Justia Georgia Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Annette Collins Flood was convicted of felony murder and a knife offense in connection with the stabbing death of Bobby Burns, her longtime boyfriend. Appellant contended on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support her conviction for felony murder. She also raised three separate enumerations of error regarding the jury instructions provided at her trial, contending these instructional errors combined to prejudice her. Finally, Appellant contended the State improperly placed her character at issue during closing argument. Appellant sought a new trial, but the Georgia Supreme Court found no reversible error and affirmed her convictions. View "Flood v. Georgia" on Justia Law

For a brief time period, OCGA 9-3-33.1 allowed time-barred civil claims for childhood sexual abuse to be revived. During that time period, Joy Caroline Harvey Merchan sued her parents, Walter Jackson Harvey, Jr., and Carole Allyn Hill Harvey, under the revival provision of the statute for damages resulting from alleged childhood sexual abuse that occurred decades prior to the filing of the action, principally in Quebec, Canada. The Harveys moved dismiss and for summary judgment, arguing that Merchan’s claims were time-barred and could not be revived. Alternatively, the Harveys argued the revival provision of the Act violated Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions. The trial court largely denied the Harveys’ motions, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted interlocutory review to decide: (1) whether Georgia or Quebec law applied to Merchan’s claims; (2) whether OCGA 9-3-33.1 could revive a cause of action for acts that did not occur in Georgia; and (3) whether Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws and the due process and equal protection clauses of the federal and state constitutions would bar Merchan’s pursuit of such a cause of action against her parents. The Georgia Supreme Court concluded: (1) Georgia substantive law applied to those torts committed in state, while Quebec substantive law applied to the torts committed there; (2) Georgia’s limitations period applied to torts committed in state, but for torts committed in Quebec, the trial court had to determine in the first instance which limitations period was shorter, and the shorter period would control. Merchan could pursue a cause of action for acts that occurred in Quebec as well as Georgia, because OCGA 9-3-33.1’s definition of childhood sexual abuse was broad enough to cover acts that occurred outside of Georgia. "And such a result does not violate Georgia’s constitutional ban on retroactive laws or the Harveys’ due process or equal protection rights. Therefore, we affirm the trial court’s judgment in part, vacate it in part, and remand the case for the trial court to compare the respective limitations periods." View "Harvey et al. v. Merchan" on Justia Law

The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the Court of Appeals properly identified the accrual date of the legal malpractice claim in this case. The court determined that the accrual date for the malpractice action based on failure to protect an underinsured motorist (“UM”) claim was the date on which the plaintiff’s attorney first became aware that the plaintiff potentially had a UM claim with available coverage. Under the facts of this case, the Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the accrual date was the last day counsel could protect the client’s UM claim by lawfully effecting service on the UM carrier. View "Armstrong et al. v. Cuffie et al." on Justia Law

Timothy Wilson, Jr. was convicted by jury of child molestation, statutory rape, and two counts of incest involving his 13-year-old stepdaughter, B. O., and the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction. Wilson petitioned the Georgia Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, which was granted to consider “[w]hether the trial court erred in concluding that evidence of alleged prior offenses of child molestation was admissible under OCGA 24-4-414.” The Court determined the Court of Appeals' analysis of the trial court's decision to admit Wilson's prior offenses of child molestation was flawed, but concluded the judgment was correct. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Wilson v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Jereno Kinslow's felony conviction for computer trespass was premised on evidence that Kinslow altered his employer’s computer network settings so that e-mail messages meant for Kinslow’s boss would also be copied and forwarded to Kinslow’s personal e-mail account. The Court of Appeals affirmed Kinslow’s conviction, and the Georgia Supreme Court granted Kinslow’s petition for certiorari, posing the question of whether Kinslow’s conduct constituted a violation of OCGA 16-9-93 (b)(2). The Court found that although the statute in general was extremely broad, the portion of (b)(2) on which the State exclusively relied did not reach Kinslow’s conduct. Accordingly, the Supreme Court concluded the evidence presented at Kinslow’s trial was insufficient to support his conviction under Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), and thus reversed. View "Kinslow v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Manuel Hernandez was shot and seriously injured by unknown assailants as he approached the doorway to his apartment. Hernandez filed suit against the owner of the apartment complex, Terraces at Brookhaven, and the operator of the complex, Star Residential, LLC (collectively “Star Residential”), asserting, among other things, a nuisance claim under the Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act (the “Gang Act”). Hernandez claimed that he was entitled to treble damages (i.e., three times the actual damages he sustained in the shooting) and punitive damages under OCGA 16-15-7(c) because his injuries occurred as a result of a criminal street gang creating a public nuisance on Star Residential’s property. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of Star Residential's motion to dismiss, holding, in relevant part, that whether to hold a property owner liable under OCGA 16-15-7(c) of the Gang Act for maintaining a public nuisance was always a question for the factfinder to decide, and not for the court. The Georgia Supreme Court granted Star Residential’s petition for a writ of certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals properly construed the civil liability provision of OCGA 16-15-7(c). After review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the statute was incorrect: "there is nothing in the language of subsection (c) to indicate that the General Assembly intended for a jury to usurp the judiciary’s role of determining the meaning of the statute at issue. ... This means only that, once a legally appropriate cause of action is submitted to the factfinder for decision, that factfinder must be instructed on the legislative intent codified in OCGA 16-15-2 in order to determine if the circumstances of the case warrant the imposition of liability under OCGA 16-15-7(c). The statute simply does not say that a factfinder must determine the meaning of subsection (c) in the first instance, which is a role reserved for the courts." View "Star Residential, LLC et al. v. Hernandez" on Justia Law

Michael and Katherine Gatto filed suit against the City of Statesboro and City Clerk Sue Starling, alleging negligence and maintenance of a nuisance, after their son, Michael, died following an altercation at a bar in the University Plaza area of the City. The trial court granted summary judgment to both defendants, based in part on sovereign immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed as to the City, solely on the ground of sovereign immunity. The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to address municipal immunity in the context of a nuisance claim. The Court held that the Citywasis immune from liability for the conduct alleged here, because municipalities never faced liability for a nuisance claim based on alleged conduct related to property they neither owned nor controlled, and "nothing in our Constitution alters that principle." Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "Gatto et al. v. City of Statesboro et al." on Justia Law

This case presented the question of whether defendants in criminal cases could have their cases dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because verdicts were rendered or sentences imposed on less than all counts of an indictment or accusation, or one or more counts were “dead- docketed.” The Georgia Supreme Court concluded it did: dead-docketing, while a common and longstanding practice in Georgia courts, had almost no statutory authority and none that would allow different treatment here. "And precedent from our Court of Appeals has for decades made clear that when a count is dead-docketed, the case remains pending in the trial court." Such a case cannot be appealed as a final judgment under OCGA 5-6-34 (a) (1); instead, it required a certificate of immediate review, which Demarquis Seals did not seek. The Supreme Court therefore affirmed the Court of Appeals’ dismissal of his appeal. View "Seals v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Charles Tyler was convicted by jury of felony murder, armed robbery, and other crimes in connection with the shooting death of David Fulkrod and theft of copper from a recycling facility. On appeal, Tyler challenged the sufficiency of the evidence as to all of his convictions. Because the evidence was sufficient to support each conviction, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed his convictions. View "Tyler v. Georgia" on Justia Law

Rodney Renia Young was convicted by jury for the murder of Gary Jones and related crimes. The jury declined in its guilt/innocence phase verdict to find him “mentally retarded.” At the conclusion of the sentencing phase, the jury found multiple statutory aggravating circumstances and sentenced Young to death for the murder. Finding no reversible error, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed Young’s convictions. View "Young v. Georgia" on Justia Law