those requests were denied, so he had to continue to represent himself. His pro se motion for new trial was denied, and his pro se direct appeal resulted in his convictions being affirmed. In 2017, Daker filed a petition for habeas corpus asserting 438 grounds for relief, all of which the habeas court denied. In his application to the Georgia Supreme Court for a certificate of probable cause to appeal, Daker claimed only that the trial court denied his constitutional right to appellate counsel, and that his requests for a determination of his indigency status for purposes of having counsel appointed were improperly delegated to and denied by the circuit public defender’s office. In 2019, the Supreme Court granted Daker’s application, vacated the habeas court’s order with regard to the two claims that Daker had raised in his application, and remanded for further proceedings. In 2020, the habeas court entered a new final order, summarily concluding Daker's 438 grounds were “without merit.” However, the habeas court concluded that “[t]he record does not show that [Daker] voluntarily waived the right to counsel on appeal as required” and that the trial court erred in ruling that Daker was not indigent for purposes of his post-conviction proceedings. Despite these specific conclusions, the habeas court remanded the case to the trial court to determine if Daker was entitled to appellate counsel, but denied the habeas petition. Warden Marty Allen appealed the habeas court’s order, arguing it was error to remand the case to the trial court and that the Supreme Court should remand the case to the habeas court to determine if Daker was entitled to appellate counsel. In a cross-appeal, Daker argued that the habeas court erred by not granting him a new direct appeal based on the improper denial of his constitutional right to appellate counsel; he asked the Supreme Court to decide that claim without a remand to the habeas court. The Supreme Court found the habeas court correctly concluded Daker did not validly waive his right to appellate counsel. The habeas court’s order was reversed to the extent that it summarily and inconsistently said Daker’s right-to-counsel claim was meritless or needed to be remanded to the trial court, then purported to deny the habeas petition as a whole. The case was remanded to the habeas court with direction to grant relief to Daker in the form of a second, out-of-time direct appeal so that he could start the post-conviction process anew in the trial court. View "Allen v. Daker (and vice versa)" on Justia Law

Lernard Bonner appealed his conviction for felony murder in connection with the shooting death of Lekeshia Moses. On appeal, Bonner contended the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on accident. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bonner v. Georgia" on Justia Law

James Stewart was convicted by jury of felony murder and aggravated assault in the shooting death of his girlfriend, Wendy Johnson. Stewart contended on appeal that the trial court committed plain error in giving an improper sequential verdict form to the jury and that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the verdict form. In addition, Stewart contended his sentence for aggravated assault (life without parole) was illegal. The Georgia Supreme Court found that because the crime charged in Count 3, aggravated assault by shooting Johnson with a gun, was the predicate felony for the charge of felony murder in Count 2, the aggravated assault conviction merged with the felony murder conviction for sentencing purposes. The trial court therefore erred in sentencing Stewart on Count 3, and the judgment was vacated in part to correct the merger error. View "Stewart v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Rubin Harvey, while driving a dump truck in the course of his employment with Oxford Construction Company, collided with a tractor driven by Johnny Williams, causing severe injuries to Williams. After Oxford conceded liability, a jury returned a general verdict for $18 million. Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, although defendants did not make a contemporaneous objection, Williams’s counsel made an improper and prejudicial statement in closing argument that clearly violated the trial court’s order granting the defendants’ motion in limine. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Williams’s petition for certiorari to address whether a party must object to argument of counsel that allegedly violates a granted motion in limine in order to preserve the issue for appeal. The Supreme Court answered in the affirmative and reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Williams v. Harvey et al." on Justia Law

Appellant Alpherd Jones was convicted of felony murder in connection with the beating death of his girlfriend, LaShanda January. On appeal, he contended the evidence presented at his trial was insufficient to support his conviction and that the trial court erred by admitting evidence of January’s diary entries under OCGA 24-8-807 and by admitting other-act evidence under OCGA 24-4-404 (b). Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Jones v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Sergio Moon was tried by jury and convicted of felony murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Linda Flint, the great-grandmother of his children. Moon argued on appeal: (1) the trial court erred when it denied his request to charge the jury on involuntary manslaughter; (2) the evidence presented at trial did not show that Moon’s felonious conduct was “inherently dangerous,” and as a result, his felonious conduct could not serve as a predicate for felony murder; (3) the prosecutor made an improper argument at closing; and (4) the evidence was insufficient to support his felony murder conviction. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed. View "Moon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Tyler Thomas was convicted of malice murder and a firearm crime in connection with the fatal shooting of Ashley Brown during a planned drug deal. The trial court granted Thomas’s motion for new trial, ruling that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by failing to disclose a deal between the State and its witness Jaleesa Glenn. On appeal, the State argued the order granting a new trial should have been reversed, while Thomas argued in his cross-appeal that the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to support the jury’s guilty verdicts, so a re-trial should have been barred by double jeopardy. After review, the Georgia Supreme Court rejected the arguments in both cases and affirmed the trial court’s grant of a new trial. View "Georgia v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Andrew Bell challenged the denial of his application for mandamus and injunctive relief in which he sought to compel Secretary of State Brad Raffensperger to include Bell’s name as an independent candidate on the ballot for the November 3, 2020 election for Georgia House District 85. Among other things, Bell claimed that he collected the signatures required for him to qualify as a candidate, and that the trial court erred by not requiring the Secretary to place Bell’s name on the ballot. Because the November 3, 2020 general election is over and the ballots have been printed, cast, and counted, however, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded there was no such ballot upon which Bell could still be placed, thus the Court could not grant Bell the relief he requested. This appeal was dismissed as moot. View "Bell v. Raffensperger" on Justia Law

Carly Walden was charged with malice murder and other crimes for the April 2019, shooting death of her mother, Andrea Walker, at Walker’s home. Walden called police and reported a shooting; she claimed an unidentified man was responsible. Walden was taken to the county sheriff’s office, where she made statements to an investigator before being provided Miranda warnings. On Walden’s motion, the trial court suppressed those statements, while declining to suppress others that she had made earlier in the day. The State appealed the trial court’s ruling in advance of trial. Though the trial court record did not reflect explicit findings were made, the Georgia Supreme Court presumed the trial court implicitly made all the findings in support of its ruling that the record would allow on a motion that did not require such findings. The Supreme Court concluded the record in this case did not allow findings that would be necessary to conclude Walden was in custody when she made the statements at issue, so it reversed the trial court’s suppression of Walden’s statements. View "Georgia v. Walden" on Justia Law

Appellant Charles Outlaw was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Angela Rabotte. On appeal, he argued the trial court erred by denying his motions to suppress evidence derived from his cell phone records and statements that he made during a meeting in jail with his girlfriend. Further, he argued his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter. Finding no merit to these claims, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Outlaw v. Georgia" on Justia Law