Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Mims Michael Morris, Sr. (“Mims”), Mims Michael Morris, Jr. (“Michael”), and Roy Bradshaw (“Roy”) were convicted by jury of malice murder, felony murder, aggravated assault, and robbery in the fatal beating of Earl Gill. In Case No. S21A0191, Mims appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions. In Case No. S21A0192, Michael appealed, also challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, and contending that the trial court committed plain error in failing to instruct the jury not to consider Roy’s statement against him and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed in both cases. View "Morris v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Robert McDaniel appeals pro se from the trial court’s denial of his motion for out-of-time appeal, his general demurrer, and his motion in arrest of judgment. In 2014, a grand jury indicted McDaniel for malice murder (Count 1); felony murder (Count 2); possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense of murder (Count 3); aggravated assault, family violence (Count 4); possession of a firearm during the commission of aggravated assault (Count 5); and aggravated stalking (Count 6) in connection with the shooting death of Maria Nunez-McDaniel. The grand jury also indicted McDaniel for aggravated assault (Count 7) and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count 8) in connection with an assault on Julia Olmos. On November 4, 2014, McDaniel entered a negotiated guilty plea to malice murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of the offense of murder, and aggravated stalking, as well as to the aggravated assault against Olmos. As part of the plea, Counts 2, 5, and 8 were nolle prossed, and Count 4 was merged with the malice murder count. McDaniel was sentenced to serve life with the possibility of parole for malice murder, a probated five-year consecutive sentence on Count 3, and two ten-year concurrent sentences on Counts 6 and 7. The Georgia Supreme Court determined that because the trial court did not err by concluding that McDaniel failed to show that his appeal of right was lost as a result of his counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance, it also did not abuse its discretion in denying McDaniel’s motion for out-of- time appeal. The Court also determined McDaniel's motion in arrest of judgment was untimely, and and “the trial court was without jurisdiction to rule on [it].” View "McDaniel v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Eric Brandon was convicted of malice murder in connection with the killing of his stepson, Alexander Koser. The evidence showed that Koser was shot several times at close range. On appeal, Brandon argued only that the trial court erred in prohibiting him from asking the jury venire whether anyone believed that a person who had been arrested must be guilty of a criminal offense. But Brandon did not object to the trial court’s sua sponte ruling that he appealed to the Georgia Supreme Court. The Court determined this failure to object foreclosed his claim. View "Brandon v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Michael Pindling was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of Robert Pett. On appeal, Pindling argued the trial court plainly erred when instructing the jury that a single witness’s testimony was sufficient to prove a fact without also instructing the jury on the requirement that an accomplice’s testimony must be corroborated. To this, the Georgia Supreme Court concurred and reversed judgment. View "Pindling v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Corey Green was convicted by jury of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the armed robbery and shooting death of Christopher Peek. On appeal, he claimed he was improperly sentenced as a recidivist, and that he received ineffective assistance of counsel when counsel advised him not to testify at trial. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Green's convictions. View "Green v. Georgia" on Justia Law

At a 2014 jury trial, John “Shug” Johnson was found guilty of malice murder and other offenses in connection with the shooting death of Brandon Scott. Johnson’s motion for new trial was granted on the basis of plain error in the jury instructions, and the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed that order. Upon return of the case to the trial court, Johnson filed a plea in bar, asserting that the evidence presented in the original trial was insufficient to support his conviction. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not err in denying his plea in bar, though on different grounds. The Court nonetheless affirmed the trial court's denying Johnson's plea in bar. View "Johnson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Zemartae Davis was convicted of felony murder and possession of a knife during the commission of a crime in connection with the stabbing death of Dontravious Hoskins. On appeal, Davis contended the trial court erred when it admitted the prior testimony of an absent witness, and that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to the admission of that testimony. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Davis’s convictions. View "Davis v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Appellant Chanze McGarity was convicted of malice murder and other crimes in connection with the 2013 shooting death of James Hendon. On appeal, Appellant contended the trial court erred by: (1) limiting Appellant’s cross-examination of certain witnesses concerning their prior convictions; (2) allowing a law enforcement officer to offer testimony regarding certain witnesses’ prior consistent statements; and (3) permitting a witness to testify after refreshing her recollection with a document that was not provided to the defense before trial. After review of the trial court record, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that while the trial court improperly admitted the prior consistent statements of three witnesses, such error required reversal of Appellant’s convictions on only two counts. View "McGarity v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jermontae Moss was convicted of felony murder, possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime, and theft by receiving stolen property in connection with the 2011 shooting death of Jose Marin. At the time of the crime, Moss was 17 years old and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. On appeal, he contended he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that the court erred in imposing that sentence. Finding no merit to either contention, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Moss' conviction and sentence. View "Moss v. Georgia" on Justia Law

In 2017, a grand jury indicted Ryan Duke for malice murder and related offenses in connection with the October 2005 death of Tara Grinstead. For approximately 17 months, Duke was represented by a public defender from the Tifton Judicial Circuit’s Public Defender’s Office. Then, in August 2018, Duke’s public defender withdrew from representation and John Merchant and Ashleigh Merchant filed an entry of appearance, indicating that they were representing Duke pro bono. The Georgia Supreme Court granted interlocutory review in this case to determine whether the trial court erred in determining whether Duke had neither a statutory right under the Indigent Defense Act of 2003, nor a constitutional right to state-funded experts and investigators needed to prepare a defense, notwithstanding private counsel as his representation. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, the Supreme Court found the IDA allowed an indigent defendant to obtain such ancillary defense services through a contract between pro bono counsel and either the Georgia Public Defender Council (“GPDC”) or the appropriate circuit public defender. Consequently, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Duke v. Georgia" on Justia Law