Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Joseph Donnell Starks was convicted of felony murder and other crimes following a vehicular collision that resulted in the death of Kristin Dyer and serious injury to Joshua Cash. The incident occurred on December 14, 2016, and Starks was indicted on multiple charges, including felony murder, homicide by vehicle, serious injury by vehicle, and driving under the influence. During the trial, the court directed a verdict for Starks on one count, and the jury found him guilty on the remaining counts. Starks was sentenced to life in prison for felony murder and received concurrent sentences for other charges.Starks filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. His subsequent appeals were dismissed as untimely. However, a habeas court later granted his petition to pursue a direct appeal. Starks argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to present medical evidence that could support a defense theory that he was unconscious due to a medical condition rather than intoxication.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that Starks's trial counsel made a strategic decision to focus on evidence of intoxication rather than a medical condition, which was not objectively unreasonable. The court held that Starks failed to show that his counsel's performance was deficient or that it prejudiced his defense. Therefore, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected.The State raised two sentencing issues on appeal, arguing that the trial court improperly merged the homicide by vehicle convictions and that sentences for other offenses should not have been served concurrently with the felony murder sentence. The Supreme Court of Georgia found that the trial court properly merged the homicide by vehicle convictions under the rule that only one conviction and sentence may be imposed for the killing of a single victim. Additionally, the court held that the trial court had discretion to run sentences concurrently with the felony murder sentence. The judgment was affirmed. View "STARKS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

William C. Pounds III was convicted of malice murder and other crimes related to the shooting death of Kendra Jackson. The incident occurred on June 12, 2015, and Pounds was indicted later that year. During the trial, evidence showed that Pounds had a tumultuous relationship with Jackson and was also engaged to another woman, Vicinda Crawford. On the day of the incident, Pounds called 9-1-1, claiming Jackson had committed suicide. However, conflicting accounts from Pounds and expert testimony suggested otherwise, leading to his conviction.Initially, the trial court sentenced Pounds to life in prison without parole for malice murder, merging the aggravated assault count and vacating the felony murder count by law. Pounds filed an untimely motion for a new trial, which was denied. The trial court later granted an out-of-time appeal, but the appeal was dismissed because the motion for a new trial was still pending. After further proceedings, the trial court denied the motion for a new trial on the merits, allowing the appeal to proceed.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the conviction. The court found that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the conviction for malice murder. The court also addressed several claims by Pounds, including alleged evidentiary errors and ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that any errors in admitting certain testimonies were harmless and did not affect the verdict. Additionally, the court found that Pounds's trial counsel did not perform deficiently by not objecting to a juror who knew Jackson's stepmother, as the juror affirmed her ability to remain impartial.Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's judgment, finding no reversible error in the proceedings. View "POUNDS v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

The Georgia Association of Club Executives (GACE), representing adult entertainment clubs, challenged the constitutionality of a 1% tax on gross revenue imposed on adult entertainment establishments that offer nude dancing and serve alcohol. The tax was intended to fund the Safe Harbor for Sexually Exploited Children Fund, aimed at helping child victims of sexual exploitation. GACE argued that the tax was a content-based regulation of speech, failing both strict and intermediate scrutiny, and that the definition of "adult entertainment establishments" was overbroad.The trial court upheld the tax, applying intermediate scrutiny and finding that the tax was content-neutral, aimed at addressing the secondary effects of adult entertainment establishments, such as prostitution and child exploitation. The court concluded that the tax furthered an important governmental interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that interest without unnecessarily burdening protected expression. GACE appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that the tax was content-neutral and satisfied intermediate scrutiny. It found that the tax was aimed at addressing the negative secondary effects associated with adult entertainment establishments, rather than suppressing the content of the expression. The court also concluded that the tax was narrowly tailored to serve the government's interest in combating child exploitation and that the burden on speech was minimal. Additionally, the court rejected GACE's overbreadth challenge, finding that the definition of "adult entertainment establishments" was not substantially overbroad relative to the statute's legitimate sweep. View "Georgia Association of Club Executives, Inc. v. State" on Justia Law

Bryan Miller was convicted by a jury of the malice murder of his wife, Gracie Miller, and the aggravated assault of her niece, Shamone Morris, after shooting them multiple times. The crimes occurred on May 18, 2021, and Miller was indicted on several counts, including malice murder and aggravated assault. He was sentenced to life without parole for the malice murder and an additional 30 years for other charges. Miller filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by the trial court.Miller appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of two prior incidents involving his wife under OCGA § 24-4-404 (b). He claimed that the evidence was irrelevant due to his self-defense claim, that a plea of nolo contendere was insufficient to prove his involvement in one incident, and that the court failed to rule on the admissibility of the other acts concerning the assault on Morris.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's decision. The court found that the prior incidents were relevant to show motive and the nature of the relationship between Miller and Gracie, which was pertinent to countering Miller's self-defense claim. The court also determined that the probative value of the evidence was not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Additionally, the court held that there was sufficient proof for a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that Miller committed the prior acts. The court also concluded that any error in admitting the evidence concerning the assault on Morris did not affect Miller's substantial rights, given the strong evidence against him and the limiting instructions provided to the jury. View "Miller v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant A. Thomas Jones challenged the City of Atlanta's imposition of charges through two ordinances, arguing that these charges, levied on the Department of Watershed Management (DWM) customers, are unlawful taxes. The ordinances in question impose a franchise fee on DWM's gross revenue and a payment in lieu of taxes (PILOT) on DWM's real property, with the collected sums deposited into the City's General Fund. Jones contended that these charges exceed the costs they purportedly cover and are instead used to generate general revenue, violating various constitutional and statutory provisions.The trial court initially dismissed Jones's suit on procedural grounds, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision in part. Upon remand, the City moved for judgment on the pleadings, and Jones filed motions for partial summary judgment. The trial court granted the City's motion and denied Jones's motions, leading to this appeal. Jones argued that the trial court erred in its application of the standard of review and in its conclusions regarding the nature of the charges.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found that the trial court erred in granting the City's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Supreme Court held that the trial court failed to treat Jones's allegations as true, particularly his claims that he paid the disputed charges, that the revenue generated from these charges grossly exceeded the associated costs, and that these costs were covered by other transfers from DWM to the City's General Fund. Consequently, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court's judgment on the pleadings and remanded the case for further proceedings.However, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Jones's motions for partial summary judgment. The Court concluded that Jones failed to demonstrate the absence of genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the charges were taxes or fees and whether the revenue generated exceeded the associated costs. The case was remanded for reconsideration of Jones's claims under the proper standard of review. View "Jones v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law

The appellants, including Congresswoman Nikema Williams, were arrested and charged under OCGA § 16-11-34.1 for allegedly disrupting official business of the Georgia General Assembly. They sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the statute is overbroad and vague, violating free speech protections under the Georgia Constitution. The appellants limited their challenges to subsections (a), (f), and (g) of the statute, which criminalize acts likely to disrupt legislative sessions or meetings, entering certain areas with intent to disrupt, and parading or demonstrating with intent to disrupt.The trial court dismissed the appellants' facial challenges and one appellant's as-applied challenge, and denied their motion for a permanent injunction. The court found the statute not facially overbroad or vague and ruled that the allegations did not support the as-applied challenge.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The court held that OCGA § 16-11-34.1 is not facially overbroad or vague. It distinguished this case from State v. Fielden, noting that the statute in question is more narrowly tailored to legislative contexts and does not substantially infringe on protected speech. The court also found that the statute provides sufficient clarity to avoid arbitrary enforcement.Regarding the as-applied challenge by State Representative Park Cannon, the court concluded that her conduct, as alleged, did not fall under the prohibited acts of the statute. Therefore, her as-applied challenge failed. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the facial and as-applied challenges and the denial of the motion for a permanent injunction. View "Williams v. Powell" on Justia Law

Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC leased land from Whitaker Farms, LLC for a peach orchard. After being locked out of the leased premises, Fitzgerald Farms sued Whitaker Farms for damages. A jury awarded compensatory damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part but reversed the trial court’s ruling that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages. On remand, a second jury awarded punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that statements made during a settlement negotiation by Whitaker Farms’s Chief Operating Officer to Fitzgerald Farms’s owner were properly admitted under OCGA § 24-4-408.The trial court initially ruled that Fitzgerald Farms could not seek punitive damages, but the Court of Appeals reversed this decision. On remand, the trial court conducted a second jury trial focused on punitive damages, where the jury awarded $500,000 in punitive damages to Fitzgerald Farms. Whitaker Farms appealed again, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements made during a settlement negotiation. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, stating that the statements were admissible to show Whitaker’s intent and state of mind.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and vacated the Court of Appeals’s judgment. The Supreme Court determined that the statements made during the settlement negotiation were inadmissible under OCGA § 24-4-408. The Court concluded that the statements were offered to prove Whitaker Farms’s liability for punitive damages, which is not permissible under the statute. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine whether the admission of the statements was harmful and if a new trial on punitive damages is required. View "Whitaker Farms, LLC v. Fitzgerald Fruit Farms, LLC" on Justia Law

An attorney, Brian Steel, was found in contempt of court for refusing to disclose how he learned about an ex parte hearing involving a witness, the witness's counsel, and prosecutors in a case where Steel represented a defendant. The trial judge, Judge Glanville, repeatedly asked Steel to reveal his source, but Steel claimed the information was protected by attorney-client privilege and attorney work product. Judge Glanville held Steel in contempt and ordered him into custody, although Steel was later allowed to return to the courtroom.The Fulton County Superior Court initially found Steel in contempt and ordered him to be taken into custody. Steel argued that the information was privileged and that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. Despite these arguments, Judge Glanville sentenced Steel to 20 days in jail to be served on weekends and denied him a supersedeas bond.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and determined that due process required Judge Glanville to recuse himself from the contempt proceedings. The court held that because the punishment was delayed and the alleged disobedience was directed toward the judge, a different judge should have presided over the contempt hearing. The court reversed the judgment of contempt imposed by the trial court. View "STEEL v. THE STATE" on Justia Law

Jarrod Miller, a resident of Athens-Clarke County, filed a complaint against Deborah Gonzalez, the District Attorney for the Western Judicial Circuit, alleging violations of the Open Records Act (ORA). Miller claimed that Gonzalez, in her official capacity as district attorney and custodian of public records, failed to produce requested public records related to the district attorney’s office. Gonzalez argued that neither she nor her office is subject to the ORA because district attorneys are constitutional officers of the judicial branch. She also contended that Miller lacked standing to bring the enforcement action and that prosecutorial immunity barred the suit.The Superior Court of Clarke County denied Gonzalez’s motion to dismiss Miller’s complaint. The court rejected Gonzalez’s argument that district attorneys are judicial officers exempt from the ORA, concluding that district attorneys perform executive functions. The court also found that Miller had standing to bring the enforcement action and that prosecutorial immunity did not bar Miller’s claims. Gonzalez then sought an interlocutory appeal, which was granted.The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that the ORA applies to district attorneys’ offices, as they are considered “offices” under the statute. The court also determined that district attorneys exercise executive power, not judicial power, and thus are subject to the ORA. Additionally, the court found that Miller had standing to sue because he directed his attorney to make the records requests on his behalf. The court further held that prosecutorial immunity does not bar official-capacity claims under the ORA, as the statute waives sovereign immunity for such claims. The court did not address the merits of Miller’s individual-capacity claims against Gonzalez. View "GONZALEZ v. MILLER" on Justia Law

Prentice Baker and Verlaine Laguerre were convicted of malice murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony for the shooting death of Matthew Hardeman. The evidence showed that Hardeman and Laguerre had a fistfight earlier in the day, which Hardeman won. Later, Laguerre returned with Baker and others to Hardeman’s neighborhood, where they encountered Hardeman and shot him multiple times, resulting in his death.A Fulton County grand jury indicted Baker and Laguerre on multiple counts, including malice murder and firearm possession. Their first trial ended in a mistrial, but a second joint trial in April 2018 resulted in guilty verdicts on all counts. Both defendants were sentenced to life in prison for malice murder and an additional five years for firearm possession. Their motions for a new trial were denied by the trial court in March 2022, leading to their appeals.The Supreme Court of Georgia reviewed the case and found no plain error in the trial court’s failure to instruct the jury on accomplice corroboration, as the evidence did not clearly indicate that Ellis was an accomplice. The court also found sufficient evidence to support Baker’s convictions, including Ellis’s identification of Baker as one of the shooters. Laguerre’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was rejected because his counsel’s decision not to object to certain testimony was deemed a reasonable strategic choice. Finally, the court dismissed Laguerre’s claim of cumulative error due to the lack of any established errors. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the convictions and sentences of both Baker and Laguerre. View "BAKER v. THE STATE" on Justia Law